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The Human Ego His Freedom and Immortality
-THE Quran in its simple, forceful
manner emphasizes the individuality and uniqueness of man, and has,
I think, a definite view of his destiny as a unity of life.1 It
is in consequence of this view of man as a unique individuality
which makes it impossible for one individual to bear the burden
of another,2 and entitles him only to what is due to his own personal
effort,3 that the Quran is led to reject the idea of redemption.
Three things are perfectly clear from the Qur«n:
(i) That man is the chosen of God:
Afterwards his Lord chose him [Adam] for himself
and turned towards, him, and guided him, .
(ii) That man, with all his faults, is meant to be
the representative of God on earth:
When thy Lord said to the angels, "Verily
I am about to place one in my stead on Earth", they said, Wilt
Thou place there one who will do ill therein and shed blood, when
we celebrate Thy praise and extol Thy holiness? God said,
"Verily I know what you know not".
And it is He Who hath made you His representatives
on the Earth, and hath raised some of you above others by various
grades, that He may prove you by His gifts.
(iii) That man is the trustee of a free personality
which he accepted at his peril:
Verily We proposed to the Heavens, and to the
Earth, and to the mountains to receive the "trust", but
they refused the burden and they feared to receive it. Man undertook
to bear it, but hath proved unjust, senseless!.
Yet it is surprising to see that the unity of human
consciousness which constitutes the centre of human personality
never really became a point of interest in the history of Muslim
thought. The Mutakallimën regarded the soul as a finer kind
of matter or a mere accident which dies with the body and is re-created
on the Day of Judgement. The philosophers of Islam received inspiration
from Greek thought. In the case of other schools, it must be remembered
that the expansion of Islam brought within its fold peoples belonging
to different creed-communities, such as Nestorians, Jews, Zoroastrians,
whose intellectual outlook had been formed by the concepts of a
culture which had long dominated the whole of middle and western
Asia. This culture, on the whole Magian in its origin and development,
has a structurally dualistic soul-picture which we find more or
less reflected in the theological thought of Islam.4 Devotional
Sufism alone tried to understand the meaning of the unity of inner
experience which the Qur«n declares to be one of the
three sources of knowledge,5 the other two being History and Nature.
The development of this experience in the religious life of Islam
reached its culmination in the well-known words of Hall«j
- I am the creative truth. The contemporaries of Hall«j,
as well as his successors, interpreted these words pantheistically;
but the fragments of Hall«j, collected and published by the
French Orientalist, L. Massignon, leave no doubt that the martyr-saint
could not have meant to deny the transcendence of God.6 The true
interpretation of his experience, therefore, is not the drop slipping
into the sea, but the realization and bold affirmation in an undying
phrase of the reality and permanence of the human ego in a profounder
personality. The phrase of Hall«j seems almost a challenge
flung against the Mutakallimën. The difficulty of modern students
of religion, however, is that this type of experience, though perhaps
perfectly normal in its beginnings, points, in its maturity, to
unknown levels of consciousness. Ibn Khaldën, long ago, felt
the necessity of an effective scientific method to investigate these
levels.7 Modern psychology has only recently realized the necessity
of such a method, but has not yet been able to go beyond the discovery
of the characteristic features of the mystic levels of consciousness.8
Not being yet in possession of a scientific method to deal with
the type of experience on which such judgements as that of Hall«j
are based, we cannot avail ourselves of its possible capacity as
a knowledge-yielding experience. Nor can the concepts of theological
systems, draped in the terminology of a practically dead metaphysics,
be of any help to those who happen to possess a different intellectual
background. The task before the modern Muslim is, therefore, immense.
He has to rethink the whole system of Islam without completely breaking
with the past. Perhaps the first Muslim who felt the urge of a new
spirit in him was Sh«h WalâAll«h of Delhi. The
man, however, who fully realized the importance and immensity of
the task, and whose deep insight into the inner meaning of the history
of Muslim thought and life, combined with a broad vision engendered
by his wide experience of men and manners, would have made him a
living link between the past and the future, was Jam«luddân
Afgh«nâ. If his indefatigable but divided energy could
have devoted itself entirely to Islam as a system of human belief
and conduct, the world of Islam, intellectually speaking, would
have been on a much more solid ground today. The only course open
to us is to approach modern knowledge with a respectful but independent
attitude and to appreciate the teachings of Islam in the light of
that knowledge, even though we may be led to differ from those who
have gone before us. This I propose to do in regard to the subject
of the present lecture.
In the history of modern thought it is Bradley who
furnishes the best evidence for the impossibility of denying reality
to the ego. In his Ethical Studies9 he assumes the reality of the
self; in his Logic0 he takes it only as a working hypothesis. It
is in his Appearance and Reality that he subjects the ego to a searching
examination.11 Indeed, his two chapters on the meaning and reality
of the self may be regarded as a kind of modern Upanishad on the
unreality of the Jâv«tm«. According to him, the
test of reality is freedom from contradiction and since his criticism
discovers the finite centre of experience to be infected with irreconcilable
oppositions of change and permanence, unity and diversity, the ego
is a mere illusion. Whatever may be our view of the self - feeling,
self-identity, soul, will - it can be examined only by the canons
of thought which in its nature is relational, and all relations
involve contradictions. Yet, in spite of the fact that his
ruthless logic has shown the ego to be a mass of confusion, Bradley
has to admit that the self must be in some sense real,
in some sense an indubitable fact We may easily grant
that the ego, in its finitude, is imperfect as a unity of life.
Indeed, its nature is wholly aspiration after a unity more inclusive,
more effective, more balanced, and unique. Who knows how many different
kinds of environment it needs for its organization as a perfect
unity? At the present stage of its organization it is unable to
maintain the continuity of its tension without constant relaxation
of sleep. An insignificant stimulus may sometimes disrupt its unity
and nullify it as a controlling energy. Yet, however thought may
dissect and analyse, our feeling of egohood is ultimate and is powerful
enough to extract from Professor Bradley the reluctant admission
of its reality.
The finite centre of experience, therefore, is real,
even though its reality is too profound to be intellectualized.
What then is the characteristic feature of the ego? The ego reveals
itself as a unity of what we call mental states. Mental states do
not exist in mutual isolation. They mean and involve one another.
They exist as phases of a complex whole, called mind. The organic
unity, however, of these interrelated states or, let us say, events
is a special kind of unity. It fundamentally differs from the unity
of a material thing; for the parts of a material thing can exist
in mutual isolation. Mental unity is absolutely unique. We cannot
say that one of my beliefs is situated on the right or left of my
other belief. Nor is it possible to say that my appreciation of
the beauty of the T«j varies with my distance from ÿgra.
My thought of space is not spatially related to space. Indeed, the
ego can think of more than one space-order. The space of waking
consciousness and dream-space have no mutual relation. They do not
interfere with or overlap each other. For the body there can be
but a single space. The ego, therefore, is not space-bound in the
sense in which the body is space-bound. Again, mental and physical
events are both in time, but the time-span of the ego is fundamentally
different to the time-span of the physical event. The duration of
the physical event is stretched out in space as a present fact;
the egos duration is concentrated within it and linked with
its present and future in a unique manner. The formation of a physical
event discloses certain present marks which show that it has passed
through a time-duration; but these marks are merely emblematic of
its time duration; not time-duration itself. True timeduration
belongs to the ego alone.
Another important characteristic of the unity of
the ego is its essential privacy which reveals the uniqueness of
every ego. In order to reach a certain conclusion all the premisses
of a syllogism must be believed in by one and the same mind. If
I believe in the proposition all men are mortal, and
another mind believes in the proposition Socrates is a man,
no inference is possible. It is possible only if both the propositions
are believed in by me. Again, my desire for a certain thing is essentially
mine. Its satisfaction means my private enjoyment. If all mankind
happen to desire the same thing, the satisfaction of their desire
will not mean the satisfaction of my desire when I do not get the
thing desired. The dentist may sympathize with my toothache, but
cannot experience the feeling of my toothache. My pleasures, pains,
and desires are exclusively mine, forming a part and parcel of my
private ego alone. My feelings, hates and loves, judgements and
resolutions, are exclusively mine. God Himself cannot feel, judge,
and choose for me when more than one course of action are open to
me. Similarly, in order to recognize you, I must have known you
in the past. My recognition of a place or person means reference
to my past experience, and not the past experience of another ego.
It is this unique interrelation of our mental states that we express
by the word I, and it is here that the great problem
of psychology begins to appear. What is the nature of this I?
continued..
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