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The Human Ego His Freedom and Immortality
-To the Muslim school of theology of which
Ghazz«lâ is the chief exponent, the ego is a simple,
indivisible, and immutable soul-substance, entirely different from
the group of our mental states and unaffected by the passage of
time. Our conscious experience is a unity, because our mental states
are related as so many qualities to this simple substance which
persists unchanged during the flux of its qualities. My recognition
of you is possible only if I persist unchanged between the original
perception and the present act of memory. The interest of this school,
however, was not so much psychological as metaphysical. But whether
we take the soul-entity as an explanation of the facts of our conscious
experience, or as a basis for immortality, I am afraid it serves
neither psychological nor metaphysical interest. Kants fallacies
of pure reason are well known to the student of modern philosophy.
The I think, which accompanies every thought is, according
to Kant, a purely formal condition of thought, and the transition
from a purely formal condition of thought to ontological substance
is logically illegitimate. Even apart from Kants way of looking
at the subject of experience, the indivisibility of a substance
does not prove its indestructibility; for the indivisible substance,
as Kant himself remarks, may gradually disappear into nothingness
like an intensive quality or cease to exist all of a sudden. Nor
can this static view of substance serve any psychological interest.
In the first place, it is difficult to regard the elements of our
conscious experience as qualities of a soul-substance in the sense
in which, for instance, the weight of a physical body is the quality
of that body. Observation reveals experience to be particular acts
of reference, and as such they possess a specific being of their
own. They constitute, as Laird acutely remarks, a new world
and not merely new features in an old world. Secondly, even
if we regard experiences as qualities, we cannot discover how they
inhere in the soul-substance. Thus we see that our conscious experience
can give us no clue to the ego regarded as a soul-substance; for
by hypothesis the soul-substance does not reveal itself in experience.
And it may further be pointed out that in view of the improbability
of different soul-substances controlling the same body at different
times, the theory can offer no adequate explanation of phenomena
such as alternating personality, formerly explained by the temporary
possession of the body by evil spirits.
Yet the interpretation of our conscious experience
is the only road by which we can reach the ego, if at all. Let us,
therefore, turn to modern psychology and see what light it throws
on the nature of the ego. William James conceives consciousness
as a stream of thought - a conscious flow of changes
with a felt continuity. He finds a kind of gregarious principle
working in our experiences which have, as it were, hooks
on them, and thereby catch up one another in the flow of mental
life. The ego consists of the feelings of personal life, and is,
as such, part of the system of thought. Every pulse of thought,
present or perishing, is an indivisible unity which knows and recollects.
The appropriation of the passing pulse by the present pulse of thought,
and that of the present by its successor, is the ego. This description
of our mental life is extremely ingenious; but not, I venture to
think, true to consciousness as we find it in ourselves. Consciousness
is something single, presupposed in all mental life, and not bits
of consciousness, mutually reporting to one another. This view of
consciousness, far from giving us any clue to the ego, entirely
ignores the relatively permanent element in experience. There is
no continuity of being between the passing thoughts. When one of
these is present, the other has totally disappeared; and how can
the passing thought, which is irrevocably lost, be known and appropriated
by the present thought? I do not mean to say that the ego is over
and above the mutually penetrating multiplicity we call experience.
Inner experience is the ego at work. We appreciate the ego itself
in the act of perceiving, judging, and willing. The life of the
ego is a kind of tension caused by the ego invading the environment
and the environment invading the ego. The ego does not stand outside
this arena of mutual invasion. It is present in it as a directive
energy and is formed and disciplined by its own experience. The
Quran is clear on this directive function of the ego:
And they ask thee of the soul. Say: the soul
proceedeth from my Lords Amr [Command]: but of knowledge,
only a little to you is given.
In order to understand the meaning of the word Amr,
we must remember the distinction which the Quran draws
between Amr and Khalq. Pringle-Pattison deplores that the English
language possesses only one word - creation - to express
the relation of God and the universe of extension on the one hand,
and the relation of God and the human ego on the other. The Arabic
language is, however, more fortunate in this respect. It has two
words: Khalq and Amr to express the two ways in which the creative
activity of God reveals itself to us. Khalq is creation; Amr is
direction. As the Quran says: To Him belong creation
and direction. The verse quoted above means that the essential
nature of the soul is directive, as it proceeds from the directive
energy of God, though we do not know how Divine Amr functions as
ego-unities. The personal pronoun used in the expression Rabbâ
(my Lord) throws further light on the nature and behaviour
of the ego. It is meant to suggest that the soul must be taken as
something individual and specific, with all the variations in the
range, balance, and effectiveness of its unity. Every man
acteth after his own manner: but your Lord well knoweth who is best
guided in his path (17:84). Thus my real personality is not
a thing; it is an act. My experience is only a series of acts, mutually
referring to one another, and held together by the unity of a directive
purpose. My whole reality lies in my directive attitude. You cannot
perceive me like a thing in space, or a set of experiences in temporal
order; you must interpret, understand, and appreciate me in my judgements,
in my will-attitudes, aims, and aspirations.
The next question is: how does the ego emerge within
the spatio-temporal order? The teaching of the Quran
is perfectly clear on this point:
Now of fine clay We have created man: Then
We placed him, a moist germ, in a safe abode; then made We the moist
germ a clot of blood: then made the clotted blood into a piece of
flesh; then made the piece of flesh into bones: and We clothed the
bones with flesh; then brought forth man of yet another make.
Blessed, therefore, be God - the most excellent
of makers.
The yet another make of man develops
on the basis of physical organism - that colony of sub-egos through
which a profounder Ego constantly acts on me, and thus permits me
to build up a systematic unity of experience. Are then the soul
and its organism two things in the sense of Descartes, independent
of each other, though somehow mysteriously united? I am inclined
to think that the hypothesis of matter as an independent existence
is perfectly gratuitous. It can be justified only on the ground
of our sensation of which matter is supposed to be at least a part
cause, other than myself. This something other than myself is supposed
to possess certain qualities, called primary which correspond to
certain sensations in me; and I justify my belief in those qualities
on the ground that the cause must have some resemblance with the
effect. But there need be no resemblance between cause and effect.
If my success in life causes misery to another man, my success and
his misery have no resemblance with each other. Yet everyday experience
and physical science proceed on the assumption of an independent
existence of matter. Let us, therefore, provisionally assume that
body and soul are two mutually independent, yet in some mysterious
way united, things. It was Descartes who first stated the problem,
and I believe his statement and final view of the problem were largely
influenced by the Manichaean inheritance of early Christianity.
However, if they are mutually independent and do not affect each
other, then the changes of both run on exactly parallel lines, owing
to some kind of pre-established harmony, as Leibniz thought. This
reduces the soul to a merely passive spectator of the happenings
of the body. If, on the other hand, we suppose them to affect each
other, then we cannot find any observable facts to show how and
where exactly their interaction takes place, and which of the two
takes the initiative. The soul is an organ of the body which exploits
it for physiological purposes, or the body is an instrument of the
soul, are equally true propositions on the theory of interaction.
Langes theory of emotion tends to show that the body takes
the initiative in the act of interaction. There are, however, facts
to contradict this theory, and it is not possible to detail these
facts here. Suffice it to indicate that even if the body takes the
initiative, the mind does enter as a consenting factor at a definite
stage in the development of emotion, and this is equally true of
other external stimuli which are constantly working on the mind.
Whether an emotion will grow further, or that a stimulus will continue
to work, depends on my attending to it. It is the minds consent
which eventually decides the fate of an emotion or a stimulus.
Thus parallelism and interaction are both unsatisfactory.
Yet mind and body become one in action. When I take up a book from
my table, my act is single and indivisible. It is impossible to
draw a line of cleavage between the share of the body and that of
the mind in this act. Somehow they must belong to the same system,
and according to the Quran they do belong to the same
system.To Him belong Khalq (creation) and Amr (direction),
how is such a thing conceivable? We have seen that the body is not
a thing situated in an absolute void; it is a system of events or
acts. The system of experiences we call soul or ego is also a system
of acts. This does not obliterate the distinction of soul and body;
it only brings them closer to each other. The characteristic of
the ego is spontaneity; the acts composing the body repeat themselves.
The body is accumulated action or habit of the soul; and as such
undetachable from it. It is a permanent element of consciousness
which, in view of this permanent element, appears from the outside
as something stable. What then is matter? A colony of egos of a
low order out of which emerges the ego of a higher order, when their
association and interaction reach a certain degree of coordination.
It is the world reaching the point of self-guidance wherein the
Ultimate Reality, perhaps, reveals its secret, and furnishes a clue
to its ultimate nature. The fact that the higher emerges out of
the lower does not rob the higher of its worth and dignity. It is
not the origin of a thing that matters, it is the capacity, the
significance, and the final reach of the emergent that matter. Even
if we regard the basis of soul-life as purely physical, it by no
means follows that the emergent can be resolved into what has conditioned
its birth and growth. The emergent, as the advocates of the Emergent
Evolution teach us, is an unforeseeable and novel fact on its own
plane of being, and cannot be explained mechanistically. Indeed
the evolution of life shows that, though in the beginning the mental
is dominated by the physical, the mental, as it grows in power,
tends to dominate the physical and may eventually rise to a position
of complete independence. Nor is there such a thing as a purely
physical level in the sense of possessing a materiality, elementally
incapable of evolving the creative synthesis we call life and mind,
and needing a transcendental Deity to impregnate it with the sentient
and the mental. The Ultimate Ego that makes the emergent emerge
is immanent in Nature, and is described by the Quran,
as the First and the Last, the Visible and the Invisible.
continued..
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