INTRODUCTION
Iqbal was a great literary artist. Although it must be admitted that with the exception of his letters in English as well as Urdu most of his prose writings dealt with non-literary subjects like religion, metaphysics and economics, yet they all bear the mark of his literary genius. It is not perhaps generally realized that Iqbal had written two prose works—Ilm-ul-Iqtesad in Urdu published in 1902 and Development of Metaphysics in Persia in English, published in 1908, before any collection of his poetical works appeared. Apart from these two books, most of Iqbal’s writings in English were either in the form of essays published in various Journals or speeches and addresses de livered on various occasions. He also issued statements as the occasion demanded. Leaving aside such statements, Iqbal’s addresses and writings can be divided into the following categories:
(1) Philosophical
(2) Literary
(3) Political
(4) Religious
The collection, in its present form, being a small one, it was not considered desirable to attempt any rigid classification. All that is attempted is a very broad classification according to which the whole collection has been divided into four parts. In Part I have been included all writings and addresses dealing with Philosophical, Literary and Political subjects. Partial have been included Iqbal’s writings on religion, dealing with Islam and Qadianism, These writings attracted a great deal of attention when they were first published, and it was considered desirable to put them together. The two main essays in this part deal with important problems concerning the history and philosophy, of religion, the others being just letters or interviews are not of very great importance. But as they also serve to throw light on the main subject they have been included in this part.
As is well-known, Iqbal was a member of the P.u Legislative Council from 1927 to 1929, and be made important speeches in that Council. As contributions to political thought these speeches can not be classed with the addresses included in Part I. SU11 as they, deal with subjects of great significance to developing nations, it was decided to include them in this collection. They form Part ii of the collection.
The statements that Iqbal issued at various times and the message he issued on the New Year’s day of 1938 throw so much light on the period 1925-1938, that it was decided to include at east the more important of them in Part It will be seen from all that has been stated above that the arrangement of the writings and addresses included in this collection is not strictly systematic. But the main object of publishing this collection the preservation of Iqbal’s writings, addresses and statements has been largely served, and the more or Less arbitrary classification and division is adopted mainly to help those turning to it for reference. As for comments each essay or address merits a detailed study by students of Iqbal. And it can be confidently expected that this will be done by serious students of Iqbal in due course. Hence it is not proposed to say here much on this aspect of the collection.
• Every word written or uttered by Iqbal is of great significance and deserves preservation. Hence an attempt has been made to collect all his writings and addresses etc., on which hands could be laid. But out of his statements only those have been included in these collections which deal with important subjects. During the last 15 years of his life Iqbal occupied an important place in the public life of the sub a newspaper-men always approached him to find out his views whenever any important question arose, but most of the statements made by him on such occasions were topical, and it was decided not to include them in this collection. Many of these statements have been included in that excellent collection Speeches and Statements of Iqbal by ‘Shamloo’. Although all that are included in the present collection were taken from the Civil and Military Gazette of Lahore, Shamloo’s work deserves recognition as presenting, for the first time, most of the important statements iii one collection. Students of Iqbal will gladly acknowledge their gratitude to ‘Shamloo’, under which name Mr. Latif Ahmad Sherwani of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, published his work.
In addition to the addresses and speeches included in this collection Iqbal made a number of speeches during his stay in England from 1905 to 1908. It was not possible to get copies of these. Moreover the following writings and addresses were also not available:
(i) “Islam and Khilafat” published in the so ciological Review of London, 1908.
(ii) ‘Islam as a Social and political Ideal”, an address delivered in Aligarh in 1910.
(iii) “Inner Synthesis of Life”, published in the Indian Review of Madras, 1926.
(IV) Note on “Qurratul Ain.”
Luckily the substance of the article on “Islam and Khilafat” was incorporated by Iqbal in ‘Political Thought in Islam’ published later on in the Hindustan Review of Allah bad, India. Iqbal wrote an article on Ijtehed about 1920 and sent the manuscript to Moulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi for opinion. The Moulana criticized it adversely and so Iqbal decided not to publish it. At one time Iqbal proposed to write a history of Sufism, and had actually written two chapters. An attempt was made to procure these chapters as well as the article on Ijtehad, but without success. All the articles and addresses of which I am aware, but which were not available at the time of preparing this collection, have been mentioned above so that the search for them may be continued. But it is quite possible that there are other writings of iqbal which have not come to my notice. If any of the readers is aware of any such writing, I would-be grateful for information concerning them. Some collections of Iqbal’s letters in Urdu as well as English have been published, other collections are under preparation. It is hoped that a complete collection of Iqbal’s letters will be available soon and therefore it was decided not to include any of Iqbal’s letters in this collection. Exceptions were made in the case of two letters: One to Dr. Nicholson and the other to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan. Both these letters are actually learned essays on the subjects with which they deal, and they throw so much light on Iqbal’s philosophy of ego and his ideas on educational reforms that they are included in this collection.
The articles on ‘Stray Thoughts’ reproduced from the ‘New Era’ contained several entries which are also inclueded in Allama’s note-book entitled ‘Stray Re flections’, which has been edited by Dr. Javid Jqbal. As deletion of these entries would have upset the original design of these articles Dr. Javid Iqbal has kindly permitted the publication of these common entries also. His kindness will be appreciated by all readers.
I gratefully acknowledge the help I have received from numerous friends n the preparation of this cognition as presenting, for the first time, most of the important statements in one collection. Students of Iqbal will gladly acknowledge their gratitude to ‘Shamloo’, under which name Mr. Latif Ahmad Sherwani of the Pakistan Institute of International Affairs, Karachi, published his work.
In addition to the addresses’ and speeches included in this collection Iqbal made a number of speeches during his stay in England from 1905 to 1908. It was not possible to get copies of these. Moreover the following writings and addresses were also not available:
(1) “Islam and Khilafat” published in the so ciological Review of London, 1908.
(ii) “Islam as a Social and, Political Ideal”, an address delivered in Aligarh in 1910.
(iii) “Inner Synthesis of Life”, published in the Indian Review of Madras, 1926.
(IV) Note on “Qurratul Ain.”
Luckily the substance of the article on “Islam and Khilafat was incorporated by Iqbal in ‘Political Thought in Islam’ published later on in the Hindustan Review of Allahabad, India. Iqbal wrote an article on Ijtehad about 1920 and sent the manuscript to Moulana Abdul Majid Daryabadi for opinion. The Moulana criticized it adversely and so Iqbal decided not to publish it. At one time I4 books proposed to write a history of Sufism, and bad actually written two chapters. An attempt was made to procure these chapters as well as the article on Ijtehad, but without success. All the articles and addresses of which I am aware, but which were not available at the time of preparing this collection have been mentioned above so that the search for them may be continued. But it is quite possible that there are other’ writings of Iqbal which have not come to my notice. If any of the readers is aware of any such writing, I would grateful for information concerning them.
Some collections of Iqbal’s letters in Urdu as well as English have been published, other collections are under preparation. It is hoped that a complete collection of Iqbal’s letters will be available soon and therefore it was decided not to include any of Iqbal’s letters in this collection. Exceptions were made in the case of two letters: one to Dr. Nicholson and the other to Sahibzada Aftab Ahmed Khan. Both these letters are actually learned essays on the subjects with which they deal, and they throw so much light on Iqbal’s philosophy of ego and his ideas on educational reforms that they are included in this collection.
The articles on ‘Stray Thoughts’ reproduced from. The ‘New Era’ contained several entries which are also in Allama’s note-book entitled ‘Stray Reflections’ which has been edited by Dr. Javid Iqbal. As deletion of these entries would have upset the Original design of these articles Dr. Javid Iqbal has kindly permitted the publication of these common entries also. His kindness will be appreciated by all readers.
I gratefully acknowledge the help I have received from numerous friends in the preparation of this collection. The work has occupy many years and such sources as the British Museum London, Kbuda Bakhsh Library, Patna, Azad Libbrary, Aligarh and libraries in Hyderabad, Deccan were used. It is obvious that the work could not have been carried out successfully with out help from many students of Iqbal but special thanks are due to two friends Dr. Zakir Hiiss Vice-President of India and Dr. Ghulam Yazdani, formerly Director General of Archaco1ogy in what used to be the Nizam’s Dominions. They responded onerous to all requests the he1p
S. A. VAHID
1st January, 1964.
PART I_M1SCELLAN
1900-1937 A.D.
THE DOCTRINE OF ABSOLUTE UNITY AS EXPOUNDED BY ABDUL KARIM AL-JILANI
While European scholars have investigated an- dent Hindu Philosophy with an unfair enthusiasm they have, as a rule, looked upon Muslim philosophy as only an unprogressive repetition of Aristotle and Plato.
Although during recent rears some attention has been paid to this part of Arabic literature, yet the work achieved by reapers in this field bears no proportion to the harvest that may yet be reaped. Comparatively indifferent attitude towards Arabic philosophy has been evident, perhaps, ever since the discovery of Sanskrit literature.
We admit the superiority of the Hindu in point of philosophical acumen, yet this admission need not leads us to ignore the intellectual independence of Muslim thinkers.
The post-Islamic history of the Arabs is a long series of glorious military exploits, which compelled them to adopt a mode of life leaving but little time for gentler conquests in the great field of science and philosophy. They did not, and could not, produce men like Kapila and Shankara Acharya, but they zealously rebuilt the smoldering edifice of science,, and even attempted to add fresh stories to it. The originality does not appear at once because the un- scientific condition f the age led them to write in the spirit of expositors rather than that of independent thinkers.
We wish here to illustrate their originality by considering that portion of the Islamic philosophy which has been generally condemned: under the contemptuous name of mysticism. We believe, however, that mysticism is but metaphysics hidden under the veil of religious phraseology, and that the super structure of mysticism is impossible without a system of metaphysics serving as its foundation. It is, in our opinion, essentially a system of verification—a spiritual method by which the ego realizes as fact what intellect has understood as theory. We know much in theory and our beliefs in this kind of know ledge depends on the force of the number of arguments advanced in its support. The detection of some logical flaw in our argument, or the force of the arguments in favor of the opposite view, may at once induce us to abandon our theory, but if the ego has “realized” the theory, if the theory in question has been a spiritual experience on our part, no argument, however forcible, no logical flaw, can dispose us to abandon our position. Hence mysticism appeals to a standard higher than intellect itself. This standard, waiving the question of its objective existence is, according to the mystic, qalb or heart, the meeting of which will be explained later on. I shall not dwell here upon the scientific necessity of mysticism for the solution of human enigma, but shall content myself with a brief statement of the Islamic Metaphysical Mysticism as represented by Shaikh Abdul Karim al-Jilani in his famous work Al-Insan al-Karmil (The Perfect Man).
The deep thinker was born at Juan in 767 A.H., as he himself says in one of his verses, and died in 811 A.H. He was not a prolific writer like Shaikh Muhy-al-Din Arabi, whose mode of thought seems to have greatly influenced his teaching. He combined in himself poetical imagination and philosophical genius, but his poetry is no more than a vehicle for his mystical and metaphysical doctrines. Among other books, he wrote a commentary on Shaikh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi’s Futuh al a commentary on Bismillah and Al-Insan al-Kamil, which we propose to consider here.
This famous work comprises two volumes: the first may be looked upon as a treatise on his meta physical opinions while the second attempts explanation of terms current in popular Muhammadan theology. In order to make his doctrine easy of under standing, he enters into certain preliminary explanations and declares that in speaking of the Ultimate we must not come down to popular language—a vehicle quite insufficient for the purpose. He avows that the enigma of existence is too high for common phraseology, and that his statements must necessarily be “broken lights” of the great truth. After this brief apology he goes on to relate personal acne dote showing how. he once felt intense thirst f truth and how at last he learnt it from a person en dewed with “all the attributes of spiritual glory”. The introduction ends with a condensed statement of his doctrine which he puts in this way:
“Divine nature soars upwards, human nature sinks downwards; hence perfect human nature must stand midway between the two, it must share both the Divine and the human attributes—in one word perfect man must be the god-man.”
In the first chapter the author explains the meanings of the word Zaat, or Essence. Essence pure and simple, he says, is the thing to which names and attributes are given, whether it is existent or non existent like unique. The existent is for two species:
(1) The Existent is absolute or pure existence—Pure being God.
(2) The existence joined with non-existence—the creation-Nature.
The Essence of God or Pure Thought cannot be understood; no words can express it, for it is beyond all relation, and knowledge is relation. The Intellect flying through fathomless empty space pierces through the veil of names and attributes, traverses the vast sphere of time, enters the domain of the nonexistent and finds the Essence of Pure Thought to be an existence which is non-existence, a sum of contradictions. It is interesting to compare this passage with Hegel whose speculations have exercised such a vast influence on the methods of modern scientific investigations. It will appear how strikingly he anticipates the conclusion of modern German philosophy without seeking the help of the Hegelian methods fact which makes his teaching appears rather dogmatic.
After this confession of ignorance the author goes on to say that Pure Being has two arches (accidents): eternal life in all past time, and eternal life in all future time. It has two qualities (wasf): God and Creation. It has two lughat (definitions): God and man. It has wajhaan (two faces): the manifested (this world) and the unmanifested (the next world). It has hukman (two effects): necessity and possibility. It has istibaraan (two points of view): from the first it is non-existent for itself but existent for what it is not itself from the second it is existent for itself, and non-existent for what is not itself. With these truths of Hegelianian the author closes this difficult spectulation, and begins his second chapter on the name.
Name, he says, fixes the named in understanding, pictures it in the mind, presents it in the imagination and keeps it in the memory. It is the outside or the husk, as it were, of the named, while the named is the inside or the pith. Some names do not exist in reality, but exist in name only as an (a fabulous bird). It is a name, the object of which does not exist in reality. Just as anqa is absolutely non existent, so God is absolutely present, although it cannot be touched or seen. The anqa exists only in idea while the object of the name Allah exists in reality, and can be known Like anqa only through its names and attributes. The name is a mirror which reveals all the secrets of the Absolute Being it is a light through the agency of which God feels Himself.
In order to understand this passage we should bear in mind the three stages of development of Pure Being, enumerated by the author in his chapter on the ‘Illuminations of the Essence’. There he pro pounds that the Absolute existence of Pure Being when it leaves its absoluteness undergoes three stages:
(1) Oneness;
(2) He-ness; and,
(3) I-ness.
In the first stage there is absence of all attributes and relations, yet it is called one, and therefore oneness marks one step away from the absoluteness. In the second stage the Pure Being is yet free from all manifestations, while the third stage I-ness is nothing but an externaymanj of the He-ness or, as Hegel would say, it is the self-direniptioii of God. The third stage is the sphere of the name ‘Allah’ there the darkness of Pure Being is illuminated, nature comes to the front, the Absolute Being has become conscious. He says further that the name of Allah is the stuff of all the perfections of the different phases of Divinity, and in the second stage of the progress pf Pure Being, all that is the result of Divine self diremption was potentially contained within the titanic grasp of this name which, in the third stage of the development, objectified itself, became a mirror in which God reflected Himself, and thus by its crystallization dispelled all the gloom of the Absolute Being.
In correspondence with these three stages of the Absolute Development, the perfect man has three stages of spiritual training, but in his case the process of development must be the reverse, because his is a process of ascent while the Absolute Being had under gone e the process of descent. In the first stage of his spiritual progress he meditates on the name, studies nature on which it is scaled in the second stage he steps into the sphere of the attribute and in the third stage he enters the sphere of Zaat. the Essence. It is here that he becomes the God-man his eye becomes the eye of God his word the word of God his life the life of God—participates in the general life of nature, and “sees into the life of things”. It will appear at once how strikingly the author has anticipated the chief phase of the Hegelian Dialectic and how greatly he has emphasized the Doctrine of the. Logos a Doctrine which has always found favour with almost all the profound thinkers of Islam, and in recent times read vocated by M. Ohulam Ahmad of Qadian, probably the profoundest theologian among modern Indian Muhammadans. The chapter ends with a fanciful discussion about the meanings of the different letters of the word ‘Allah,; each letter of the word, he says, marks a separate Divine illumination.
The third chapter is a brief discussion of the nature of the attribute. The author’s views on this interesting question are very important, because it is here that his doctrine fundamentally differs from Hindu idealism. He finds attribute as an agency which gives us knowledge of the state of things. Else where he says that this distinction of attributes of the under lying reality is tenable only in the sphere of the manifested because here every attribute is regarded as the other of the reality in whidth it is supposed to inhere. The otherness is due to the existence of combination and disintegration in the sphere of the manifested. But the distinction is untenable in the domain of the unmanifested, because there is no combination of disintegration there. It should be observed how widely he differs from the advocates of the Doctrine of Maya he believes that the material world has real existence it is the outward husk of the real being, no doubt, but this outward husk is none the less real. The cause of the phenomenal world, according to him, is not the real entity hidden behind the sum of attributes, but it is a conception furnished by the mind so that there may be no difficulty in understanding the material world. Berkeley will so far agree with our author, but his view leads him to the most characteristically Hegelian doctrine—identity of Thought and Being.
In the thirty-seventh chapter of the second volume of his book, he clearly says that Idea is the stuff of which this universe is made. Thought, Idea, Notion, is the material of the structure of nature. While laying stress on this doctrine he says, “Dost thou not look to thane own self? Where is the reality iii which the so-called Divine attributes inhere? It is but the idea.” Hence nature is nothing but the crystallized idea. He would give his hearty assent to the results of Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason but, unlike him, he would make this very idea the essence of the universe, Kant’s Ding an sic to him is a pure nonentit3fl there is nothing behind this collection of attributes, the attributes are not the real things, the material world is but the objectification of the Absolute Being it is the other self of the Absolute itself. Nature is the idea of God, a something r for His Knowledge of Himself. While Hegel calls his doctrine the identity of thought and being, our author calls the identity of attribute and reality. It should be noted that the author’s phrase ‘aalam-i-Sifaat’ (‘world of attributes’), which he uses for the material world, is slightly misleading. What he really holds is that distinction of attribute and reality is merely phenomenal and does not at all exist in the nature of things. It is useful because it facilitates our understanding of the world around us, but it is not at all real. It will be under stood that the author recognizes the birth of Empire cal Idealism only tentatively and does not admit the absoluteness of the distinction.
These remarks should not lead us to understand that the author does not believe in the objective reality of the thing in itself He does believe in it, but then he advocates its unity, and says that the material world is the thing in itself, it is the “other”, the external excretion of the thing in itself. The Ding as such and its external expression or the production of its self-deception is really identical; he says how could one express the other? In one word, he means by Ding such or Zaat the Pure, the Absolute Being, and sees it through its manifestations or external expression. He says that as long as we do not realize the identity of attribute and reality, the material world, or the world of attributes, seems to be a veil but when the doctrine is brought home to us the veil is removed. We see Zaat itself everywhere and find that all the attributes are but ourselves. Nature then appears in her true light all otherness is removed, and we are at one with her. The aching prick of curiosity ceases and the inquisitive attitude of our minds are replaced by a state of philosophic calm. To the person who has realized this identity, discoveries of science bring no new information, and religion with her role of supernatural authority has nothing to say. This is the spiritual emancipation.
After these profound remarks the author proceeds to classify the different Divine Names and Attributes which have received expression in nature or the crystallized Uloohiyyat—a doctrine similar to that of the Vedanta. His classification is as follows:
(1) Al-Zaatiyya: Allah, Al-Ahad, Al-Waahid, Al-Fard, A1-Witr, Al-Samad.
(2) Ai-Jalaliyya: Al-Kabir-al-Mut’aal, Al Aziz-al-Azeem, Al-Jalil-al-Qahhar
Q) Al Kwnaaliyya: Al-Rahman, Al-Malik, Al. Rabb Al-Muhaimin, AI-Khaliq, Al-Samia..
(4) Al-Jamaaliyya: Al-Aleem, Al-Raheem, Al Salaam, Al-Mumin, Al-Baari, Al-Musawwir.
Each of these names and attributes has its own particular effect by which it illuminates the soul of the perfect mane How these illuminations take place and how they reach the soul is not explained by the author His silence about these matters throws into relief the mystical portion of his views and implies the necessity of spiritual Directorship.
Before the author’s views of particular Divine Names and Attributes, we should note that his conception of God implied in the above classification is very similar to that of While the German theologian reduced all the Divine attributes to one single attribute of power our author sees the danger of advancing a God, free from all attributes which “are nothing more than views from different human standpoints, the various appearances which the one changeless cause presents to out finite exigency cording to how we look at it from different sides of the spiritual landscape”. In his absolute existence He is beyond the limitations of names and attribttte5, when Re externalizes
Himself, when He 1eav His absoluteness, when nature is born, names and attributes appear sealed on her fabric.
Let us now consider what the author teaches about particular Divine Names and Attributes. The first essential name is Allah, or Uloohiyyat (Divinity) which forms the subject of the fourth chapter; Divinity means the sum of all the realities of existence with their respective order in that sum This name is applied to God as the only necessary existence Divinity being the highest manlfestattohi of pureBeing, the difference between them is that the latter is Visible to the eye, but its where is invisible, while the tracesof the former are visible, itself is invisible. By the very fact of her being crystallized Divinity, nature is not the real divinity, hence Divinity is invisible and its traces in the form of nature are visible to the eye. Divinity, as the author illustrates, is water nature is crystallized water or ice, but ice is not water. The Zaat is visible to the eye (another proof of our author’s Natural Realism or Absolute Idealisna), although all its attributes are not known to us. Evea its attributes are not known as they are in themselves their shadows or their effects are only known. For instance, generosity itself is unknown, only its effect or the fact of giving to the poor is known and seen. This is due to the attributes being incorporated in the very essence of Zaat. If the expresser of the attributes in its real nature has been possible, its separation from the Zaat would have been possible also.
After these remarks on the Divinity, the author proceeds to explain the other Essential Names of God—the Absolute Oneness and Simple Oneness. The Absolute Oneness marks the first step of pure Thought From the darkness of cecity (the internal or the original Maya of the Vedanta) to the light of manifestation. Although this movement is not at tended with any external manifestations, yet it sums up all of them under its hollow universality. Look at a wall, says the author you see the whole wall but you cannot see the individual pieces of the material that contribute to its formation. The wall
Is a unity but a unity that diversity s the Zaat or pure being is a unity, but a unity which is the soul diversity?
The third movement of the Absolute Being is wahediyyat or Simple Oneness is free from all particular names and attributes, but there is no distinct between them one is the essence of the other. The Uloohiyyat is similar to Simple Oneness, but its names and attributes are 5 front one another and even contradictory as generous is contradictory to revengeful. The third step, or, as Hegel would say, Voyage of the Being has another appellation Rahmaniyat (Mercy). The first Mercy, the author says, is the Evolution of the Universe from Him and the manifestations of His own self in every atom of the result of His own self the author make this point clearer by an instance. He says that nature is frozen water and God is water. The real name of nature is God (Allah): ice Condensed water is mercy, a borrowed appellation. I elsewhere the author calls water the original Wedge, intellect, understanding thought and idea. This instance leads the author or guard against the error of looking upon God as immanent or living through the sphere of material existence. He says that immanence implies disparity of being God is not immanent because He is Himself the existence. He says that immanence implies disparity being; God is not immanent because He is Himself - The existence. Eternal existence is the other self. God; it is a light ought which He sees Himself. As the originator of an idea is existent in that so God is present in nature. The difference between God and mart (as one may say) is that His Ideas materialized themselves, ours do St. it will be remembered here that Hegel would use the same line of argument in freeing himself from the accusations of Pantheism.
The remarks of Mercy are followed by brief notice of the word Rabubiyyat (Pravidence). He dennes it as a sum of all that existence stands in need of. Plants are supplied with Water through the force of this name the natural philosopher would express the same thing differently. He would speak of the same phenomena and resulting from the activit of a certain force of nature. Our author would call it a manifestation of Rabubiyyat, but unlike the natural philosophy? he would not advocate the unknown ability of that force. He would as that there is nothing behind it. It is the Absolute Being itself. This brief chapter ends with some verses of his own composition, one of which is given here, though marred in the rendering:
“All that is, owes its existence to you, and
you owe your existence to all that is.”
Another Still has expressed a similar thought still more boldly:
“ to God as much as God owes to me.”
We have now finished all the essential names and attributes of God, and proceed to examine the nature of what existed before all things. The Arabian Prophets says the author, was once questioned about the place of God before creation. He said that God, before creation, existed in Amaa (blindness). It is the nature of this blindness or primal darkness which the author now proceeds to examine. The chapter
particular j because the word translateted into modernly phraseology would be “the uncoil sciousliess”. This single word impresses upon us the foresightedness with which the author anticipates wethPhY5 doctrine of modern Germany He says that the Unconsciousness is the reality of all realities; it is tile Pure Being without any descending movement; it is free from the attributes of God and creations it does not stand in need of any name or quality because it is beyond the sphere of relations. It is stinguished from the absolute blindness because the latter name is applied to the Pure Being in its process of coming down towards manifestation.
This brief but very interesting chapter ends with a very important caution. He says that when we speak of the priority of God and posterity of creation, our words must not be construed to imply time or r and time, are themselves creations, and how can one piece of creation intervene between God and :his creation? Hence our words before, after, where, whence, etc , in this sphere of thought, should not be construed to imply time or space. The Zaat or the real Being is beyond the grasp of human conception no category of material existence can be applicable to it, because as Kant would say, the laws of phenomena cannot be spoken of as obtaining in the sphere of it: It is a matter of regret that the author does not touch here upon the anthropomorphic con captions of God inculcated by positive religion, but ends his chapter with some verses which. Run as follows:
“Thou who are one having the effect of two. Thou hast comprehended under thyself all the beauties of perfection, but owing to their being heterogeneous to one another, they became contradictories which became one in three.”
The 13th, 14th and 15th chapters are nothing but a jumble of mystical phraseology. We have already noticed that man in his progress towards per faction has three stages: the first is the meditation of the name which the author calls the illumination of names. He remarks that “when God illuminates a certain man by the light of His names, the man is destroyed under the dazzling splendor of that name, and when thou called God, the call is responded to by the man”. The effect of this illumination would be, in Schopenhauer’s language, the destruction of the individual will, yet it must not be confounded with physical death, because the individual goes on living and moving like the spinning wheel, as Kapila would say, after he has become one with Party. It is. Here that the individual cries in a pantheistic mood:
“She was I and I was she and there was no one to separate us.”
The second stage of the spiritual illumination is what the author calls the Illumination of the Attribute. This illumination makes the perfect man receive the attributes of God in their real nature in pro portion to the power of receptivity possessed by him—a fact which classifies man according to the magnitude of this light resulting from the illumination. Some men receive illumination from the divine attribute of life and thus participate in the soul of the universe. The effect of this light is soaring in the air, walking on water, changing the magnitude of things (as Christ often did). In this verse the perfect man receives illuminations from all the Divine attributes, crosses the sphere of the name and the attribute, and steps into the domain of (Zaat Essence — Absolute Existence.
As we have already noticed, the Absolute Being, when it leaves its absoluteness, has three voyages to undergo, each voyage being a process of particularization of the bare universality of the Absolute Essence. Each of these three movements appears under a new Essential Name which has its own peculiarly illuminating effect upon the human soul. Here is the end of our author’s spiritual ethics; man has become perfect, he has amalgamated himself with the Absolute Being, or has learnt what Hegel calls the Absolute philosophy. “He becomes the paragon of perfection, the object of worship, the preserver of the universe.” He is the point where Rabubiyyat (Man-ness) and al Wahidaniyyat (God-ness) become one and result in the birth of the god-man.
Although the author devotes a separate chapter to the perfect man in the second volume of his book, yet we will consider that chapter here in order to secure a continuous view of his doctrine. Here he Unfolds his Doctrine of SeIf-reflect in a new dress. He says that the perfect man is the pivot around which revolves all the “heavens” of existence, and the sum of the realities of material existence cores ponds to his unity. The Arsh corresponds to his heart; the Kursi (the Chair) to his illness; Sidarat Muntaha (the Plum Tree) to his spiritual position; the Qalam (Pen) to his intellect; the Lauh Mahfuz (the Preserved Tablet) to his mind; the elements to his temperament; matter to his faculty of perception, and to the space he occupies; the Attas (Heaven) to his opinion: the starry heaven to his intelligence; the seventh heaven to his will; the sixth to his imagination ; the fifth to his perseverance; the fourth to his understanding; the third to his fancy; the second to his reflection and the first to his memory of the above-mentioned correspondences ; the author has very obscure explanations and goes on to enume rate all the phases ormaterial existence in order to explain the truth that the perfect matrix is truly a microcosm and moves in every sphere of thought and being.
Angels.—His doctrine implies that angels have not a separate existence of their own; all have their source in the faculties of the perfect man; in on word they are personifications of his faculties. The Qaib of the perfect man is the source of Israfeel (the source of life), his intellect the source of Gabriel (the source of revelation), that part of his nature which is subject to the illusions of fear, the source of Izraeel (the angel of fear), his will the source of Meekayil and his reflection the source of the rest of the angels. The interpretation of these phrases is doubtful, hut it seems that what are called angels are nothing but different phases of the activity of the different powers of his nature. How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the author does not tell us, but he says that at every stage he has a peculiar spiritual, experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or agitation. The instrument of his experience is what he calls the Qalb (heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical diagram of Qalb and explains it by saying that it is the eye which sees the names, the attributes, and the Absolute Being successively. It owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind (Nafs wa Ru and becomes by its very nature the organ for .the recognition of the ultimate realities of existence. Perhaps Dr. Schnekel’s sense of the word ‘conscience’ would approach our author’s meaning of the word. All that the Qalb or the source of what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge reveals is not seen by the individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the individual exercising that faculty. But the spiritual experience, as the Sufis of this school hold, is not permanent; moments of spiritual vision, says Matthew Arnold, cannot be at our command. The godman is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has realized himself as god-man; but when that particular spiritual realization is over, man is man and God is God. Had the experience been permanent, a great which revolves all the “heavens” of existence, and the sum of the realities of material existence corresponds to his unity. The Arsh corresponds to his heart; the Kursi (the Chair) to his I-ness; Sidra al A’Izmtaha (the Plum Tree) to his spiritual position; the Qalam (Pen) to his intellect; the Lauh Mahfuz (the Preserved Tablet) to his mind; the elements to his temperament; matter to his faculty of perception, and to the space he occupies; the Attas (Heaven) to his opinion: the starry heaven to his intelligence; the seventh heaven to his will; the sixth to his imagination ; the fifth to his perseverance; the fourth to his understanding; the third to his fancy; the second to his reflection and the first to his memory of the above mentioned correspondences. The author has very obscure explanations and goes on to enume rate all the phases’ ormaterial existence in order to explain the truth that the perfect man is truly a microcosm and moves in every sphere of thought and being.
Angels.—His doctrine implies that angels have not a separate existence of their own; all have their source in the faculties of the perfect man; in one word they are personifications of his faculties. The Qaib of the perfect man is the source of Israfeel (the source of life), his intellect the source of Gabriel (the source of revelation), that part of his nature which is subject to the illusions of fear, the source of Izraeel (the angel of fear), his will the source of Meekayil and his reflection the source of the rest of the angels. The interpretation of these phrases is doubtful, hut it seems that what are called angels are nothing but different, phases of the activity of the different powers of his nature. How the perfect man reaches this height of spiritual development, the author does not tell us, but he says that at every stage he has a peculiar spiritual, experience in which there is not even a trace of doubt or agitation. The instrument of his experience is what he calls the Qalb (heart), a word very difficult of definition. He gives a very mystical diagram of Qaib and explains it by saying that it is the eye which sees the names, the attributes, and the Absolute Being successively. It owes its existence to a mysterious combination of soul and mind (Nafs wa Ruh) and becomes by its very nature the organ for the recognition of the ultimate realities of existence. Perhaps Dr. Schnekel’s sense of the word ‘conscience’ would approach our author’s mean ing of the word. All that the Qaib or the source of what the Vedanta calls the Higher Knowledge reveals is not seen by the individual as something separate from and heterogeneous to himself; what is shown to him through this agency is his own reality, his own deep being. This characteristic of the agency differentiates it from the intellect, the object of which is always different and separate from the individual exercising that faculty But the spiritual experience, as the Sufis of this school bold, is not permanent; moments, of spiritual vision,’ says Matthew Arnold, cannot be at our command. The god-man is he who has known the mystery of his own being, who has realized himself as god-man ; but when that particular Spiritual realization is’ over, man is man and God is God. Had the experience been permanent, a great moral force would have been lost and society overturned.
Let us now sum up the author’s Doctrine of the Trinity. We have seen the three movements of the Absolute Being, of the first three categories of Pure Being; We have also seen that the third movement is attended with external manifestation which is the self diremption of the Essence into God and man. This separation makes a gap which is filled by the perfect man who shares in both the Divine and human at tributes. The author holds that the perfect man is the preserver of the Universe, hence in his view appearance of the perfect man is a necessary condition for the continuation of nature. It is easy, therefore, to under- stand that in the god-man, the Absolute Being which had left its Absoluteness, returns unto itself, and but for the god-man it could not have done so, for then there would have been no nature, and consequently no light through which God could have seen Himself. The light through the agency of which God sees Himself is due to the principle of differences in the nature of the Absolute Being itself. He recognizes the principle in the following verse:
“If you say God is one, you are right, but if you say that He is two, this is also true.
“If you say no, but He is three, you are right, for this is the real nature of man.”
The perfect man, .then, is the joining link. On the one hand he receives illumination from all the essential names, on the other hand all the Divine attributes reappear in him. These attributes are:
(1) Independent life, or existence.
(2) Knowledge which is a form of life, as the author proves from a verse of the Quran.
(3) Will—the principle of partictilarization or the manifestation of the Being.
The author defines it as the illumination of the knowledge of God accord ing to the requirements of the Essence; hence it is a particular form of knowledge. It has nine manifestations, all of which are different names for love, the last is the love in which the lover and the beloved, the knower and the known, merge into each other and become identical. This form of love, the author says, is the Absolute Essence ; as Christianity teaches God is love. The author guards here against the error of looking upon the individual act of will as uncaused. Only the act of the universal will is uncaused; hence he implies the Hegelian Doctrine of Freedom, and holds that the acts of man are both free and deter mined.
(4) Power which expresses itself in seif-diremp ton-creation. The author controverts Shaikh Muhy al-Din In Arabic’s position that the universe before its creation in the knowledge of God, as Hamilton holds. He says, this would imply that God did not create it out of nothing, and holds that the universe, before its existence as an idea, existed in the self of God.
(5) The Word or the reflected being. Every pos suability is the word of God; hence nature is the materialization of the word of God. It has different flames—the tangible word, the sum of the realities of the man, the arrangement of the Divinity, the spread of Oneness,, the expression of the unknown, the Phases of Beauty, the trace of names and attributes, and the object of God’s knowledge.
(6) The Power of hearing.
(7) The Power of seeing.
(8) Beauty—that which seems less beautiful in nature (the reflected beauty) is in its real existence, beauty. Evil is only relative, it has no real e thence; it is merely a relative deformity.
(9) Glory or beauty in its intensity.
(10) Perfection, which is the unknowable essence of God and therefore Unlimited and Infinite.
We now have the doctrine of the perfect man completed. All through the author has maintained his argument by an appeal to different verses of the Quran, and to the several traditions of the Prophet the ‘authenticity of which he never doubts. Al though he reproduces the Christian doctrine of the Trinity, except that his god-man is Muhammad in stead of Christ, he never alludes to his having been influenced by Christian theology. He looks upon the doctrine as something common between the two forms of religion and accuses Christianity of a blasphemous interpretation of the doctrine—of re grading the Personality of God as split up into three distinct personalities. Our own belief, however, is that this splendid doctrine has not been well under stood by the majority of Islamic and Christian thinkers. The doctrine is another way of stating that the Absolute Unity must have in itself a principle of difference in order to evolve diversity out of itself. Almost all the attacks of Muhammadan theologians are directed against vulgar beliefs while the truth of real Christianity has not sufficiently been recognized. I believe no Islamic thinker will object to the deep meaning of the Trinity as explained by this author, or will hesitate in approving Kant’s in perpetration of the Doctrine of Redemption. Shaikh Muhy al-Din Ibn Arabi says that the error of Chris trinity does not lie in making Christ God but in making God Christ.
After these remarks on the Doctrine of Trinity let us now review the remainder of the author’s treatise. His principal doctrine is complete before us, but he has got something more to say. He devotes a separate chapter to the He-ness, the second movement of the Absolute Being, but drops no new remark here. He then goes on to consider the I-ness, the third movement of the Absolute, and defines it and says that ‘I’ and ‘H’ are but the out side and the inside of the same thing, In the three succeeding chapters the author considers the words ‘Eternity’ and ‘Uncreatableness’, and guards against the error of understanding them as implying time. The 31st chapter goes under the heading of “The Days of God”, by which phrase the author means the different manifestations of the Absolute. The Absolute Being has two phases; in Himself He is one and Unchangeable, but in the second phase He is the cause of all diversity—nay, is the diversity. That which appears is not unreal, it is the Absolute being itself. It is interesting to observe that the author uses her the word tahud, which means Evolution implying’ the identity of the object under all its diverse forms. The first volume ends here with brief notices of the Quran, the Old Testament, the Book of Psalms and the Bible. The author’s remarks on the different Books are very interesting, but are not directly con nested with the main theory he propounds. We therefore, proceed to estimate the value of his philosophical labor. While summing up his Doze of the Perfect Man, we have seen that, although he has anticipated many of the chief doctrines of modern German philosophy, particularly Hegelianism, yet he is not a systematic thinker at all. He .per chives the: truth, but being unequipped with the in strunmentality of a sound philosophical method, he cannot advance positive, proofs for his positon, or rather cannot present his views in a systematic unity. He is keenly alive to the necessity of philosophical precision yet his mysticism constantly leads him to drop vague, obscure remarks savouring of Platonic poetry rather than philosophy. His book is a con-. fused jumble of metaphysics, religion, mysticism and ethics, very often exicuding all likelihood of analysis. Len his defence of the Islamic institutions-he implies that religion is something quite differnt from meta physics, yet in his general treatment he is firmly convinced of their identity that he regards religion as applied metaphysics, and to a great extent antici pates the views of the modern Neo-Hegelian school of England. Amidst the irregularity and general want-of clearness his chief doctrine, however, insufficiently clear—a doctrine which makes the principal merit of our author, and brings him out as the trim pant possessor of the deep metaphysical meaning of the Trinity. In the grip of mysticism he has dropped remarks which might be developed so as to result in a philosophical system, but it is a matter for regent that this sort of idealistic speculation did not find favour much with later Islamic thinkers.
(Indian Antiquary, Bombay,
September, 1900)
LEBENS LAUF
I was born on the 3rd of Dhi-Qaud, 1294 A.H. (1876 A.D.) at Sialkot—Punjab (Pakistan). My education began with the study of Arabic and Persian. A few years after I joined one of the local schools and began my University career, passing the first Public examination of the Punjab University in 1891. In 1893 I passed the Matriculation and joined the Scotch Mission College, Sialkot, where I studied for two years, passing the Intermediate Examination of the Punjab University in 1895. In 1897 to 1899, respectively, I passed my B.A. and M.A. from the Lahore Government College. During the course of my University career I had the good fortune to win several gold and silver medals and scholarships. After my M.A. I was appointed McLeod Arabic Reader in the Punjab University Oriental College where I lectured on History and Political Economy for about 3 years. I was then appointed Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Lahore Government College. In 1905 I got leave of absence for three years in order to complete my studies in Europe where I am at present residing.
* This is the introductory note which prefaces lqbal’s Thesis. The Development of Metaphysics in Persia. As submitted to Munich University. It is interesting as giving certain information about Iqbal in his own words.Ed.
There is still a good deal of confusion about the date of Iqbals birth. Prof Marek of Prague University has dealt with the subject in an interesting note in Archive Oriental, 1958. Mr. Wahiduddin has also dealt with the subject in his Roozgsv-i they agree that the correct date is as given by Iqbal here. The 3rd of Dht-Qaud 1294 A.H. corresponds to 9th November 1877 and this should b, accepted as the correct date of birth.Ed.
ISLAM AS A MORAL AND POLITICAL IDEAL
There are three points of view from which a religious system can be approached; the standpoint of the teacher, that of the expounder, and that of the critical student. I do not pretend to be a teacher whose thought and action are, or ought to be, in perfect harmony in so far as he endeavors to work out, in his own life, the ideals which he places before others, and thus influences his audience more by example than by precept. Nor do I claim the high office of an expounder who brings to bear a subtle intellect upon his task, endeavors to explain all the various aspects of the principles he expounds and works with certain pre-suppositions, the truth of which he never questions. The attitude of mind which characterizes a critical student is fundamentally different from that of the teacher and the expounder. He approaches the subject of his inquiry free from all pre and tries to understand the organic structure of a religious system just as a biologist would study a form of life or a geologist a piece of mineral. His object is to apply methods of scientific research to religion, with a view to discover how the various elements in a given structure fit in with one another, how each factor functions individually, and how their relation with one another determines the functional value of the wholr. He looks at the subject from the standpoint of history and raises certain fundamental questions with regard to the origin, growth and formation of the system he proposes to understand What are the historical forces, the operation of which evoked, as a necessary consequence, the phenomenon of a particular system? Why should a particular religious system be produced by a particular people? What is the real significance of a religious system in the history of the people who produced it, and in the history of mankind as a whole? Are there any geographical causes which determine the original locality of a religion? How far does it reveal the in-most soul of a people, their social, moral and political aspirations? What trans formation, if any, has it worked in them? How far has it contributed towards the realization of the ultimate purpose revealed in the history of man? These are some of the questions which the critical student of religion endeavors to answer, in order to com pretend its structure and to estimate its ultimate worth as a civilizing agency among the forces. of historical evolution.
I propose to look at Islam from the standpoint of the critical student. But I may state at the outset that I shall avoid the use of expressions current in popular Revelation Theology; since my method is essentially scientific and consequently necessitates the use of terms which can be interpreted in the light of everyday human experience. For instance, when I say that the religion of a people is the sum- total of their life-experience finding a definite expression through the medium of a great personality, j ant. only an Slating the fact of Revelation into the of science. Similarly, inter between individual and universal energy is only another e%present for the feeling of prayer, which ought to be so described for purposes of scientific accuracy. It is because I want to approach my subject from a roughly human stand profit, and not because I doubt the fact of Divine Revelation as the final basis of all religion, that I prefer to employ expressions of a more scientific content. Islam is moreover the youngest of all religions, the last creation of humanity. Its founder stands out clear before US; he is, truly a personage of history and lends himself freely even to the most searching criticism. Ingenious legend has weaved no screens round his figure; he is born in the broad daylight of history; we can the inner spring of his actions; we can subject his mind to a keen psychological analysis. Let us then, for the time being, eliminate the supernatural element and try to understand the structure of Islam as we find it.
I. have just indicated the way in which a critical student of religion approaches his subject. Now, it is not possible for me, in. the short space. at my disposal, to answer, with regard to Islam, all the q which as a critical student f religion thought to raise and answer in order to reveal tube real meaning of this religious system. I shall not raise the question of the origin and the development of Islam. Nor shall I try to analyze the various currents of thought in the pre Arabian society, which found a final focus in the utterances of the Prophet of Islam. I shall confine my attention to the Islamic ideal in its ethical and political aspects only.
To begin with, we have to recognise that every great religious system starts with certain propositions concerning the nature of man and the universe. The psychological implication of Buddhism, for instances is the central fact of pain as a dominating element in the constitution of the universe. Man, regarded as an individuality, is helpless against the fetches of pain, according to the teachings of Buddhism. There is an indissoluble relation between pain and the individual consciousness which, as such, is nothing but a constant possibility of pain. Free Dom from pain means freedom from individuality. Starting from the fact of pain, Buddhism is quite consistent in placing before man the ideal of self- destruction. Of the two terms of this relation, pain and the sense of personality, one (i.e., pain) is ultimate; the other is a delusion from which it is possible emancipate ourselves by ceasing to act on those lines of activity, which have a tendency to intensify the sense of personality. Salvation, then, according to Buddhism, is in action; renunciation of self and unwieldiness are the principal virtues. Similarly, Christianity, as a religious system, is based .in the fact of sin. The world is regarded as evil and the taint of sin is regarded as hereditary to man, who, as an individuality is insufficient and stands in need of some supernatural personality to intervene between him and his Creator. Christianity unlike Buddhism, r human personality as something real, but agrees with Buddhism in holding that man, as a force against sin, is insufficient. There is, how ever, a subtle difference in the agreement. We can, cording to Christianity, get rid of sin by depending upon a Redeemer; we can free ourselves from according to Buddhism, by letting this insufficient force dissipate or lose itself in the universal energy of nature. Both agree in the fact of insuffisticaly and both agree in holding that this insufficiency is an evil; but while the one makes up the deficiency by bringing in the force of a redeeming personality the anther prescribes its gradual reduction until it is annihilated alt Again, ZoroaStriaflhsm looks up to nature as a scene of endless struggle between the powers of evil the powers of good, and recognise in man the power to choose any course of action he likes. The universe, according to Zoroastriaflism, is partly evil, partly good; man is neither wholly good nor wholly evil, but a combination of the two principles_hg1it and darkness continually fighting against each other for universal supremacy. We see then that the fundamental pre.suPP0SitbonS with regard to the nature of the. universe and mail, in Buddhism, Christianity and Zoroastriaflism, respectively, are the following —
(1) There an individual.
(2) There is sin in nature and the taint of sin is fatal to man (Christianity).
(3) There is struggle in nature; man is a mixture of the 5 and is free to range himself on the side of the powers of good which will eventually is pain in nature and man regarded as is evil (Buddhism).prevail (Zoroastrianism).
The question now is what is the Muslim view of the universe and man? What is the central idea in Islam which determines the structure of the entire system? We know that sin, pain and sorrow are constantly mentioned in the Quran. The truth is that Islam looks upon the universe as a reality and consequently recognizes as reality all that is in it. Sin, pain, sorrow, struggle are certainly real, but Islam teaches that evil is not essential to the universe; the universe can-be reformed; the elements of sin and evil can be gradually eliminated. All that is in the universe is God’s and the seemingly destructive forces of nature become sources of life, if properly controlled by man, who is endowed with the power to understand and to control them.
These and other similar teachings of the Quran, combined with the Quranic recognition of the reality of sin and sorrow, indicate that the Islamic ‘ of the universe is neither optimistic nor pessimistic. Modern psychometric has given the final answer to the psychological implications of Buddhism. Pain is not an essential factor in the constitution of the unveil and pessimism is only a product of ahostilë social environment. Islam believes in the efficacy of well directed action; hence the standpoint of Islam must be described as melioristic—the ultimate pre supposition and justification of all human -effort at scientific discovery and social progress. Al-though Islam recognizes the fact of pain, sin aid struggle in nature, yet the principal fact which stands in the way of man’s ethical progress is, according to Islam, neitb.er pail nor suit, nor struggle. It is fear to which is a victim owing to his ignorance of the nature of his environment and. want of absolute faith in God. The highest stage of man’s ethical progress is reached when he becomes absolutely free from fear and grief.
The central proposition which regulates the structure of Islam, then, is that there is fear in nature, and the object of Islam is to free man from fear. This view of the universe indicates also the Islamic view of the metaphysical nature of man. If fear is the force which dominates man and counteracts his ethical progress, man must be regarded as a unit of force, an energy, a will, a germ of infinite power, the gradual enfoldment of which must be the object of all human activity. The essential nature of man, then; consists in will, not intellect or understanding.
With regard to the ethical nature of man too, the teaching of Islam is different from those of other religious systems. And when God said to the angels— “I am going to make a Viceroy on the earth,” the said: “Art Thou creating one who spills blood and disturbs the peace of the earth, and we glorify Thee and sing Thy praises?” God answered “I know what you do not know.” This verse of the Quran read in the light of the famous tradition that every child is born a Muslim_Peacathil, indicates that according to the tenets of Islam man is essentially good and peaceful—a view explained and defended, in our own items, by Rousseau—the great father of modern political thought. The opposite view, the doctrine of the depravity of man held by the Church of Rome, leads to the most pernicious religious and political consequences. Since if man is elementally wicked, he must not be permitted to have his OW way; his entire life must be controlled by external authority. This means priesthood in religion and autocracy in politics. The Middle Ages in the history of Europe drop this dogma of Romanism to its political and religious consequences, and the result was a form of society which required terrible revolutions to destroy it and to upset the basic pre suppositions of its structure. Luther, the enemy of despotism in religion, and Rousseau, the enemy of despotism in politics, must always be regarded as the emancipators of European humanity from the heavy fetters of pop Edom and absolutism, and their religious and political thought must be understood as a virtual denial of the Church dogma of human depravity. The possibility of the elimination of sin and pain from the evolutionary process and faith in the natural goodness of man are the basic propositions of Islam, as of modern European civilization, which has, almost unions recognized the truth of these propositions in spite o the religious system with which it is associated. Ethically speaking, there•. fore, man is naturally good and peaceful. Meta physically speaking, he is a unit of energy, which cannot bring out its dormant possibilities owing to its misconception of the nature of its environment. The ethical ideal of Islam is to disenthrall man from fear, and thus to give him a sense of his personality, to make him conscious of himself. as a source of power This idea of man as an individuality of finite power determines, according to the teachings of Islam, the worth of all human action. That which intensifies the sense of individuality in man is good, that which enfeebles it is bad. Virtue is power, force, strength; evil is weakness. Give man a keen sense of respect for his own personality, let him move fearless and free in the immensity of God’s earth, and he will respect the personalities of others and become perfectly virtuous. It is not possible for me to show in the course of this paper, how all the principal forms of vice can be reduced to fear. But we will now see the reason why certain forms of human activity, e.g., self-renunciation, poverty, slavish obedience which sometimes conceals itself under beautiful name of humility and unworldliness—modes of activity which tend to weaken the force of human individuality—are regarded as virtues by Buddhism and Christianity, and altogether ignored by Islam. While the early Christians glorified in poverty and unworldliness, Islam looks upon poverty as a vice, and says: “Do not forget thy share in the world.” The highest virtue from the standpoint of Islam is righteousness which is defined by the Quran in the following manner :— “It is not righteousness that ye turn your faces in prayers towards east and west, but righteousness is of him who believeth in God and the last day and the angels and the scriptures and the Prophets, who give the money for God’s sake unto his kindred and Unto orphans and the needy and to strangers and to those who ask and for the redemption of captives; of those who are constant at prayer, and of those who perform their covenant when they have covenanted, and behave themselves patiently in adversity and in times of violence.”
It is, therefore, evident that Islam, so to speak, transmutes the moral values of ancient world, and declares the preservation, intensification of the sense of human personality to be the ultimate ground of all ethical activity. Man is a free responsible being, he is the maker of his own destiny, and his salvation is his own business. There is no mediator between God and man. God is the birthright of every man. The Quran, therefore, while it looks upon Jesus Christ as the spirit of God, strongly protests against the Christian doctrine of Redemption, as well as the doctrine of an infallible visible head of the Church—doctrines which proceed upon the assumption of the insufficiency of human personality and tend to create in man a sense of dependence, which is regarded by Islam as a force obstructing the ethical progress of man. The law of Islam is almost unwilling to re cognisillegitimacy, since the stigma of illegitimacy is a great blow to the healthy development of in- dependence in man. Similarly, in order to give man an early sense of individuality the law of Islam has laid down that a child is an absolutely free human being at the age of fifteen.
To this view of Muslim ethics, however, there can be one objection. If the development of human individuality is the principal concern of Islam, why should it tolerate the institution of slavery? The idea of free labor was foreign to the economic con sciousness of the ancient world. Aristotle lookup° it as a necessary factor in human society. The prophet of Islam, being a link between the ancient and the modern world, declared the principle of equality and though, like every ‘wise reformer, he slightly conceded to the social conditions around him in retaining the name slavery, he quietly took away the whole spirit of this institution. That slaves had equal opportunity with other Muhammadans, is evidenced by the fact that some of the greatest Muslim warriors, kings, premiers, scholars, and jurists were slaves. During the days of the early Caliphs slavery by. purchase was quite unknown; part of public revenue was sent apart for purposes of manumission, and prisoners of war were either freely dismissed or freed on the payment of ransom. Omar .set all slaves at liberty after his conquest of Jerusalem. Slaves were also set at liberty as a penalty for culpable homicide and in expiation of a false oath taken by mistake. The Prophet’s own treatment of slaves was extraordinarily liberal. The proud aristocratic Arab could not tolerate the social elevation of a slave even when he was manumitted. The democratic ideal of perfect equality, which had found the most uncompromising expression in the Prophet’s life, could only be brought home to an extremely aristocratic people by a very cautious handling of the situation. He brought about a marriage between an emancipated Slave and a free Qureish woman, a relative of his Own. This marriage was blow to the aristocratic pride of this free Arab woman; she coul4 not get on With her husband, and the result was a divorce, which Xflade her the more helpless, since no respectableArab.would marry the divorced wc(e of slave. The ever-watchful Prophet availed himself of situation and turned it to account in his efforts at social reform. He married the woman himself, indicating thereby that not only a slave could marry a free woman, but also a woman divorced by him could become the wife of a man no less than the greatest Prophet of God. The sign ificance of this marriage in the history of social reform in Arabia is, indeed, great. Whether prejudice, ignorance or want of insight has blinded European critics of Islam to the real meaning of this union, it is difficult to guess.
In order to show the treatment of slaves by modern Muhammadans, 1 quote a passage from the English translation of the autobiography of the late Amir Abdur Rahman of Afghanistan :—
“For instance,” says the Amir. “Framurz Khan. A Chitrali slave, is my most trusted Commander-in- Chief at Herat, Nazir Muhammad Safar Khan, an other Chitrali slave, is the most trusted official of my Court; he keeps my seal in his hand to put to any document and to my food and diet; in short, he has the full confidence of my life, and my kingdom is in his hand3. Parwana Khan, the late Deputy Coinmander-in and Jan Muhammad Khan, the late Lord of Treasury, two of the highest officials of the kingdom in their lifetime, were both of them my slaves.”
The truth is that the institution of slavery is a mere name in Islam, and the idea of individuality reveals itself as a guiding principle in the entire system of Muhammadan law and ethics. Briefly speaking, then, a strong will in a strong body is the ethical ideal of Islam. But let me stop here for a moment, and see whether we, Indian Musalmans, are true to this ideal. Does the Indian Muslim possess a strong will in a strong body? Has he got the will to live? Has he got sufficient strength of character to oppose thosf forces which tend to disintegrate the social organisr to which he belongs? I regret to answer my questions in the negative. The reader will understand, that the great struggle for existence it is not principally number which makes a social organism survive. Character is the ultimate equipment of man, not only in his efforts against a hostile natural environment, but also in his contest
with kindred competitors after a fuller, richer, ampler life. The life-force of the Indian Muhammadan, however, has become woefully enfeebled. The decay of the religious spirit, combined with other causes of a political nature over which he bad no control, has developed in him a habit of self-dwarfing, a sense of dependence and, above all, that laziness of spirit which an enervated people call by the dignified name of ‘contentment’ in order to conceal their own enface Belmont. Owing to his indifferent commercial morality he fails in economic enterprise; for want of a true Conception of national interest and a right appreciation of the. present situation of his community among the communities of this country, he is work ing, in his private as well as public apacity, on lines Which, I am afraid, must lead him to ruin. How Often do we see that he shrinks from advocating a Cause, the significance of which is truly national, simply because his standing aloof pleases an influential Hindu, through whose agency he hopes to secure a personal distinction? I unhesitatingly declare that I have greater respect for an illiterate shopkeeper, who earns his honest bread and has sufficient force in his arms to defend his wife and children in times of trouble, than the brainy graduate of high culture, whose low, timid voice betokens the dearth of soul in his body, who takes pride in his submissiveness, eats sparingly, complains of sleepless nights and produces unhealthy children for his community, if he does produce any at all. 1 hope I shall not be offending the reader when I say that I have a certain amount of admiration for the devil. By refusing to prostrate himself before Adam whom he honestly believed to be his inferior, he revealed a high sense of self-respect, a trait of character, which, in my opinion, ought to redeem him from his spiritual deformity, just as the beautiful eyes of the toad redeem him from his physical repulsiveness. And I believe God punished him not because he refused to make himself low before the progenitor of an enfeebled humanity, but because he declined to give absolute obedience to the will of the Almighty Ruler of the Universe. The ideal of our educated young men is mostly service, and service begets, especially in a country like India, that sense of dependence which undermines the force of human individuality. The poor among us have, of course, no capital; the middle class people cannot undertake joint economic enterprise owing to mutual mistrust; and the rich look upon trade as an occupation beneath their dignity. Truly economic dependence is the prolific mother of all the various forms of vice. Even the vices of the Indian Muhammadan indicate the weakness of life-force in him. Physically too he has undergone dreadful deterioration. If one sees the pale, faded faces of Muhammadan boys in schools and colleges, one will find the painful verification of my statement. Power, energy, force, strength, yes physical strength, is the law of life. A strong man may rob others when he has got nothing in his own pocket; but a feeble person, he must die the death of a mean thing in the world’s awful scene of continual warfare. But .how to improve this undesirable state of things? Education, we are told, will work the required transformation. I may say at once that I do not put much faith in education as a means of ethical training—I mean education as understood in this country. The ethical training of humanity is really the work of great personalities, who appear, from time to time, during the course of human history. Unfortunately, our present social environment is not favorable to the birth and growth of such personalities of ethical magnetism. An attempt to discover the reason of this dearth of personalities among us will necessitate a subtle Analysis of all the visible and invisible forces which are flow determining the course of our social evolution— an enquiry which I cannot undertake in this paper. But all unbiased persons will easily admit that such personalities are now rare among us. This being the case, education is the only thing to fall I upon. But what sort of education? There is flow absolute truth in education, as there is none in philosophy or science. Knowledge for the sake of knowledge is a maxim of fools. Do we ever find a person rolling in his mind the undulatory theory of light simply because it is a fact of science? Education, like other things, ought to be determined by the needs of the learner. A form of education which has no direct bearing on the particular type of character which you want to develop is absolutely worthless. I grant that the present system of education in India gives us bread and butter. We manufacture a number of graduates and then we have to send titled mendicants to Government to beg appointments for them. Well, if we succeed in securing a few appointments in the higher branches of service, what then? It is the masses who constitute the backbone of the nation; they ought to be better fed, better housed and properly educated. Life is not bread and butter, alone; it is something more; it is a healthy character reflecting the national ideal in all its aspects. And for a truly national character, you ought to have a truly national education. Can you expect free Muslim character in a young boy who is brought up in an aided school and in complete ignorance of his social and historical tradition? You administer to him dose3 of Corm well’s history; it is idle to expect that he will turn out a truly Muslim character. The knowledge of Corm well’s history will certainly create in him a great deal of admiration for that Puritan revolutionary; but it cannot create that healthy pride in his soul which is the very life-blood of a truly national character. Our educated young man knows all about Wellington and Gladstone, Voltaire and Luther. He will tell you that Lord Roberts worked in the South African war like a common soldier at the age of eighteen; but how many of us know that Muhammad II conquered Con stantinople at the age of twenty-two? How many of us have even the faintest notion of the influence of our Muslim civilization over the civilization of modern Europe? How many of us are familiar with the wonderful historical productions of Ibn Khaldun or the extraordinarily noble character of the great Mir Abdul Nadir of Algeria? A living nation is living because it never forgets its dead. I venture to say, that the present system of education in this country is not at all suited to us as a people. It is not true to our genius as a nation, it tends to produce an Muslim type of character, it is not determined by our national requirements, it breaks entirely with our past, and appears to proceed on the false assumption that the ideal of education is the training of human in tell ectrather than human will Nor is this superficial system true to the genius of the Hindus. Among them it appears to have produced a number of political idealists, whose false reading of history drives them to the upsetting of all conditions of political order and social peace. We spend an immense amount of money every year on the education of our children. Well, thanks to the King-Emperor.
India is a free country; every body is free to entertain any opinion he likes—I look upon it as a waste. In order to be truly ourselves, we ought to have our own schools, our own colleges, and Our own universities, keeping alive our social and historical traditions, making us good and peaceful citizens and creating in us that free but law-abiding spirit which evolves out of itself the noblest types of political virtue. I am quite sensible of the difficulties that lie in our way, all that I can say is that if we cannot get over our difficulties, the world will soon get rid of us.
Having discussed in the last issue of this review the ethical ideals of Islam, I now proceed to say a few words on the political aspect of the Islamic ideal. Before, however, I come to the subject, wish to meet an objection against Islam so often brought forward by our European critics. It has been said that Islam is a religion which implies a state of war and can thrive only in a state of war. Now, there can be no denying that war is an expression of the energy of a nation; a nation which cannot fight cannot hold its own in the strain and stress of selective competition, which constitutes an indispensable condition of all human progress: Defensive war is certainly per matted by the Quran; but the doctrine of aggressive war against unbelievers is wholly unauthorized by the Holy Book of Islam. Here are the words of the Quran: — “Summon them to the way of thy Lord with wisdom and kindly warning, dispute them in the kindest manner. Say to those who have been given the book and to the ignorant: ‘Do you accept Islam’? Then, if they accept Islam they are guided aright: but’ if they turn away ‘then thy duty is only preaching; and God’s eye is on His servants.”
All the wars undertaken during the life-time of the Prophet were defensive. His war against the Roman Empire in 628 A.D. began by a fatal breach of international law on the part of the Government at Constantinople who killed the innocent Arab envoy sent to their Court. Even in defensive wars be forbids wanton cruelty to the vanquished. I quote here the touching words which he addressed to his followers when they were starting for a fight:—
“In avenging the injuries inflicted upon us disturb not the harmless votaries of domestic seclusion, spare the weakness of the female sex, injure not the infant at the breast, or those who are ill in bed. Abstain from demolishing the dwellings of the unresisting inhabitants, destroy not the means of their subsistence, nor their fruit trees, and touch not the palm.”
The history of Islam tells us that the expansion of Islam as a religion is in no way related to the political’ power of its followers. The greatest spintual conquests of Islam were made during the days of our political decrepitude. When the rude bar barians of Mongolia drowned in blood the civilization of Baghdad in 1258 A.D., when the Muslim power fell in Spain and the followers of Islam were mercilessly killed or driven out of Cordova by Ferdinand in 1236, Islam had just secured a footing in Sumatra and was about to work the peaceful con version of the Malay Archipelago.
“In the hours of its political degradation,” says Professor Arnold, “Islam has achieved some of its most brilliant conquests. On two great historical occasions, infidel barbarians have set their foot onthenecks of the followers of the Prophet, the Seijuk Turks in the eleventh and the Mongols in the thirteenth century, and in each case the conquerors have accepted the religion of the conquered.” “We undoubtedly find,” says the same learned scholar elsewhere, “that Islam gained its greatest and most lasting missionary triumphs in times and places in which its political power has been weakest, as in South India and Eastern Bengal.”
The truth is that Islam is essentially a religion of peace. All forms of political and social disturbance are condemned by the Quran in the most uncompromising terms. .1 quote a few verses from the Quran “Eat and drink from what God has given you and run not on the face of the earth in the matter of rebels.
“And disturb not the peace of the earth after it has been reformed; this is good for you if you are believers.
“And do good to others as God has done good to thee, and seek not the violation of peace in the earth, for God does not love those who break the peace.
“That is the home in the next world which we build for those who do not mean rebellion and disturbance in the earth, and the end is for those who fear God.
“Those who rebelled in ‘cities and enhanced disorder in them, God visited them with His whip of punishment.”
One sees from these verses how severely all forms of political and social disorders are denounced by the Quran. But the Quran is not satisfied with mere of the evil of fesad. It goes to the very root of this evil We know that both in ancient and modern times, secret meetings have been a constant source of political and social unrest. Here I what the Quran says about such conferences: “O believers, if you converse secretly__that is to say, hold secret conference, converse not for purpose of and rebellion.” The ideal of Islam is to secure social peace at any cost. All methods of violent change in society are condemned in the mostulinhis takable language. Tartushi—a Muslim lawyer of Spain—is quite true to the spirit of Islam when he says:
“Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy.” “Listen to him and obey him” says the Prophet of God in a tradition mentioned by Bukharee, “even if a negro slave is appointed to rule over you:.” Muslim mentions another important tradition of the Prophet on the authority of Arfaja, who says “I heard the Prophet of God say, when you have agreed to follow one man then if another man comes forward intending to break your stick (weaken your strength) or to make you disperse in disunion, kill him.”
Those among us who make it their business to differ from the general body of Musalmans in political views ought to read this tradition carefully, and if they have any respect for the words of the Prophet, it is their duty to dissuade themselves from this mean traffic in political opinion which, though perhaps it brings a little personal gain to them, is harmful to the interests of the communally. My object, in citing these verses and traditions is to educate political opinion On strictly Islamic lines. In- this country we are living under a Christian Government. We must always keep before our eyes the example of those early Muhammadans who, persecuted by their own countrymen, had to leave their home and. to settle in the Christian State of Abyssinia How they behaved in that land must be our guiding principle in this country where an over dose of Western ideas has taught people to criticize the existing Government with a dangerous lack of historical perspective. And our relation with the Christians are determined for us by the Quran, which says: — “And thou wilt find nearer to the friendship of the believers those men who call themselves Christians. This is because among them there are learned men and hermits, and they are never vain.”
Having thus established that Islam is a religion of peace, I now proceed to consider the purely political aspect of the Islamic ideal—the ideal of Islam a entertained by a corporate individuality. Given a settled society, what does Islam expect from its fool lowers regarded as a community? What principles ought to guide them in the management of communal affairs? What must be their ultimate object and how it is to be achieved?’ We know that Islam is something more than a creed, it is also a community, a nation. The membership of Islam as a community is not determined by birth, locality or naturalization; it consists in the identity of belief. The expression’s Mubami fladan’ ,however convenient it may be, is a contradiction in terms; since Islam in its essence above all condition of time and space. Nationality with us is a pure idea; it has geographical basis. But in as much as the average man demands a material centre of nationality the Muslim looks for it in the holy town of Mecca, so that the basis of Muslim nationality combines the teal and the ideal, the concrete and the abstract. When, therefore, it is said that the interests of Islam are superior to those of the Muslim, it is meant that the interests of the l as a unit are sub to the interests of the community as an external symbol of the Islamic principle. This is the only principle which limits the liberty of the individual, who is otherwise absolutely free. The best form of Government for such a community would be democracy, the ideal of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as practicable. The Caliph of Islam is not an infallible being; like other Muslims he is subject to the same law; he is elected by the people and is deposed by them if he goes contrary to the law. An ancestor of the present Sultan of Turkey was sued in an ordinary law c by a mason, who succeeded in getting him fined by the town Qazee. Democracy, then, is the most import ant aspect of Islam regarded as a political ideal. It must, however, be confessed that the Muslims, with their ideal of individual freedom, could do nothing for the political improvement of Asia. Their democracy lasted only 30 years and disappeared with their political explanation. Though the principle of election was not quite original in Asia (since the ancient Parthian Government was based on the same principle) yet somehow or other it was not suited to the nations of Asia in the early days of Islam. It was, however, reserved for a Western nation politically to vitalize the countries. of Asia. Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times, and English statesmen have boldly carried this principle to countries which have been, for centuries, groaning under the most atrocious forms of despotism. The British Empire is a vast political organism, the vital it. of which consists in the gradual working out of this principle. The permanence of the British Empire as a civilizing factor in the political evolution of mankind is one of our greatest interests. This vast Empire has. our fullest sympathy and respect, since it is one aspect of our own political ideal that is being slowly worked out in it. England, in fact, is doing one of our own great duties, which unfavorable circumstances did not permit us to perform. It is not the number of Muhammadans which it protects, but the spirit of the British Empire that makes it the greatest Muhammadan Empire in the wend.
To return now to the political constitution of the Muslim society. Just as there are two basic propositions underlying Muslim ethics, so there are two basic propositions underlying Muslim political constitution.
(1) The law of God is absolutely supreme. Auth ority, except as an interpreter of the law, has no place in the social structure of Islam. Islam has a hor-ror of personal authority. We regard it as imical to the enfoldment of human individuality. The Shias, of course, differ from the Sunnis in this respect. They hold that the Caliph or Imam is appointed by God and his interpretation of the Law is final; he is infallible and his authority, therefore, is absolutely supreme. There is certainly a grain of truth in this view; since the principle of absolute authority has functioned usefully in the course of the history of mankind. But it must be admitted that the idea works well in the case of primitive societies and reveals its deficiency when applied to higher stages of civilization. Peoples grow out of it, as recent events have revealed in Persia, which is a Shia country, yet demands fundamental structural change in her Government by the introduction of the principle of election.
(2) The absolute equality of all the members of the community. There is no aristocracy in Islam. “The noblest among you,” says the Prophet, “are those who fear God most.” There is no privileged class, no priesthood, and no caste system. Islam is a unity in which there is no distinction, and this unity is secured by making men believe in the simple propositions—the unity of God and the mission of the Prophet—propositions which are certainly of a super national character, but which, based: as they are on the general religious experience of mankind are intensely true to the average human nature. Now, this principle of the equality of all believers made early Musalmans the greatest political power in. the World. Islam. worked as a leveling force it gave the Individual a sense of his inward power; it elevated those who were socially low. The elevation of the down-trodden was the chief secret of the Muslim political power in India. The result of the British rule in this country has been exactly the same; and if England continues true to this principle it will ever remain a source of strength to her as it was to her predecessors.
But are we Indian Musalmans true to this principle in our social economy? Is the organic unity of Islam intact in this land? Religious adventurers set up different sects and fraternities, ever quarrelling with one another; and then there are castes and sub- castes like the Hindus! Surely we have out-Hindued the Hindu himself; we are suffering from a double caste system—the religious caste system, sectarianism, and the social caste system, which we have either learned or inherited from the Hindus. This is one of the quiet ways .in which conquered nations revenge themselves on their conquerors. I condemn this accursed religious and social sectarianism; I con demn it iii the name of God, in the name of human ity, in the name of Moses, in the name of Jesus Christ, and in the name of him—a thrill of emotion passes through the very fibre of my soul when I think of that exalted name—yes, ir the name of him who brought the final message of freedom and equality to mankind. Islam is one and indivisible; it brooks no distinctions in it. There are no Wahabies, Shias or Sunnies in Islam. Fight not for the interpretations of the truth, when the truth itself is in danger. It is foolish to complain of stumbling when you walk if the darkness of night. Let all come forward and contribute their respective shares in the great toil of the nation. Let the idols of class-distinctions and sectarianism be smashed for ever. Let the Musalmans of the country be once more united into a great vital whole. How can we, in the presence of violent internal disputes, expect to succeed in persuading others to our way of thinking? The work of freeing humanity from superstition—the ultimate ideal of
Islam as a community, for the realization of which we have done so little in this great land of myth and superstition—will ever remain undone if the emancipators themselves are becoming gradually enchained in the very fetters, from which it is their mission to set others free.
(Hindustan Review,
Vol. XX, July-December, 1909.)
POLITICAL THOUGHT IN ISLAM
Pre-Islamic Arabia was divided into various tribes continually at war with one another. Each tribe had its own chief, its own god and its own poet, whose tribal patriotism manifested itself chiefly in the glorification of the virtues of his own tribe. Though these primitive social groups recognized, to a certain extent, their kinship with one another, yet it was mainly the authority of Muhammad (PBUH) and the cosmopolitan character of his teaching which shatter- Ed the aristocratic ideals of individual tribes, and welded the dwellers of tents into one common ever expanding nationality. For our purposes, however, it is necessary to notice, at the outset,’ the features of the Arabian see of tribal succession, and the procedure followed by the members of the tribe on the death of their chief. When the Chief or Shaikh of an Arab tribe died all the elders of the tribe met together, and, sitting in a circle, discussed the matter of succession. Any member of the tribe could hold the chieftainship if he were unanimously elected by the elders and heads of great families. The idea of hereditary monarchy, as Von Kremer has pointed out, was quite foreign to the Arab mind, though the principle of seniority which, since Ahmad I, has received legal recognition in the constitution of modern Turkey, did certainly influence the election. When the tribe was equally divided between two leaders, the rival sections separated from each other until one of the candidates relinquished his claim; otherwise the sword was appealed to. The Chief thus elected could be deposed by the tribe if his conduct necessitated deposition. With the expansion of the Arab conquest, and the consequent enlargement of mental outlook, this primitive custom gradually developed into a Political Theory carefully constructed, as we shall see, by the constitutional lawyers of Islam through reflective criticism on the revelations of the political experience.
True to this custom, the Prophet of Arabia left no instructions with regard to the matter of his succession. There is a tradition that the old Amir, son of Tufail, came to the Prophet and said, “If I am bracing Islam what would my rank be? Wilt thou give me the command after thee?” “It does not belong to me,” said the Prophet, “to dispose of the command after me.” Abu Bakr, the Prophet’s father in-law and one of his chief companions therefore, in consequence of the danger of internal disruption, was rather hurriedly and irregularly elected. He then rose and addressed the people thus:—
“O people! Now I am ruler over you, albeit not the best amongst you. If I do well, support me ; if ill, then set me right. Follow the true wherein is faith fulness, eschew the false wherein is treachery. The Weaker amongst you shall be as the stronger with me, Until that I shall have redressed his wrong; and the Stronger shall be as the weaker until, if the Lord Will, I shall have taken from him that which he hath Wrested. Leave not off to fight in the way of the Lord ; whosoever leaveth off, him verily shall the Lord abase. Obey me as I obey the Lord and his Prophet, wherein I disobey, obey me not.”
Omar, however, afterwards held that the hurried election of Abu Bakr, though very happy in its consequences and justified by the need of the time, should not form .a precedent in Islam; for, as he is reported to have said (Dozy, I, p. 121), an election which is only a partial expression of the people’s will is null and void. It was, therefore, early understood that Political Sovereignty defactoresides in the people; and that the electorate by their free act of unanimous choice embody it in a determinate personality in which the collective will is, so to speak, individualized without investing this concrete seat of power with any privilege in the eye of the law except legal control over the individual wills of which it is an expression. The idea of universal agreement is, in fact the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory. “What the Muslim community considers good,” said the Prophet, “God also considers good.” it is probably on the authority of this saying of the Prophet that Al-Ashari developed his political dogma—”That error is impossible in the united deliberations of the whole community.” After the death of Abu Bakr, Omar, who acted as Chief Judge during his predecessor’s Caliphate, was universally elected by the people. In 644 A.D. he was mortally wounded by a Persian slave, and committed his trust, before be died, to seven electors—one of them being his own son to nominate his successor, with the condition that their choice must be unanimous, and that none of them must stand as a candidate for the Caliphate. It will be seen, from Omar’s exclusion of his own son from the candidature, how remote was the idea of hereditary monarchy from the Arabian political con sciousness. The choice of this council, however, fell upon one of the councilors, Uthman, who was con sequently nominated, and the nomination afterwards confirmed by the people. The caliphate of Uthman is really the source of the three great religio-political parties with their respective political theories which each party, finding itself in power, attempted to realise in one or the other of the provinces of the Arab Empire. Before, however, I proceed to describe these theories, I want to draw attention to the follow ing two points :—
(1) That the Muslim Commonwealth is based on the absolute equality of all Muslims in the eye of the law. There is no privileged class, no priesthood, no caste system. In his latter days the Prophet once ascended the pulpit and said to the people :— “Muslims! If I have struck anyone of you,
here is my back that he may strike me. If anyone has been wronged by me, let him return injury for injury. If I have taken anybody’s goods, all that I have is at his disposal.” A man arose and claimed a debt of three dirhams (about three shillings). “I Would much rather,” said the Prophet, “have the shame in this world than in the next.” And he paid him on the spot.
The law of Islam does not recognise the apparently natural differences of race, nor the historical differences of nationality. The political ideal of Islam consists in the creation of a people born of a free fusion of all races and nationalities. Nationality, with Islam, is not the highest limit of political development; for the general principles of the law of Islam rest on human nature, not on the peculiarities of a particular people. The inner cohesion of such a nation would consist not in ethnic or geographic unity, not in the unity of language or social tradition, but in the unity of the religious and political ideal; or, in the psychological fact of “like as St. Paul would say. The membership of this nation, consequently, would not be determined by birth. marriage, domicile or naturalization. It would be determined by a public declaration of “like-mindedness”, and would terminate when the individual has ceased to be like-minded with others. The ideal territory for such a nation would be the whole earth. The Arabs, like the Greeks and the Romans endeavored to create such a nation or the world-state by conquest, but failed to actualize their ideal. The realization of this ideal, however, is not impossible; for the ideal nation does already exist in germ. The life of modern political communities finds expression, to. a great extent, in common institutions, Law and Government; and the various sociological circles, so to speak, are continually expanding to touch one another. Further, it is not incompatible with the sovereignty of individual States, since its structure will be determined not by physical force, but by the spiritual force of a common ideal.
(2) That according to the law of Islam there is no 4istinction between the Church and the State. The State with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unity in which no such distinction exists. The Caliph is not necessarily the high-priest of Islam; he is not the representative of God on earth. He is fallible like other men, and is subject, like every Muslim, to the impersonal authority of the same law. The Prophet himself is not regarded as absolutely infallible by many Muhamniadan theologians (e.g., Abu ishaq, Tabari). In fact, the idea of personal authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam. The Prophet of Arabia succeeded in commanding the absolute submission of an entire people; yet no man has depreciated his own authority more than he. “I am,” he says, “a man like you; like you.my forgiveness also depends on the mercy of God.” Once in a moment of spiritual exaltation, he is reported to have said to one of his companions, “Go and tell the people—he who says—there is only one: God—will enter the paradise,” studiously omitting the second half of the Muslim creed—”And Muhammad (PBUH) is his Prophet.” The ethical importance of this attitude is great. The whole system of Islamic ethics is based on the idea of individuality; anything which tends to repress the healthy development of individuality is quite inconsistent with the spirit of Islamic law and ethics. A Muslim is free to do any thing he likes, provided he does not violate the law. The general principles of this law are believed to have been revealed; the details, in order to cover the relatively secular cases, are left to the interpretation of professional lawyers. It is, therefore, true to say that the entire fabric of Islamic law, actually administered, is really judge-made law, so that the lawyer performs the legislative function in the Muslim constitution. If, however, an absolutely new case arise which is not provided for in the law of Islam, the will of the whole Muslim community becomes a further source of law. But I do not know whether a general council of the whole Muslim community was ever held for this purpose.
I shall now describe the three great political theories to which I have alluded above. I shall first take up the Sunni view.
I. ELECTIVE MONARCHY
The Caliph and the People.
During the days of the early Caliphate things were extremely simple. The Caliphs were like private individuals, sometimes doing the, work of an ordinary constable. In obedience to the Quranic verses—”and consult them in all matters”—they always consulted the more influential companions of the Prophet, in judicial and executive matters, but no formal ministers existed to assist the Caliph in his administrative work. It was not until the time of the House of Abbas that the Caliphate became the subject of scientific treatment. In my description of the Sunni view I shall mainly follow all constitutional lawyers who flourished during the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al-Qadir. Al-Mawardy divides the whole Muslim community into two classes,
(1) The electors,
(2) The candidates for election. The qualifications absolutely necessary for a candidate are thus enumerated by him::
1. Spotless character.
2. Freedom fighte physical and mental infirmity. The predecessor of the present Sultan of Turkey was deposed under this condition.
3. Necessary legal and theological knowledge in order to be ‘able to decide various cases. This is true in theory; in practice the power of the Caliph, especially in later times,;, was divided.
4. Insight necessary for a ruler.
5. Courage to defend the empire.
6. Relation shi with the family of the Quraish. This qualification is not regarded as indispensable by modern Sunni lawyers on the ground that the Prophet never nominated any person as his successor.
7. Full age (AU-Ghazali). It was on this ground that the chief judgee refused to elect Al-Muqtadir.
8. Male sex (PA1-Baidawi). This is denied by the Khawarij who holdd that a woman can be elected as Caliph
If the candidaate satisfies these conditions, the representative of ! influential families, doctors of law, high officials off the State and commanders of the Army, meet together and nominate him to the Caliphate. The whole assembly then proceeds to the mosque where then is duly confirmed by the people in distant places representatives of the elected Caliph are permit to receive homage on behalf of the Caliph. In this matter of election the people of the capital, however, have no precedence over other people, though, in practice, they have a certain amount of precedence, since they are naturally the first to hear of the Caliph’s death. After the election, the Caliph usually makes a speech, promising to rule according to the law of Islam. Most of these speeches are preserved. Jet will be seen that the principle of representation is, to a certain extent, permitted in practical politics; in the law of property, however, it is expressly denied. For instance, if B dies in the lifetime of his father A and his brother C, leaving issue, the whole property of A goes to C. The children of B have no claim; they cannot re present their father, or “stand in his shoes”.
From a legal standpoint, the Caliph does not occupy any privileged position. In theory, he is like other members of the Commonwealth. He can be directly sued in an ordinary law court. The second Caliph was once accused of appropriating a larger share in the spoils of war, and he had to clear his conduct before the people, by production of evidence according to the law of Islam. In his judicial capacity he is open to the criticism of every Muslim. Omar I was severely reprimanded by an old woman who pointed out to him that his interpretation of a certain Quranic verse was absolutely wrong. The Caliph listened to her argument, and decided the case accord ing to her views.
The Caliph may indicate his successor who may be his son; but the nomination is invalid until con firmed by the people. Out of the fourteen Caliphs of the House of Umayya only four succeeded in securing their sons as successors. The Caliph cannot secure the election of his successor during his lifetime tells us that but lbn Musayyib the great Mekkan lawyer, strongly protested against the Caliph’s behavior. The Abbasi Caliph Hadi, however, succeeded in securing the election of his son jafat, but after his death the majority declared for liarun. In such a case, when the people declare for another Caliph, the one previously elected must, “ penalty of death, immediately renounce his right in public.
If the Caliph does not rule according to the law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliphate is forfeited. Usually one influential Muhammad stands up in the mosque after the prayer, and speaks to the congregation giving reasons for the proposed deposition. He declares deposition to be in the interest of Islam, and ends his speech by throwing away his finger-ring with the remark: “1 rejects the Caliph as i throw away this ring” The people then signify their assent in various ways, and the deposition is complete.
The questioning whether two or more rival Caliphates can exist simultaneously is discussed by Muslim lawyers. Ibn Jama holds that only one Caliphate is possible. Ibn KhaldUfl holds that there is nothing illegal in the co of two or more Caliphates, provided they are in different countries. lbn Kbal dun’s view is certainly contrary to the old Arabian idea, yet in so far as the Muslim Commonwealth is governed by an impersonal authoriY, i.e., law, his position seems to me to be quite a tenable one. More-over, as a matter of fact, two rival Caliphates have existed in Islam for a long time and still exists.
Just as a candidate for the Caliphate must have certain qualifications, so, according to Al-Mawardy, the elector also must be qualified. He must possess:
(1) Good reputation as an honest man.
(2) Necessary knowledge of State affairs.
(3) Necessary insight and judgment.
In theory all Muslims, men and women, possess the right of election. There is no property qualification. In practice, however, women and slaves did not exercise this right. Some of the early lawyers seem to have recognized the danger of mass-elections as they endeavor to show that the right of election resides only in the tribe of the Prophet. Whether the seclusion of women grew up in order to make women incapable of exercising a right which in theory could not be denied to them, I cannot say.
The elector has the right to demand the deposition of the Caliph, or the dismissal of his officials if he can show that their conduct is not in accordance with the law of Islam. He can, on the subject, address the Muslim congregation in the mosque after the prayer. The mosque, it must be remembered, is the Muslim Forum, and the institution of daily prayer is closely connected with the political life of Muslim communities. Apart from its spiritual and social functions, the institution is meant to serve as a ready means of constant criticism of the State. If, however, the elector does not intend to address the congregation, he can issue a judicial inquiry concerning the conduct of any State official, or any other matter Which affects the community as a whole. The judicial inquiry as a rule, does not mention the name of any dive I quote an illustration in order to give an idea of this procedure “In the name of God, merciful and clement. What is the opinion of the doctors of law, the guides of the people, on the ncouragemeflt of the Zimmis, and on the assistance we can demand from them, whether as clerks to the Amirs entrusted with the administration of the country, or as collectors of taxes? . . . Explain the above by solid proofs, establish theorthodOX belief by sound arguments ,and give your reasons. .God will reward you.”
Such judicial inquiries are issued by the State as well, and when the lawyers give conflicting decisions, the majority prevails. Forced election is quite illegal. Ibn Jama, an Egyptian lawyer, however, holds that forced election is legal in times of political unrest. The opportunist view has no support in the law of Islam; though, undoubtedly, it is based on historical facts. Tartushi, a Spanish lawyer, would probably hold the same view, for he says: “Forty years of tyranny are better than one hour of anarchy.”
Let us now consider the relation between the elected and the elector. Al-Mawardy defines this relationas”Aqd”—binding together, contract in con sequence of which the Caliph has to do certain duties, e.g. to define the religion, to enforce the law of Islam, to levy customs and taxes according to the law of Slam, to pay annual salaries and properly to direct the State treasury. If he fulfils those conditions, the people have mainly two duties in relation to viz., to obey him, and to assist him in his work Apart from this contract, however, Muslim I why have also enumerated certain cases in which benefice to the Caliph is not necessary.
The origin of the State then, according to Al Mawardy, is not force, but free consent of individual who unite to form a brotherhood, based upon leg equality, in order that each member of the brother hood may work out the potentialities of his individual laity under the law of Islam. Government, with him, is an artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the; sense that the law of Islam—believed to have, been revealed—demands peace and security.
The Caliph, after his. election, appoints it principal officials of the State, or confirms those pre piously in office. The following are the principal State officials with their duties defined by the law :—
(1) The Weir, the Prime Minister—either with limited or unlimited powers. The Weir with Un-. limited powers must possess the same qualifications as the Caliph, except that, according to Al-Mawardy, he need not necessarily belong to the Quash tribe. He must be thoroughly educated especially Mathew- mastics, History, and the Art of speaking. He can perform all the functions of the Caliph, except that he cannot nominate the Caliph’s successor. He can,. without previous sanction of the Caliph, appoint officers of the various departments of the State. The Weir with limited powers cannot do so. THC dis_ missal of the Wazir with unlimited powers means the dismis5ai of all officials appointed by him; while the dismissal of the Wazir with limited powers does not lead to the dismissal of the officials appointed by him. More than one Wazir with unlimited powers cannot be appointed. The governors of various provinces can appoint their own Weirs. A non Muhammadan may be appointed Wazir with limited powers. The Shiah dynasty of the Obaidies appointed a Jew to this position. An Egyptian poet expresses their sentiments as follows:—
“The Jews of our time have reached the goal of their ambition. Theirs is all honour theirs is all gold—people of Egypt I advise you to become Jews; God himself has become a Jew.”
(2) Next to the Wazir the most important executive officers of the State were governors of various provinces. They were appointed by the Caliph with limited or unlimited powers. The governor with un limited powers could appoint sub-governors to ad joining smaller provinces. For instance, the sub- governor of Sicily was appointed by the governor of Spain and that of Sindh by the governor of Basra. This was really an attempt to create self-governing Muslim colonies. The officer in charge was, so to speak, a miniature caliph’ of his province ; he appoint d his own Wazir, Chief Judge and other State )officers. Where special commander of the provincialism was not appointed, the governor, ex-official cited as the commander. This, however, was an error, ;lance the govern become gradually powerful and requent1y asserted their independence. But in his capacity of the commander the governor had no right to raise the salaries of his soldiers except in very special circumstances. It was his duty to send all the money to the central treasury after defraying the necessary State expenses, If the provincial income fell short of the expenses, he could claim a contribution from the central treasury. If he is appointed by the Caliph, the death of the latter is not followed by his dismissal; but if he is appointed by the Wazir, the death of the Wazir means the dismissal of all governors appointed by him, provided they are not newly confirmed in their respective posts.
The governor with limited powers was a purely executive officer. He had nothing to do with judicial matters, and in criminal matters too his authority was very much limited.
Muslim lawyers, however, recognise a third kind of governorship, i.e., by usurpation. But the usurper must fulfill certain conditions before his claim is legally justified.
(3) Commanders of armies. Here too the distinction of limited and unlimited powers is made, and the duties of commanders, subordinate officers, and soldiers are clearly defined.
(4) The Chief Judge. The Chief Judge could be appointed by the Caliph or the Wazir. According to Abu Hanifa in some cases and according to Abu Jafir Tabary, a non-Muslim can be appointed to administer the law of his co-religionists. The Chief Judge, as representative of the law of Islam can depose the Caliph—he can kill his own creator. His death means the dismissal of his staff; but the death 0 the sovereign is not followed by the dismissal of the judges appointed by him. During an interregnum a judge can be elected by the people of a town, but not during the sovereign’s lifetime.
(5) President of the Highest Court of Appeal and general control. The object of this institution was to hear appeals and to exercise a general supervision overall the departments of the State. AbdulMalik— the Umayya Caliph and the founder of this court— personally acted as the president, though more difficult cases he transferred to Qazi Abu Idris. In later times, the president was appointed by the Caliph. During the reign of the Abbasi Caliph Al Muqtadir, his mother was appointed President, and she used to hear appeals, on Fridays, surrounded by Judges, priests and other notables. In one respect, the President of this court differed from the Chief Judge. He was not bound by the letter of the law like the Qazi; his decisions were based on general principles of natural j that the President was something like the keeper of the Caliph’s con science. He was assisted by a council of judges and l3s whose duty was to discuss every aspect of the case before the President announced his decision. The importance of this institution may be judged from the fact that it was among the few Muslim institutions which. the Normans retained after their Conquest of Sicily in the eleventh century.
II. THE SH1 VIEW
According to the Shiah view the State is of divine origin and the Caliph or, as they call, Imam, governs by divine right. The view arose among an obscure Arabian sect known as the Sybarites whose founder Abdulla ibn Saba was a Jew of Sana in Yemen. In the time of Uthman he became a convert to Islam, and finally settled in Egypt were he pre ached his doctrine. This doctrine b.armonised with the pre-Islamic habits of political thought in Persia, and soon found a permanent home in that country. The Imam, according to the Persians, is not elected (the Shiahs of Oman, however, adopted the elected principle and held that the Imam might be deposed) but appointed by God. He is the reincarnation of Universal Reason, he is endowed with all perfections, his wisdom is superhuman and his decisions are absolute and final. The first Imam, Au, was appointed by Muhammad; Abu’s direct descendants are his divinely ordained successors. The world is never without a living .Imam whether visible or invisible. The 12th Imam, according to the Shiahs, suddenly disappeared near Kufa, but he will come again and fill the world with peace and prosperity. In the mean time, he communicates his will, from time to time, through certain favoured individuals called Gates, who hold mysterious intercourse with him. Now this doctrine of the absence of the Imam has a very important political aspect which few students of Islam have fully appreciated. Whether the Imam really disappeared or not, I do not know; but it is obvious that the dogma is a clever way of separating the Church and the State. The absent Imam, as I have pointed out above, is absolute authority in all matters; the present executive authorities are, therefore, only guardians of the estate which really belongs to the Imam, who, as such, inherits the property of deceased intestates in case they leave no heirs. It will therefore be seen that the authority of the Shah of Persia is limited by the authority of the Mullahs—the representatives of the absent Imam. As a mere guardian of the estate be is subject to the religious authority though as the chief executive authority he is free to adopt any measure for the good of the estate. It is not, there fore, surprising that the Mullahs took an active part in the recent constitutional reforms in Persia.
III. THE KHAWARIJ_REPUBLICA
I shall be very brief in my account of the Khawarij, since the history of their opinions is yet to be worked out. The first Muslims who were so called were the notorious 12,000 who revolted against Au after they had fought under him at the battle of Sniffing. They were offended at his submitting the decision of his right to the Caliphate to the arbitration of men when, in their opinion, it ought to have been ‘submitted to the law of God—the Quran. “The nation,” they said to Au, calls us to book of God; you call us to the sword.” Shahristani divides them into twenty-four sects, differing slightly from one another in legal and constitutional opinion, e.g.,
•tha the ignorance of the law is a valid excuse; that the adulterer should not be stoned, for the Quran nowhere mentions this punishment; that the hiding of one’s religious opinions is illegal ; that the Caliph Should not be called the commander of the faithful; at there is nothing illegal in having two or more Caliphs in one and the same time. In East Africa and Mazab—South Algeria—they still maintain the simplicity of their republican ideal. Broadly speak ing, the Khawarij can be divided into three classes:—
(1) Those who hold that there must be an elected Caliph, but it is not necessary that he should belong to a particular family or tribe. A woman or even a slave could be elected as Caliph provided he or she is a good Muslim ruler. Whenever they found themselves in power, they purposely elected their Caliph from among the socially lowest members of their community.
(2) Those that hold that there is no need of a Caliph, the Muslim congregation can govern themselves.
(3) Those who do not believe in Government at all—the anarchists of Islam. To them Caliph Au is reported to have said: “You do not believe in any Government, but there must be some Government, good or bad.” *
Such are, briefly, the main lines of Political Thought in Islam. It is clear that the fundamental principle laid down in the Quran is the principle of election; the details or rather the translation of this principle into a workable scheme of Government is left to be determined by other considerations. Unfortunately, however, the idea of election did not develop on strictly democratic lines, and the Muslim conquerors consequently failed to do anything for the political improvement of Asia. The form of election was certainly maintained in Baghdad and Spain, but no regular political institutions could grow to vitalise the people at large. It seems to me that there were principally two reasons for this want of political activity in Muslim countries:—
(1) In the first place the idea of election was not
at all suited to the genius of the Persians and the Mon gols the two principle races which accepted Islam as their religion. Dozy tell us that the Persians were even determined to worship the Caliph as a divinity, and on being told that worship belonged to God alone, they attempted to rebel against the Caliph who would not be the centre of religious emotion.
(2) The life of early Muslims was a life of con quest. The whole energy was devoted to political expansion which tends to concentrate political power in fewer hands; and thus serves as an unconscious hand maid of despotism. Democracy does not seem to be quite willing to get on with Empire—aless on which the modern English Imperialist might well take to heart. In modern times—thanks to the influence of Western political ideas—Muslim countries have exhibited signs of political life. Egypt has made progress; Persia has received a constitution from the
Shah and the Young Turkish Party too have been struggling, scheming, and plotting to achieve their object. But it is absolutely necessary for these political reformers to make a thorough study of Islamic constitutional principles, and not to shock the naturally suspicious conservatism of their people by appearing as prophets of a new culture. They would certainly impress them more if they could show that their seemingly borrowed ideal of political freedom is really the ideal of Islam, and is, as such, the rightful demand of free Muslim conscience.
(Hindus tan Review,
Vols. XXII & XXIII, 1910-1911)
STRAY THOUGHTS (1)
The result of all philosophical thought is that absolute knowledge is an impossibility. The Poet Browning turns this impossibility to ethical use by a very ingenious argument. The uncertainty of human knowledge, says the poet, is a necessary condition of moral growth, since complete knowledge will destroy the liberty of human choice:
Literary criticism sometimes precedes the creation of a great Literature. We find Lessing on the very threshold of German Literature.
So are we drawn as wood is shoved, By other’s sinews each way moved.Montaigne remarks on the above lines of Horace :— “We go not, but we are carried, as things that float, now gliding gently, now hulling violently, according as the water is either stormy or calm.” While reading the above in Montaigne. I was put in mind of a verse by our late and lamented writer Azad, wao has given an expression to this idea much more beautifully than either Horace or Mon Both Shakespeare and Goethe rethink the thought of Divine creation. There is, however, one, important difference between them. The Realist Englishman rethinks the Individual the Idealist German, the Universal. Faust is a seeming individual only. In reality he is humanity individualized.
As a plant growing on the bank of a stream hearth not the sweet silver-music which s it from beneath, so man, growing on the brink of Infinity listened not to the Divine undertone that makes the life and harmony of his soul.
The attitude of toleration and even conformity without belief in dogma is probably the most income prehensible thing to the vulgar mind. If such is your attitude, keep quiet and never try to defend your position. Nations are born in the hearts of Poets; they prosper and die in the hands of politicians. Democracy has a tendency foster the spirit of meaning. it’s itself bad; but unfortunately to make the illegal and the wrong identical a No religious of suffering. The oral it was that they based the errors of Christian. suffering alone and ignore religion on the fact of factors. Yet such a rely the moral value of other to the European mind in order to supplement system was a necessity to supplement the beautiful but one-sided dream of life was certainly The Greek but it wanted in the color eel which was supplied by Christianity.
Life, like the arts of Poetry and P& wholly expression. Contemplation without act ion is Matthew Arnold is a however, an element of every precise poet. I like, the vague appears profound in poetry, since e emotions. At There Pact sin is better than piety. is lacking in the lattwe element in the former which .
Suffering is a gift from the gods in order to the whole of life.
Self in builds families, in communities it builds Empires. power is more divine betroth. God s power. Be ye, then, like your Father Who is in heaven. The powerful man creates environment the eb1e have to adjust them to it.
Matthew Arnold defines poetry as criticism of life. That life is criticism of poetry is equally true. The fate of the world has been principally deciding minorities. The history of Europe bears ample testimony to the truth of this proposition It seems to me that there are psychological reasons why minorities should have been a powerful factor in the of mankind Character IS the invisible force which determines the destinies of nations, and an if tense character IS not possible in a majority It IS a force, the more it is distributed the weaker it becomes (New Era, 7th April, 1971)
ISLAM AND MYSTICISM
The present day Muslim prefers to roam about aimlessly in the dusky valleys of Hellenic-Persian Mysticism which teaches us to shut our eyes to the hard Reality around, and to fix our gaze on what it describes as “Illuminations”—blue, red, and yellow Reality springing up from the cells of an over-worked brain. To me this self-mystification, this Nihilism, i.e., seeking Reality in quarters where it does not exist, is a physiological symptom which gives me a clue to the decadence of the Muslim world. The intellectual history of the ancient world will reveal to you this most significant fact that the decadent in all ages have tried to seek shelter behind self-mystification and Nihilism. Having lost the vitality to grapple with the temporal, these prophets of decay apply themselves to the quest of a supposed eternal; and gradually complete the spiritual impoverishment and physical degeneration of their society by evolving a seemingly charming ideal of life which seduces even the healthy and powerful to death! To such a peculiarly constructed society as Islam the work of these sentimental obscurantist has done immense harm. Our birth, as a society repudiating the ideas of race and language as principles of social recons traction, was due 3nly to our subjecting ourselves to a system of Law believed to be Divine in its origin; yet the old Mystic frankly held and secretly preached it to but merely Phenomenal; nothing more than an outer husk of the Real which is to be attained by means other than the Law of God. In most cases the observance of the Law, even though held to be phenom was retained to avoid social odium; but no tudent of Muslim thought and literature can deny that the tendency to ignore the Law—the only force holding together Muslim Society was the direct consequence of a false Mysticism born of the heart and brain of Persia. Thus Muslim Democracy was gradually displaced and enslaved by a sort of spiritual Aristocracy pretending to claim knowledge and power not open to the average Muslim. The danger of this Personalization of Islam was clearly seen on the great Muslim Saint, Sheikh Ahmad Rifai (peace be on him). Writing to Abdul Sami ‘Hashimi’ the Sbeikh says…
Elsewhere the great Saint strikes at the very root of Persian mysticism (i.e., the distinction of inner and outer, phenomenal and Real, to which I have alluded before) and declares:
The Muslims of Spain, with their Aristotle and Spirit and away from the enervating influences of the thought of Western and Central Asia, were comparatively much closer to the spirit of Islam than the Muslim races of Asia, who let Arabian Islam pass through all the solvents of Ajam and finally divested it of its original character. The conquest of Persia meant not the conversion of Persia to Islam, but the conversion of Islam to Persianism! Read the intellectual history of the Muslims of Western and Central Asia from the 10th century downwards, and you will find therein verified every word that I have written above.
Such are the charms of decadence! We drink the poison and kiss the hand of those who administer it Remember that Islam was born in the broad day light of history. The great democratic Prophet lived and worked among intelligent men, who have transmitted to posterity every word that dropped from his sacred lips. There is absolutely nothing esoteric in his teachings. Every word of the Quran is brimful of light and joy of existence. Far from justifying any gloomy, pessimistic mysticism, it is an open assault on those religious teachings which have for centuries mystified mankind. Accept, then, the reality of the world cheerfully and grapple with it for the glorification of God and His Prophet. Do not listen to him who says there is a secret doctrine in Islam which cannot be revealed to the uninitiated. Herein lies the power of this pretender and your thralldom. See how in the spirit of Roman Christianity he builds fortifications round himself with a view to save his realms of darkness against the possible invasions of the historian. He enslaves you by exploiting your ignorance of the history of Islam; but seeing clearly that the light of history may some time dispel the mist his teaching from your intellectual atmosphere, he teaches you to regard sense-perception as “the greatest veil” (Thus this enemy of sense-reality blunts your sense for fact, and undermines the very foundations of the science history).
Muslim young men! Beware of the mystified! His noose has now been too long round your neck. The regeneration of the Muslim world lies in the strong uncompromising, ethical Monotheism which was preached to the Arabs thirteen hundred years ago. Come, then, out of the fogs of Persianism and walk into the brilliant desert—sunshine of Arabia.
2. MUSLIM DEMOCRACY
The Democracy of Europe—over shadowed by so cialistic agitation and anarchical fear—originated mainly in the economic regeneration of European societies. Nietzsche, however, abhors this “rule of the herd” and, hopeless of the plebeian, he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an Aristocracy of Supermen. But is the plebeian so abs. lutely hopeless? The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity, it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character. Out of the plebeian material Islam has formed men. of the noblest type of life and Power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche?
3. OUR PROPEIET’S CRITICISM OF Contemporary
ARABIAN POETRY
History has preserved some of the criticisms of our Prophet on contemporary Arabian poetry But two of these criticisms are most profitable to Indian Muslims whose literature has been chiefly the work of the period of their national decadence, and who are now in search of a new literary ideal. One of these criticisms indicates to us what poetry should not be and the other what it should be:
l Of the Poet lmra-ul-Qais who flourished about 40 years before Islam, our Prophet is reported
to have said:
“He is the most poetic of all poets and their leader to Hell.”
Now what do we find in the poetry of Imra-ulQais?
Sparkling wine, enervating sentiments and situations of love, heart-rending moans over the ruins of habitations long swept away by stormy winds, superb pictures of the inspiring scenery of silent deserts— and all this is the choicest expression of old Arabia. Imra-ul-Qais appeals more to imagination than to will, and on the whole acts as a narcotic on the mind of the reader. The Prophet’s criticism reveals this most important art-principle—that the good in art is not necessarily identical with the good in life; it is possible for a poet to write fine poetry, and yet lead his society to Hell. The poet is essentially a seducer; woe to his people, if instead of making the trials of life look beautiful and attractive he embellishes decadence with all the glories of health and power, and seduces his people to extinction. Out of the richness of his nature he ought to lavish on others something of the super-abundance of life and power in him, and not steal away,. thief-like, the little they already, hipper to possess.
2. Again the following verse of Antra of the tribe of Abs was read to our Prophet:
“Verily I pass through whole nights of toil to merit a livelihood worthy of an honorable man.
- The Prophet whose mission was to glorify life and to beautify all its trials was immensely, pleased, and said to his companions:
“The praise of an Arabian has never kindled in me a desire to see him, but I tell you I do wish to meet the author of this verse.”
Imagine the man, a single look at whose face was a of infinite bliss to the looker desiring to meet an infidel Arab for his verse! What is the secret of this Unusual honour which the Prophet wished to give to the poet? It is because the verse is so healthful and Vitalizing, it is because the poet idealizes the pain of honorable labor. The Prophet’s appreciation of this verse indicates to us another art-principle of great Value art is subordinate to life, not superior to it. ‘The ultimate end of all hutnan activity is Life—glorious, powerful, exuberant. All human art must be subordinated to this final purpose and the value of everything must be determined in reference to its life- yielding capacity. The highest art is that which awakens our dormant will-force, and nerves us to face the trials of life manfully. All that brings drowsiness and makes us shut our eyes to reality around—on the mastery of which alone life depends—is a message of decay and death. There should be no opium-eating in Art. The dogma of Art for the sake of Art is a clever invention of decadence to cheat us out of life and power.
Thus the Prophet’s appreciation of Antra’s verse gives us the ultimate principle for the proper evaluation of all Art.
(New Era,
28th July, 1917)
STRAY THOUGHTS (III)
TOUCH OF HEGELIANISM IN Disannul Afar, AKBAR
‘ To the great German idealist Hegel creation means the Absolute Reason leaving its absoluteness and returning to itself by visualizing or objectifying itself in the form of a Universe which, in its essence, is no more than the unity of the Absolute Reason powdered up in a visible, perceptible plurality. When there this process of return is tern portal or non-temporal (for on this point Hegelians differ) it is clear that ac cording to the Master its motive-force is the neces sarily self-contradictory categories through which the Absolute Reason has to pass synthetically to regain its primeval Absoluteness. At the beginning of the process, since we are distant from the origial Absolute tenses the contradictions are sharp and mutually exclusive, but when we approach the end of the process their sharpness begins to disappear until we reach the Absolute idea in which all contradictions embrace ea other, and are transformed into a single unity. Thus the central idea of Hegel’s Philosophy can be summed up in a few words—infinite becoming Finite and regaining itself through synthesis of self-evolved oppositions. The life of the universe, then, is neces Sarily constituted by a perpetual conflict of opposing °races. This brief sketch of Hegel’s idea, I am afraid, is not quite luminous, but I venture to hope it will assist you in realizing the depth of Akbar’s apparently simple verse: The endless conflict of Nature’s creative force is too palpable to escape the observation of poets and thinkers. Tennyson has perhaps given it a fuller and more pathetic expression; and our own Urfi has seized it in a majestic verse: The special feature of Akbar, however, is that in a few simple and well-chosen words he reveals to you not only the conflict, but also the cause (i.e. Limitation of the Limitless) which has generated it. And in the words J and he further suggests that this conflict is not limited to the material Plane ( only, but extends itself to the mental plane as well. In Alexander’s well-known book: Moral Order and Progress, you will find how our ideas, ideals, beliefs and modes of life are constantly engaged in a quiet, bloodless fight, and how they displace, kill and absorb one another.
(2)
NIETZSCHE AND JALAL-UD-DIN RUM!
Comparisons, they say, are odious. I wants however, to draw your attention to a literary comparison which is exceedingly instructive and cannot be regarded as odious. Nietzsche and Maulana Jalaltid-din Rumi stand at the opposite poles of thought; butin the history of literature and thought it is the jets of contact and departure which constitutentres of special interest In spite of the enormous 0 distance that lies between them these two Feat poet-philosophers seem to be in perfect agreement with regard to the practical bearing of their thought on life. Nietzsche saw the decadence of the human type around him, disclosed the subtle forces that had been working for it, and finally attempted to aclumbrate the type of life adequate to the task of our planet. “Not how man is preserved, but how man is surpassed,” was the keynote of Nietzsche’s thought. The superb Rumi—born to the Muslim world at a time when enervating modes of life and thought, and an outwardly beautiful but
inwardly devitalising literature had almost completely sucked up the blood of Muslim Asia and paved the
way for an easy victory for the Tartar—was not less keenly alive than Nietzsche to the poverty of life,
incompetence, inadequacy and decay of the body Social of which he formed a part and parcel. See
With What unerring insight he describes the corroding disseat of his society and suggests the ideal type of Muslim manhood :—
(3)
I would not exchange for half a dozen systems of Philosophy this one verse of Naziri—
(4)
History is a huge gramophone in which the voices of Nations are preserved. Human Intellect—Nature’s attempt at self-
(5)
criticism,
(6)
Our soul discovers itself when we come into contact with a great mind. It is not until I had realized the infinitude of Goethe’s mind that I discovered the narrow breadth of my own.
(7)
Belief is a great power. When I see that a proposition of mine is believed by another mind, my own conviction of its truth is thereby immensely increased.
(8)
When we fail in an enterprise we feel inclined to leave our home and try our luck in alien climes. If such is your situation, study your soul closely before deciding one way or the other. Is it because your ambition has received a fresh spur from your failure, or because your wish to hide your face from those Who have witnessed your failure. Excuse this bit of cruelly Hegel’s system of Philosophy is an epic poem in prose.
(10)
Because I (living) in the 20th century) know hemi have the highest respect for Aristotle. Not only better than the older generations of my community, thought of my people. The tinge, however, of in-but also because of his vast influence on the entire gratitude veiled in his criticism of Plato’s doctrine of Ideas withholds me from giving him my fullest admiration. I do not deny the element of truth in his criticism, but I do detest the spirit in which he chooses to handle his master.
(11)
A woman of superb beauty with a complete absence of self-consciousness is probably the most charming thing on God’s earth.
(12)
Both God and the Devil give man opportunities, only leaving him to make use of those opportunities in the way he thinks best.
(13)
God! I thank Thee for my birth in this world of rosy dawns, flame-clad sunsets and thick forests wherein the gloom of Nature’s bygone nights rest in eternal slumber!
(14)
Philosophy ages; Poetry rejuvenates.
(15)
Science and Philosophy have limits, Art I boundless.
(16)
The soul of Oscar Wilde is more Persian Thai English. (New Era, 18th August, 1917:
LETTER TO DR. NICHOLSON
(Lahore: dated 24-1-1921)
MY dear Dr. Nicholson,
1 was very glad to learn from your letter to Shafi’ that your translation of the Asrar-i-Khudi had been favourably received and excited much attention in England Some of the English reviewers, however, have been misled by the superficial resemblance of some my ideas to those of Nietzsche.
The view of the writer in the Athenaeum is largely affected by some mistakes of fact for which, however, the writer does not seem to be responsible. But I am sure if he had known some of the dates of the publication of my Urdu poems referred to in his review, he would have certainly taken a totally different view of the growth of my literary activity. Nor does he rightly understand my idea of the Perfect Man which he confounds with the German thinker’s Superman. I wrote on the Solidest of the Perfect Man more than twenty years ago, long before it had read or heard anything of Nietzsche. This was then Published in the Indian Antiquary, and later in 1908 Ormed part of my Persian Metaphysics. The English reader ought to approach this idea not through the German thinker, but through an English thinker of great merit—I man Alexander—whose Gifford lectures, delivered at Glasgow, were published last year. His chapter on Deity and God (Chapter 1, Book IV, p. 341, Vol. II) is worth reading, On page 347, he says: “Deity is thus the next higher empirical quality to mind, which the universe is engaged in bringing to birth. That the universe is pregnant with such a quality—we are speculatively assured. What that quality is we cannot know, for we can neither enjoy nor still less contemplate it. Our human altars still are raised to the Unknown God. If we could know what Deity is, how it feels to be Divine, we should first have to become as Gods.” Alexander’s thought is much bolder than mine.
I believe there is a Divine tendency in the universe, but this tendency will eventually find its complete expression in a higher man, not in a God subject to Time, as Alexander implies in his discussion of the subject. I do not agree with Alexander’s view of God, but it is clear that my idea of the. Perfect Man will lose much of its outlandishness in the eyes of the English reader if he approaches it through the ideas of a thinker of his own country.
But it was Mr. Dickinson’s review which interested me most, and I want to make a few remarks of it. Kindly pass on this letter to him; I am sure be will be interested to know what I think of his re view
(1) Mr. Dickinson thinks, as I understand frond his private letter to me, that I have deified physical force in the poem. I am afraid he is mistaken in his view. I believe in the power of the spirit, not brute force. When a people is called to a righteous war, it is, according to my belief, their duty to obey the call, but i condemn all wars of conquest (the story of Mianmir and the Emperor ot India). Mr. Dickinson, however, is quite right when he says that war is destructive whether it iswaged in the interests of Truth and Justice, or in the interests of conquest and exploitation. It must be put an end to in any case. We have seen, however, that Treaties, Leagues, Arbitrations and Conferences cannot put an end to it. Even if we secure these in a more effective manner than before, ambitious nations will substitute more peaceful forms of the exploitation of races supposed to be less favoured Ot less civilized. The truth is that we stand in need of a living personality to solve our social problems to settle our disputes, and to place international morality on a surer basis. How very true are the last paragraphs of Prof. Mackenzie’s Introduction to Seal Philosophy “There can be no ideal society without ideal man: and for the product of these we require not only insight but a motive power; fire as well as light. Perhaps, a philosophic understanding of our social problems is not even the chief want of our time. We need prophets as well as teachers, men like Carlyle or Ruskift or Tolstoy,
Who are able to add for us a new severity to con science or a new breadth to duty? Perhaps we want a new Christ. . . it has been well said that the prophet of our time must be a man of the world, and not merely a voice in the wilder ness. For indeed the wilderness of the presentis in the streets of our crowded cities, and in the midst of the incessant war by which we are trying to make our way upwards. It is there that the prophet must be.
“Or perhaps our chief want is rather for the poet of the new age than for its prophet—or for one who should be poet and prophet in one. Our poets of recent generations have taught us the love of nature, and enabled us to see in it the revelation of the Divine. We still look for one who shall show us with the same clearness the presence of the Divine in the human . . . We still need one who shall be fully and in alt seriousness what Heine playfully called himself a “Ritter von deem Hooligan Geish,” one who shall teach us to see the working out of our highest ideals in the everyday life of the world, and to find in devotion to the advancement of that life, not merely a sphere for an ascetic self. sacrifice, but a supreme object in the pursuit of which all thoughts, all passions, all delights may receive their highest development and satisfaction.”
It is in the light of the above thoughts that I want the British public to read my description of the ideal man. It is not our treaties and arbitrations which will put an end to the internecine wars of the human family.
(2) Mr. Dickinson further refers to may “Be hard”. This is based on the view of reality that I have taken in the poem. According to my belief. reality is a collection of individualities tending to become a harmonious whole through conflict which 1 inevitably lead to mutual adjustment. This inflict is a necessity in the interests of the evolution of higher forms of life, and of personal immortality. Nietzsche did not believe in personal immortality. To those desiring it, he ruthlessly says, “Do you wish to be a perpetual burden on the shoulders of time ?“ He was led to say this because he had a wrong notion of amen, and never tried to grapple with the ethical issue involved in the question of time. On the other hand, I took upon immortality as the, highest aspiration of man on which he should focus all his energies, and consequently I recognise the need of all forms of activity, including conflict, which tends to make the human person more and more stable. And for the same consideration, I condemn speculative mysticism and inactive quietism. My interest in conflict is mainly ethical and not political whereas Nietzsche’s was probably only political. Modern physical science has taught us tuba atom of material-energy h achieved its present form through thousands of years of evolution. Yet it is unstable and can be made to disappear. The same is the case with the atom of mind-energy, i.e., the human person. It has achieved its present form through ions of incessant effort and conflict; yet, in spite of all this, its instability is clear from the various phenomena of mental pathology. If it has tocontinue’intact it cannot ignore the ressons learnt from its past bareer, and will require the same Or similar forces to maintain its stability which it has availed of before. It is possible that in its onward rifle nature may modify or eliminate altogether some of the forces (e.g., conflict in the way of mutual wars) that have so far determined and helped its eviction, and introduce new forces hitherto unknown mankind to secure its stability. But, I confess I an not an idealist in this matter and believe this time to be very distant. I am afraid mankind will not, for a very long time to come, learn the lesson that the Great European War has taught them. Thus it I clear that my purpose in recognizing the need of conflict is mainly ethical. Mr. Dickinson has unfortunately altogether ignored this aspect of the “Be hard.”
(3) Mr. Dickinson further remarks that while my philosophy is universal my application of it is particular and exclusive. This is in a sense true. The humanitarian ideal is always universal in poetry air philosophy, but if you make it an effective ideal work it out in actual life, you must start, not with poets and philosophers, but with a society exclusive:
In the sense of having a creed and well-defined out line, but ever enlarging its limits by example and per- suasion. Such a society, according to my belief, i Islam., This society has so far proved itself a r - successful opponent of the race-idea which is probably the hardest barrier in the way of the humanitarian ideal. Ronan was wrong when he said that scic was the greatest enemy of Islam. No, it is the race. idea which is the greatest enemy of Islam—in fact, c... all humanity, and it is the duty of all lovers of man- kind to stand in revolt against this dreadful invention:
of the Devil. Since I find that the idea of nationally based on race or territory is making headway in t’ world of Islam, and since I fear that the Muslims,, 10 sight of their own ideal of a universal human ity, are being lured by the idea of a territorial nation laity, I feel it is my duty as a Muslim and as a lover of all mankind, to remind them of their true function the evolution of mankind. Tribal or national organizations on the lines of race or territory are only temporary phases in the enfoldment and upbringing of collective life, and as such I have no quarrel with them; but I con4emn them in the strongest possible terms when they are regarded as the ultimate expression of the life of mankind. While I have the greatest love for Islam, it is in view of practical and not patriotic considerations, as Mr. Dickinson thinks, that I am compelled to start with a specific society (e.g., Islam) which, among the societies of the world, happens to be the only one suitable to my purpose. Nor is the spirit of Islam so exclusive as Mr. Dickinson thinks. In the interests of a universal unification of mankind the Quran ignores their minor differences and says, “Come let us unite on what is common to us all !“
I am afraid the old European idea of a blood thirsty Islam is still lingering in the mind of Mr. Dickinson. All men and not Muslims alone are meant for the Kingdom of God on earth, provided they say good-bye to their idols of race and national ity, and treat one another as personalities. Leagues, mandates, treaties, like the one described by Mr. Keynes, and Imperialisms, however draped in demo cracy, can never bring salvation to mankind. The salvation of man lies in absolute equality and free doni of all. We stand in need of a thorough over-hauling of the aims of science which has brought s much misery torn in-kind and of a total abandonment of what may be called esoteric politics which is ever planning the ruin of less clever or weaker races.
That Muslim peoples have fought and conquered like other peoples, and that some of their leaders have screened their personal ambition behind the veil of religion, II do not deny; but I am absolutely sure tha territorial conquest was no part of the original programmed of Islam. As a matter of fact, I consider it a great loss that the progress of Islam as a conquering faith stultified the growth of those germs of an economic and democratic organization of socret which I find scattered up and down the pages of the Quran and the traditions of the Prophet. No doubt, the Muslims succeeded in building a great empire, but thereby they largely repaganized their political ideals, and lost sight of some of the most important potentialities of their faith. Islam certainty aims at. absorption This absorption, however, is to be achieved not by territorial conquest but by the simplicity of its teaching, its appeal to the common sense of mankind and its aversion to abstruse meta- physical dogma That Islam can succeed by its inherent force is sufficiently clear from the Muslim missionary work in China, where it has won million of adherents without the help of any political power. I hope more than twenty years’ long study of the* world’s thought has given me sufficient training to judge things impartially. The object of my Persian poems is not to make out a case for Islam, my aim is simply to discover a universal social reconstruction, and in this endeavor, I find it philosophically impossible to ignore asocial Which exists with the express object of doing away with all the distinctions of caste, rank and race; and which, while keeping a watchful eye on the affairs of this world, fosters a spirit of unworldly lines so absolutely essential to man in his relations with his neighbors. This is what Europe lacks and this is what she can still learn from us.
One word more. In my notes which now form part of your introduction to Asrar-i-Khudi, I deliberately explained my position in reference to Western thinkers, as I thought this would facilitate the understanding of my views in England. I could have easily explained myself in the light of the Quran and Muslim Sufis and thinkers, e.g., Ibn Arabi and Iraqi (Pantheism), Wahid Mahmud (Reality as a Plurality), Al-Jili (the idea of the Perfect Man) and Mujaddid Sarhindi (the hu person in relation to the Divine Person). As a matter of fact, I did so explain myself in my Hindustani introductio:i to the first edition of the Asrar.
I claim that the philosophy of the Asrar is a direct development out of the experience and specu lation of old Muslim Sufis and thinkers. Even Bergson’s idea of time is not quite foreign to our Sufis. The Quran is certainly not a book of meta physics, but it takes a definite view of the life and destiny of man, which must eventually rest on Propositions of a metaphysical import. A statement by a modern Muslim student of philosophy of such Propositions, especially when it is done in the light of religious experience and philosophy invoked by th great book, is not putting new wine in old bottles It is only a restatement of the old in the light of tL new. It is unfortunate that the history of Mush thought is so little known in the West. I wish I ha time to write an extensive book on the subject show to the Western student of philosophy how philosophic thinking makes the whole world kin.
Yours sincerely,
Muhammad Iqbal
SOME THOUGHTS ON ISLAMIC STUDIES’
My dear Sahibzada,
I have read with great interest your excellent note on Islamic Studies to which, it seems, you have given a great deal of thought and attention. The subject has to be looked at from various points of view and in reference to the birth or rather rebirth of humanism in the world of Islam today. However, I beg to offer a few stray thoughts which have come to me. Before I proceed further I would state the sub jects of what you call Islamic Studies as follows:—
1. To educate and train well-qualified theo logians, divines, etc. (This is your first object on page 4 of your letter and I fully agree with it.)
2. To produce scholars who may, by their researches in the various branches of Muslim literature and thought, he able to trace genetically the continuity of intellectual life between Muslim culture and modern knowledge. This requires a little more elucidation. The political fall of Islam in Europe unfortunately took place, roughly speaking, at a moment when Muslim thinkers began to see the futility of deductive science and were fairly on the way to building inductive knowledge. It was practically at this time that Europe took up the task of research and discovery Intellectual activity in the world of Islam practically ceased from this time and Europe began to reap the fruits of the labor of Muslim thinkers The Humanist movement in Europe was3 due to a large extent to the force set free by Muslim thought. It is not at all an exagger ation to say that the fruit of modern European humanism in the shape of modern science J and philosophy are in many ways only a further development of Muslim culture. Neither the European nor the Mussalman. of todays realises this important fact because the extant , work of Muslim thinkers still lies scattered and $ unpublished in the libraries of Europe, Asia and Africa The ignorance of the Mussalmans of today is so great that they consider thoroughly anti-Islamic what has, in the main, arisen out of the bosom of their own culture If, for instance, a Muslim savant knew that something like the theory of Einstein was seriously discussed in the scientific circles of Islam (Abul Ma’ali quoted by Averroes) the present theory of Einstein would appear to him less outlandish. Again his anti pathy to modern Inductive logic would be very much diminished if he knew that the whole system of modern Logic started from Razi’s well-I known objection to the deductive logic of Aris-li totle. The production of such scholars is absolutely necessary as they alone can help in the assimi lation of modern knowledge.
3. To turn out Muslim scholars well-versed in the various aspects of Muslim History, Art, General Culture and Civilisation. (This is really your third object mentioned on page 4 of your letter, which I have a bit narrowed by excluding science and philosophy from its scope.) This will include your object No. 2.
4. To produce scholars who may be fitted to carry on researches in the legal literature of Islam. As you know, our legal literature, a good deal of which is still unpublished, is simply enormous. In my opinion it should be treated as a separate branch of Muslim learning. (By law I mean the law relating tofiqh only.)
It is in the light of these general considerations that we should devise a scheme of Islamic Studies in the Muslim University at Atigarh.
The study of Muslim Theology: Our first object in which we both agree is the training of well-qualified theologians to satisfy the spiritual needs of the community. But the spiritual needs of a community change with the expansion of that community’s outlook life. The change in the position of the individual, his intellectual kiberation and infinite advance in natural sciences have entirely changed the substance of modern life so that the kind of scholasticism or theolo gical thought which satisfied a Muslim in the
of the matter :—
I will now proceed to consider the practical aspect middle Ages would not satisfy him today. Thu does not mean an injury to the spirit of re but it certainly contradicts traditional views. II rejuvenation of Muslim life and the regaining original depths are desirable then a rebuilding c theological thought is absolutely necessary. Ti vision of Sir Syed Ahmad Khan on this point, on many others, was almost prophetic. As yot know he himself undertook the task, which did not, and could not, prosper because it was mainly based on the philosophical thought of a bygone age. I am afraid I cannot agree with your suggested syllabus in Muslim Theology (paragrap 4 of your letter). In my opinion it is perfectly use- less to institute a school of Muslim Theology on older lines unless it is your object to satisfy theli more conservative portion of our community Spiritually, the older theology is, generally speaking, a set of worn-out ideas; educationally, it has no value in view of the rise of new, and r state ment of old problems. What is needed toda is intellectual activity in fresh channels and th building of a new theology and Kalam. This can obviously be done by men who are properly equipped for such a task. But how to product. such men?
I fully agree with you in your suggestion that a system be devised for utilising the best material from: Deoband and Lucknow. But the point is what woul you do with these men after having trained them up to the Intermediate standard? Would you make the B.A s and M A after the suggestion of Sir Thom Arnold? I am sure that so far as the study and development cuff theological thought is concerned they will not serve your purpose. These Deoband and Lucknow men who disclose a special aptitude for theological thinking should, in my opinion, be given a thorough grounding in modern thought and science before you allow them to pass through Arnold’s course, which, for their purpose, will have to be very much short end. After completing their study of modern thought and science they may be required to attend lectures on such subjects in Arnold’s course as have a direct bearing on their special study, e.g., sects of Islam and Muslim Moral and Metaphysical Philosophy. With this equipment they may be made University Fellows to give original lectures on Muslim Theology, Kalam and Tafsir. Such men alone will be able to found a new school of Muslim Theology in the University and serve our object No. 1. My suggestion, there fore, is that if you wish to satisfy the more conservative portion of our society you can start with a school of Theology on older lines as suggested in paragraph 4 of your letter, but your ultimate aim must be gradually to displace it by the work of original thinkers produced in the manner I have sug gested.
Coming now to our second object, those among the Lucknow and Deoband men who disclose a special aptitude for purely scientific research should be given a thorough grounding in Mathematics, Science or Philosophy according to their respective aptitudes. After having completed their study in modern science and thought they may be permitted to pass through Arnold’s course, which will have to be shortened for their purpose also. For instance, a man who has studied Physical Science only shoi, be called upon to attend lectures on “Science in tb Muslim World”, Arnold’s No. 3 in the M.A. You can then make him a University Fellow to dev all his time to researches in the particular science has studied.
Coming to our third object, Arnold’s full should be opened to those who do. not happen to pc sess a special aptitude for science or philosophy L want a general training in the principles of Mush culture and civilisation.. But this need not be C to men from Deoband or Nadwa only. Your own University men with a better knowledge tf Arabic may take it up. It would find a place for Muslim a and architecture in this course.
Coming to our fourth object, i.e., the study of Mohammedan Law and Legal History, we shoulc pick up more brilliant men from Deoband and Luc know, who happen to possess a legal mind an4 disclose a special aptitude for legal subtleties. In view of the fact that the whole syste: of Moham’ inedan Law stands in need of constructive readjust- ment we should give them a thorough grounding in modern jurisprudence and principle of legislatioi and perhaps also in modern Economies and Socio1ogy. You can make them LL.B.s if you like and the permit them to pass through Arnold’s courser whic will have to be shortened in their case alscx For instance, they may be required to attend lectures oft such subjects as Muslim Political Theory and in court and council.
Briefly my suggestions are: I accept the course of study suggested by Sir Thomas Arnold. But the wholeof it should be opened only to those candidates who do not disclose an aptitude for Law, Theology and Science. In so far as the study of Theology is concerned, I allow your suggestions (paragraph 4 of yourletter),but consider it as only a tentative measure to be displaced eventually by the work of original thinkers, who shall have to be trained in the manner I have suggested in the course of my letter. For these men as well as for those who take up the study of Law and special Sciences, Arnold’s course will have to be shortened according to their needs. It is hardly necessary here to point out that a workable knowledge of German and French is absolutely necessary for those who take up the study of Muslim thought, literature, art, history and even of theology of Muslim Jurisprudence. Some of them may be allowed to take up the profession of law. Others may accept your University Fellowship and devote themselves to legal research work. The present state of the administration of Mohammedan Law in this country is simply deplorable and there are difficulties which can be solved through legislative agencies ofliy. Mohammedan professional lawyers thoroughly well-grounded in the principles of Mohammedan Law will be of the greatest help both
Yours sincerely,
Muhammad Iqbal
SELF IN THE LIGHT OF RELATIVITrY
1
The case with which we perceive external It’ hides from us the mystery of human perceeç According to modern science all that is necesssary fc an act of perception happens inside the observier; y’ the things perceived appear outside, and evetiri at enormous distance from the observer, as in thhe c of a star. If the star is a mere interpretation of happenings within, then why does it look exttert You may say that it looks external becausse it is external. I do not contend this point. The st m be a reality situated outside me in an absolute.e spa My point is that if the account of perceptionn give by modern science is correct, the star oughtt not to look external.
2
But is the thing known independent of thee act of knowledge Or, is the act of knowledge a constitutetive element in the making of the object? Obbjeotive reality as understood by Physical Science is eentire independent of the act of knowledge. Knowinag do not make any difference to it. It is there swheth one knows it or not. In studying its behavicour tb, act of knowledge can be ignored. Thus, IPhysi ignored Metaphysics in the sense of a the.eory O knowledge in its onward march. But this attititude of
P physical Science, though highly advantageous to itself, could not have been maintained for a long time. The act of knowledge is a fact among other factS:Of experience which empirical Science claims its exclusive subject of study. Physics cannot afford to ignore Metaphysics. It must recognise it as a great ally in the organisation of experience. Happily it isflot a Metaphysician but a Scientist who justifies Metaphysics—I mean Einstein, who has taught us that the knower is intimately related to the object known, and that the act of knowledge is a cons titutive element in the objective reality, thus confirming in a sense, the idealistic position of Kant. A further advance in our knowledge of the relationship between the act of knowledge and the object known will probably come from Psychology.
3
The object known, then, is relative to the )bserving self; its size and shape change as his posi ion and speed change. But whatever the position md speed of the observer, whatever his frame Df reference, something must always remain which onfronts him as his ‘other.’ What does this mean? Does it mean that there is something absolute in what appears to us as objective reality? No. We cannot construe ever-present externality to mean the total independence or absoluteness of what appears as external to the self. Such an interpretation would :ontradict the very principle which discloses its relati vity. If, then, in view of the principle of relativity, the object confronting the subject is really relative, there must be some self to whom it ceases to exist as a confronting other. This self must be non• non-temporal—--Abso!ute, to whom what is externaU to us must cease to exist as external. Without SU an assumption objective reality cannot be relative t the spatial and temporal self. To the Absolute Sejf then, the Universe is not a reality confronting him as his ‘other’, its only a passing phase of His consciences, a fleeting moment of His infinite life. Einst & is quite right in saying that the Universe is finite, b boundless. It is finite because it is a passing ph ( in the Quranic language) of God’s extensive infinite consciousness, and boundless because th creative power of God is intensively infinite. T Quranic way of expressing the same truth is that t Universe is liable to increase. This simple trumentioned in the Quran was the greatest blow given to the Deductive systems of thought that existed before Islam, and to the circular view of the movement of Time, common to all the Aryan modes of though But the age of the Quran was hardly ready to as simulate it.
4
We have seen that the Universe does not confront the Absolute Self in the same way as it confronts t human self. To Him it is a phase of His conscious ness, to us it presents itself as an independent reality• But is the human self aIsoa phase of God’s consciousness, or something more substantial than a mer idea? The nature of self is such that it is self- centred and exclusive. Are, then, the Absolute Self and the human self so related to each other that they mutually exclude each other? Pringle-Pattison deplores that the English language possesses only one word_Creation—to express the relation of God and the Universe on the one hand, and the relation of God and the self of man 011 the other. The Arabic language is, however, more fortunate in this respect. It has two words to express this relation, i.e., khalq and amr. The former is used by the Quran to indicate the relation of the Universe of matter to God, and the latter indicates the relation of the human self to the Divine Self. All that we can say in answer to the extremely difficult question raised above is that the ainr is not related to God in ‘the same way as the khalq is. The amr is distinct but not isolated from God. But I confess I cannot intellectually apprehend this relationship any more than Rumi, who says: V
The next question is whether it is possible for the human observer to reach the Divine point of view, and to realise the freedom from the universe as a confronting “other”. The mystic says it is possible to reach a super-intellectual standpoint, and his method is to escape from the conditions which make the movement of intellect possible. The mystic method has attracted some of the best minds in the history of mankind. Probably there is something in t. But I am inclined to think that it is detrimental to some of the equally important interests of life, and is prompted by a desire to escape from the arduous task of the conquest of matter through intellect. The surest way to realise the potentialities of the world is to associate with its shifting actualities that Empirical Science—association with the VI:—is an indispensable stage in the life of contemplation. In the words of the Quran, the Universe that confronts us is not It has its uses, a — the most important use of it is that the effort to overcome the obstruction offered by it sharpens our insight and prepares us for an insertion into what lie below the surface of phenomena. As the poet Nazi says: A keen insight is needed to see the non-temper behind the perpetual flux of things. The my forgets that reality lives in its own appearances an that the surest way to reach the core of it lies through its appearances. The Prophet of. Arabia was the firs to protest against this unhealthy Asiatic mysticism and to open our eyes to the great fact of change with. in and without through the appreciation of whic alone it is desirable to reach the eternal. The Quran describes God as L J , and fixes our gaze on change and variety as the greatest “Signs” of Go Thus the Quran has its own method for the elevation of the human self to the Divine standpoint. But I can only suggest this method in the following par graph:
4
“The impulse which drives me into world is precisely the same as that which the drives nanny into’ monasteries—the desire for self real Saigon.” So says Count Keyserling in his Diary recently translated into English. The Count is quite right. The world of matter which confronts the self of men as its “other” is an indispensable obstruction which forces our being into fresh formations. I am afraid, however, that the Count’s view of self realisatjon is one-sided. He tells us further, “I want to let the climate of the Tropics, the Indian modes of con sciousness, the Chinese code of life, and many other factors which I cannot envisage in advance, to work their spell on me, one after the other, and then waicii what will become of me.” Now, such a process may bring about the realization of our intellectual self. It may give us an acute thinker who can work out the spell of impressions into a coherent system of ideas, but it cannot shape our clay into an ideal human being. The intellectual self is only one aspect of the activity of our total self. The realization of the total self comes not by merely permitting the wide world to throw its varied impressions on our mind, and then watching what becomes of us. It is not merely by receiving and intellectually shaping the im pressions, but mainly by moulding the stimuli to ideal ends and purposes that the total self of man realises itself as one of the greatest energies of nature. In great action alone the self of man becomes united with God without losing its own identity, and trans cends the limits of space and time. Action is the highest form of contemplation.
(Crescent, Lahore, 1925)
McTAGGART’S PHILOSOPHY
I was reading the other day Mr. Dickinson’s Memoir of the late and lamented Dr. McTaggart, that philosopher-saint whose lectures on Kant an4 Hegel I had the privilege to attend as an advance student of Trinity College, Cambridge, about a quarter of a century ago. I should like to note a fe points which occurred to me while reading this inter-n esting book, whose value is very much enhanced b$ the personal reminiscences of those who had th good fortune of coming into contact with that greats thinker.
“As we have pointed out more than once,” says Mr Dickinson, “the origin of McTaggart’s philosophy was not in his intellect but in his emotion.” This is true, perhaps more or less true of all thinkers if we look at McTaggart as a thinker torn asunder from. the general current of British thought. In order t understand the true significance of his philosophy we must put him back into that current.
Agnosticism is not a permanent mode of thought, It comes and goes The British mind tried to escape from it in two ways One is the total elimination of what is called the ultimate Reality. The ‘Unknown and Unknowable’ of Herbert Spencer simply does no exist. Why, then, look for it? The universe is nothing but perishable phenomena without any eternal reality behind it. The other way is that an Eternal Reality does exist behind the world of perisha. able phenom.ena, and is approachable by a purely speculative method. The first course was adopted by Hume, the second by Green. In opposition to British Phenomenal ism, Green affirmed the existence of an Eternal Consciousness. The temporal process according to Green is unthinkable without a non temporal Consciousness, for consciousness of change cannot be identical with the process of change. But the Eternal Consciousness, so regarded, is nothing more than a kind of Newtonian space holding to ge ther the world ofe ternalIy inter-related appearances. This view makes it impossible to develop the living concrete self out of a dead immobile system of abstract relations. Bradley’s philosophy is the logical outcome of Green. The criterion of reality is coherence and freedom from contradiction. Applying this test, the world of appearance—time, change, move ment, multiplicity—turns out to be a mere illusion. The ultimate Reality is one and immutable. This is the ancient Hindu doctrine of Maya and the Greek Parmenitles. But how did this illusion originate? Nobody knows. Bradley, however, admits in spite of the contradictions involved in the notion of self, that the human self must, in some sense, be real. In what sense is itreal?He doesn’t explain. McTaggart reaches the Absolute by means of Dialectic method, but he does not stop at the Absolute. The Absolute, according to him further differentiates itself into Concrete egos. The universe is not an illusion,, it. Is a system of real selves; which cannot be regarded a mere predicates or adjectives of the Absolute. As I wrote to me in December, 1919:
“I agree with you, as you know, in regard quite untenable the view that finite beings are adjectives of the Absolute. Whatever they are, it is qc certain to me that they are not that.”
In this aspect of his teaching McTaggart is mucl more genuinely British than either Bradley or”-- or Bosanquet.. Indeed he was to Hegel as Leibni was to Spinoza. Thus the character of McTaggart’ philosophy was determined, not so much by his private emotions as by the intellectual c well as the un-British character of Neo-Hegel thought in England. It also determined by what called the needs of his country. I quote from an other letter of 1920, which he appears to have written after he had read Nicholson’s English translation of my Secrets of the Self:
“I am writing to tell you with how much plea- sure I have been reading your poems. Have you not changed your position very much? Surely, n the days when we used to talk philosophy .together, you were much more of a Pantheist and mystic.
“For my own part I adhere to my own belief that selves are the ultimate reality, but as to their true content and their true goal, my position is, as it was, that that is to be found in eternity and not in time, and in love rather than action.
“Perhaps, however, the difference is largely a question of emphasis we each lay most weight on what our .. country needs. I dare say you are right when you say that India is too contemplative. But I am sure that England—and all Europe—is not contemplative enough. That is a lesson that we ought to learn from you—and no doubt we have something to teach in return.
The point of interest in McTaggart’s philosophy, however, is that in his system mystical intuition, as a source of knowledge, is much more marked than in the system of Bradley the need of such a direct revelation is the natural outcome of the failure of a purely speculative method. An Italian writer describes McTaggart’s philosophy as mystical degeneration of English NeoHegelianism. Nothing of the kind. Some of the greatest minds of the world have felt the need of a direct contact with the ultimate Reality, and have indeed, in some cases, achieved such contact. Plotinus, Ghazzali, Schelling and Berg son are instances in point. In his spiritual evolution Kant himself reached that stage; but unlike Ghazzali and others he was led to achieve the Ultimate Reality as a regulative idea only. The result of his critical philosophy is that God cannot be proved to exist, but that we should act as if He does exist. Not William James but Kant was the real founder of modern Pragmatism. Will, then, the Italian writer, referred to above describe Kant’s philosophy as a pragmatic degeneration of German thought?
It must, however, be remembered in the case of MeTaggart that the mystic revelation of Reality came to him as a confirmation of his thought. His system is deductive not in the sense in which the philosophy of l3ergson and Plotinus is deductive. He started with a firm conviction in the power of.human reasofl and that conviction remained with him to the end of his days. His illumination came, I think, as a accidental confirmation of what he had reacbed through pure reason. That why he had such a unshakable faith in his philosophy. This is clear from the last words which he said to his wife “I air grieved that we must part, but you know I am no afraid of death.” Such a triumphant faith is the re sult of a direct revelation alone. And this revelation has nothing to do with what our psychology .call emotion. It is as Mrs. McTaggart rightly insists, “Air actual perception of the senses.” Like a true mysti4 McTaggart rarely mentioned his experiences to others. The ultimate basis of religion is an experience which is essentially individual and incommunicable. It is because of its essentially private character that mystics talk about it for the purposes of verification only In the history of Islamic mysticism we find many recorded instances in which some mystics have been reported to have traveled thou sands of miles for the verification of a single experience. This is technically known as tasdiq, i.e., verification by an appeal to another man’s experience Knowledge and direct revelation are not mutually opposed: they are complementary to each others I’ve philosophical theologian simply tries, for the sake of less fortunate persons, to s through reason what is essentially individual. When mystic Sultan Abu Said met the philosopher Abu Ali ibn Sina he is reported to have said, “I see what he knows.” McTaggart both knew and saw; but this I believe, did not precede his system. It did Ot initially inspire his thought, though it did bring t him the warmth of conviction. This, to my mind, 1 a far more powerful intellect than that of plotinus or Bergson. Yet the vision of McTaggart, view of its static character, is not free from the unhealthy influences of his Hegelian inspiration. But perhaps we possess no criterion to. decide whether the universe in its ultimate essence is at rest or in motion.
Another point on which I would like to say a few words is McTaggart’s view of the self. Hegel’s indifference to personal immortality has more or less affected all those who received inspiration from
him. With Bosanquet and Bradley the self is not a substance in the sense of Spinoza. It is a con striation of thought, a mere predicate or adjective of the Absolute. And this self-hood, according to these thinkers, is further transcended in the Absolute. This account of self disregards even the elementary conditions of safe-hood as known to living experience. The self, as known to experience, is much more than a mere predicate of the Absolute; it is a dynamic centre of experience. By this criticism of the common Neo-Plebeian view of the self I do not mean to argue for McTaggart’s view. All that I mean is to show how his mind tried to escape from the results of English Nero-Hegelianism. To Mc Taggart the self is a real substance. He reached the Absolute through the method of Hegel. But with him the Absolute has further determinate egos of actual experience which participate in the elemental eternity of the Absolute. This amounts to total dismissal of the Hegelian Absolute. But th result of this dismissal is not a return to Empiricism, It gives us not a world of interrelated appearance but a living world of interrelated egos Mr Dicki son thinks that it cuts out science at one stroke. It does nothing of the kind any more than the spiritual pluralism of Leibnitz. But while I agree that the. self is more than a mere predicate of the Absolute, j cannot agree with McTaggart in the view that the self is elementally immortal. From the mere fact that the individual ego is a differentiation of th# eternal Absolute it, by no means, follows that, eve4 in its finitude, the human self retains the character which belongs to its source alone. To my mind such a differentiation should give it only a capacity fog immortality and not immortality itself. Personally’ I regard immortality as an inspiration and not some thing eternally achieved Man is a candidate for immortal life which involves a ceaseless struggle in maintaining the tension of the ego.
I venture here to translate for the English reader one or two passages from my poem called The Garden of Mystery
If you say that the ‘I’ is a mere illusion— an appearance among other appearances— then tells me who is the subject of this illusion Look within and discover. The world is visible; Not even the intellect of an angel can compare head it-The ‘I’ is invisible and needs no proof Think awhile and see thane own secret the ‘I’ is Truth, it is no illusion. When it ripens, it becomes eternal Lovers, even though separated from the Beloved, live in blissful union. It is possible to give wings to a mere spark, And to make it flutter for ever and for ever! To Eternity of God is elemental and not the reward of His action! That eternity is superior, which a borrowed soul wins for herself by love’s frenzy. Why fear that death which comes from without? For when the ‘I’ ripens into a self, it has no danger of dissolution. There is more subtle inner death which makes me tremble. This death is falling down from love’s frenzy, saving one’s spark and not giving it away freely to the heaps of chaff. But while I disagree with McTaggart in his view of immortality, I regard this part of his work as al most apostolic. He emphasized personal immortality, even at the expense of the transcendent God of Christian theology, at a time when this important belief was decaying in Europe, and when the Euro penman was about to face death on an enormous scale. Indeed in this aspect of his work he may be Compared to the great Muslim mystic Halley, whose Undying phrase “I am the creative Truth” was thrown as a challenge to the whole Muslim world at a time when Muslim scholastic thought was moving in a direction which tended to obscure the reality anij destiny of the human ego. Hallaj never ceased utter what he had personally seen to be the Trutj until the Muilas of Islam prevailed upon the stat to imprison him and finally to crucify him He me his death with perfect calm.
There is one more point which. I would li1 briefly to consider here—I mean his atheism. I use to meet him almost every day in his rooms in T and very often our talk turned an the question of God. His powerful logic often silenced me, but he never succeeded in convincing me There is n doubt, as Mr. Dickinson points out in his Memoi that 1 had a positive dislike for the transcendent God of Western theology. The Absolute of the Hegelian lacks life and movement The Extern Consciousness of Green is hardly distinguishable from Newtonian space. How could these satisfy him? In a letter, already quoted, he wrote to me:
“As far as the life of the individual remains th4 same in the course of amplification and expression, I am inclined to think (for an European, you know calf( also be a mystic) that the solution rests in loving th same persons. But indeed it still seems to me, as it did when we first knew one another,. that the solution of all problems is found only in Love.”
Indeed his description of love as the. essence of Reality indicates that, in spite of his thorough-go intellectualism, his soul revolted against the inc Absolute of Neo-Hegelians. Yet in a letter fro which I have quoted above he seems to oppose lo to action. I do not see the opposition. Love is no passivity. It is active and creative. Indeed, on the janitorial plane, it is the only force which circumvents death: for when death carries away one generation, Jove regarded as the essence of Reality is just the love of one person for another; and further, it is the cause and not the effect of the proximity of two persons. Now it is because of its character as an active cause that in spite of variety in content of the mutual loves of various persons, it is capable of being experienced as aunty embracing the entire universe. But the crucial point is whether this central unity is an all-inclusive self. This was McTaggart’s real difficulty. The self is unique and impervious. How could one self, how ever superior, include other selves? The mystic poet Rumi felt the same difficulty. “Between the individual egos and their Sustainer,” he says, “obtains a contact which can neither be imagined nor intellectually conceived.” In his Idea of God Professor Pringle-Pattison also regards this relation as inscrutable by human intellect. But is not the individual go himself a colony of egos?
Shall I point the way to the eternal secret?
Open thane eye on thyself Thou art visible and invisible, many and one!
Perhaps it is not possible intellectually to conceive this ultimate unity as an all-embracing self. It is my belief, as I have pointed out before, that McTaggart’s Regalia inspiration marred the vision which was Vouchsafed him. A more serious thing happened to Poor Nietzsche, whose peculiar intellectual environmental him to think that his vision of the Ultimate could be realized in a world of space and time’s What grows only out of the inner depths of the heart of man he proposed to create by an artificial biological experiment He was taken as a mad man and was placed in the hands of those who administer drugs and mixtures. As I said of him in my Javid Nama:
A} A stranger in his own land Safe from the Mulla’s hit, killed by the Physi_f
cian’s hand.
The real test of a self is whether it responds to the call of another self. Does Reality respond to us? it does; sometimes by reflection, sometimes by reflection rising higher than itself—i.e. , the act of worship. In Taggart’s case reflection took the place of worship. The oiders of Muslim mystics have invent ed various rules and practices by which to come int4. direct contact with the Ultimate Reality. The truth, however, is that i worship nor reflection nor any kind of practices entitle a man to this respons4 from the Ultimate Love. It depends eventually on what religion calls “grace”. The philosophy of McI Taggart has in fact raised the great problem of th nature of Love. How will it be solved in Europe if at all? Surely analytic psychology will never be abli to solve it. Its secret lies in the pangs of separation detachment, or, as McTaggart would say, atiOil.
11! the ultimate Reality, i.e., Love, has any finance for the life of its own ego must itself be an all ego which sustaif responds, loves and is capable of being loved. I cTaggatt’5 view there is no guarantee that the process of birth, death and rebirth will be the other hand, he himself suggests in his Some dogmas of Religion that “it may be that the process will eventually destroy itself, and merge in a perfection which transcends all time and change.” In this eventuality we come back to the Absolute again, and MeTaggart’s system defeats its own purpose. The possibility of ego-differentiations merging again j a perfection transcending time and change must be counteracted, however remote it may be. And this can be done only by taking immortality as a hope, an inspiration, a duty, and not as an eternal fact.
My heart burns on the loneliness of God,
In order, therefore, to maintain intact His Ego-Society,
I sow in my dust the seed of self-hood,
And keep a constant vigil over my “I”.’
(Indian Arts and Letters, 6, 1932)
KHUSHHAL KHAN KHATTACK
(The Afghan Warrior-Poet)
The unification of the Afghan race—a process which is still going on before our eyes—forms one of the most interesting chapters in the history of Central Asia. BahIol Lodhi and Sher Shah Surii India, the Khattack poet Khushhal Khan and Pin Roshan among the frontier tribes, the late Amir Abdul Rahman Khan and his grandson King Aman Ullah Khan in Afghanistan proper, are the most outstand ing figures in the history of this interesting move ment. The day is not far off when some Afghan historian will tell us the storyof the unity of his race much in the same way as Bolton King has told the story of the unity of Italy.
I want to place before the readers of “Islamic Culture” some specimens of Khushhal Khan’s poe try the value and importance of which is yet to be realised by the Afghans. He was born in 1613, and rose to the chieftainship of his tribe at the age of 27. He served the Emperor Shah Jahan loyally, but fell under the suspicion of Aurangzeb who imprisoned him in the fortress of Gwalior. He was released after seven years, but on his return to his native land openly revolted against the Emperor and founded the great Afghan confederacy against the Mughals. He personally went from tribe to trible, and byn as well as his charming poetry tried to fuse something of his own burning soul into his countrymen. The diplomacy and gold of Auraiigzeb, however, were too powerful for him, and he was finally compelled to retire in the Afridi country where be died at the age of 78. His was a versatile mind and he wrote on various subjects, such as poetry, philosophy, ethics, medicine and his own autobiography which is unfortunately lost. Through out his poetry, the major portion of which was written in India, and during his struggles with the Mughals, b the spirit of early Arabian poetry. We find in it the same simplicity and directness of expression, the same love of freedom and war, the same criticism o I hope the Education Minister of Afghanis tan will appoint some Afghan scholar to make a critical study of this great warrior-poet of the Push language and to bring out a complete edition of his works with’the necessary historical notes. This must be the first literary undertaking of modern Afghanistan.
The following specimens of Khushhal Khan’s poetry are taken from Captain Raverty’s literal English translation which was published in 1862. The selection is sure to give the reader some idea of the poet’s passionate patriotism, his aspirations, and the keenness of his observation of men. The poet has no doubt said some bitter things against Aurangzeb, but we must not forget that these are the judge of an enemy. who had passed seven long years as the Emperor’s prisoner in a country of which he himself say :—
“Defend us from Hind, though’ it should teem with all the world’s luxuries besides.”