PLACE OF DOUBT IN ENQUIRY IN PEIRCE IN COMPARISON TO DESCARTES

Mrs Arifa Shameem

Philosophers have always looked suspiciously at the common-sense beliefs and notions accepted by common man. The philosopher’s task consists in enquiring into the real nature of things instead of simply assuming their existence. The common man hardly questions things around him. This is the reason why he is ignorant. It is characteristic of a philosopher, on the other hand, to question everything. This is how, he thinks, he can ultimately embrace the truth.

One may ask here what the psychological motives behind man’s quest for knowledge are. The motives can be varied. Curiosity, love of truth, guilt or shame felt on accepting uncriti‑( cal beliefs, or a sense of responsibility to accept only what is true, are some of the possible motives. There may be many more. However, doubt about conventional beliefs and opinions seems to be the most fundamental and dominant motive for rejection of such beliefs. From Parmenides to Plato, down to the father of modern philosophy, Rene Descartes, and the father of pragmatism, Sanders Peirce, philosophical quest has always been initiated by doubt.

Doubt may be a perversive tendency. It might end in scepticism. It is an irritating state of mind and makes one uncomfortable, but it has its positive side, too. It initiates enquiry. This was realised by Descartes as early as eighteenth century, and this is what Peirce reaffirms.

Doubt, according to Peirce, is “an uneasy and dissatisfied state from which we struggle to free ourselves”.[1] Whereas belief is a habit of mind, doubt is a privation of habit. The struggle to free oneself from this uncomfortable state of mind called doubt, and to form a habit of mind called belief, is enquiry. Since enquiry is a struggle to free oneself from doubt, in the absence of doubt, no genuine enquiry, Peirce believes, is possible.

Peirce’s recognition of doubt as the sole motive of enquiry opens so many questions: (1) What are the different kinds of doubt? (2) What is the place of doubt in human enquiry? (3) Can doubt be used as a method of enquiry?

We are all familiar with the feeling of doubt which Peirce characterises as irritating and uncomfortable, and from which we struggle to free ourselves. In an attempt to overcome this dissatisfying state we begin enquiring into the nature of ideas and objects and things, etc., which we doubt. This state of doubt is psychological. It serves a great purpose. It is the psycho-logical root of all scientific and philosophical enquiry. Were this feeling of doubt absent, no enquiry, Peirce believes, would have been possible. In the absence of such a feeling man would either have become God Who knows everything, or would have fallen to the level of animal who cares for no knowledge. Thanks to doubt, it restores man’s dignity as a rational being who enquires into the nature of things and acquires knowledge as a result of it.

Whereas for Peirce a genuine feeling of doubt is the sole motive of enquiry, the sole object of enquiry is “settlement of belief or opinion”.[2] Beyond that no enquiry is reasonable or recommended. Peirce offers two criteria for the assessment of a true belief. One is negative, the other is positive. The negative criterion is the absence of uneasy, irritating state of mind. The positive criterion is the settlement of opinion based on scientific enquiry. Peirce blamed Descartes for not seeing the difference between ideas that are seemingly clear and those that are really so. However, he commits the same error. It never occurred to him that there can be a confusion between beliefs that seem true and those that are really true ; in other words, between true and false beliefs. He never cared to draw such a distinction between beliefs. It suffices Peirce to withhold enquiry whenever one feels satisfied with regard to any idea or concept. What the mind does not question need not be questioned. However, it is interesting that, whereas Peirce views doubt to be the sole motive of equiry, he does not consider subjective certitude of any significance in enquiry. Peirce ignores and mistrusts the feeling of certainty which is claimed to be accompanied by ideas clear and distinct. Subjective certainty is no criterion of truth in Peirce’s opinion. Peirce’s view seems to be confused on this issue. On the one hand, he asserts that in the absence of doubt no enquiry is justified ; on the other, he thinks certainty is no criterion of truth. He does not see that doubt and certainty are correlative. Absence of one implies the presence of the other. To Peirce, absence of doubt is a habit of action called belief. He does not realise that certitude is indispensable to belief. If by belief he means a determination of mind, certainty and indubitability are essential elements of such a habit.

Descartes views psychological doubt differently from Peirce and he would probably agree with Peirce that psychological doubt motivates the doubter to struggle against it and to rest with some belief. But his views are different about the function of the psychological doubt in philosophical and scientific enquiry. The best way to free oneself from such an irritating state called doubt, he would argue, is to accept some ready-made belief or opinion about the object in question and to cling to it tenaciously till one is disturbed again ; or remains satisfied if luckily not so disturbed. There the struggle should end. Descartes would not devaluate the place of such psychological feeling of doubt in enquiry. But he rejects it because it does not guarantee true knowledge as a fruit of the struggle. The doubter has a tendency to seek refuge in any opinion or belief that may help him get rid of the uncomfortable state of mind. The goal of psychological doubt is not truth or knowledge. It can end at best in what Plato calls “true belief”. Since such beliefs are accepted without proper assessment, they are easily shaken whenever any conflict arises. Descartes, therefore, rejects psychological doubt on account of its unscientific character. Psychological doubt might initiate enquiry. But all enquiry need not be initiated by a genuine feeling of doubt. Descartes is a thoroughgoing rationalist. To him, rational enquiry ought to be initiated by a rational motive. Though Descartes does not specify different possible motives of enquiry, his own reason for starting fresh enquiry was his discontentment with Scholastic theology. He felt a strong urge to disown his Scholastic philosophical heritage. He felt it his responsibility to overthrow all beliefs and convictions that have no rational foundation and to raise knowledge equal to the dignity of man. Mistrust or authority and absolute faith in reason are the primary motives for his fundamentally new search for truth.

However, Descartes looked at doubt as a very useful tool of enquiry. He used doubt for a double purpose: (1) as an instrument of clearing the mind of all past prejudices, and (2) as a method of arriving at indubitable truth. To this combined effort he gave the name methodological doubt. Here the first step can be appropriately described as provisional doubt, the second procedural doubt. Descartes sets aside psychological doubt as of no use in a systematic enquiry and feels the need of replacing it with methodological doubt. There need not be a genuine feeling of doubt in order to doubt methodologically. Doubt has to be used as a procedure, as a systematic way of pursuing knowledge. It is here that Peirce disagrees with Descartes. Without a genuine living doubt no enquiry is possible. You cannot doubt, he argues, by writing down on a piece of paper that you doubt. “Doubt is not as easy as lying.”[3] We shall not enter into a discussion of the possibility and feasibility of methodological doubt before examining it carefully. Let us examine here, there-fore, the two steps: (1) provisional doubt, and (2) procedural doubt, of the method.

Provisional doubt is only a temporary suspension of judg. ment on things which have not been known in a systematic or methodic way. Such provisional doubt would refrain us from making hasty and premature judgments. Its purpose is to help us abstain from all positive assertions until reflective consciousness comes face to face with genuine truth.

In a way all great thinkers have been making use of pro-visional doubt before beginning their enquiry. Looking at the natural world with suspicion provisionally in order to recognise its true nature is what every great thinker thought as its most appropriate starting point. Their enquiry was not necessarily initiated by a genuine psychological feeling of doubt. Most of them participated in the natural world more effectively than common folk. Yet a provisional doubt, a temporary suspension of judgment until enquiry is complete, is characteristic of every great philosophical enterprise. They all cast doubt on natural standpoint. They all challenged it provisionally. But in the end of their enquiry, some of them reaffirmed it more fully ; others offered a modified interpretation of the world. Following the line of Descartes, the phenomenologists especially adopted pro-visional doubt as part of their phenomenological method. Sus-pension of judgment is the first step towards their understanding of the world. Their suspension of judgment or “bracketing exist­ence” is very similar to Descartes’ doubt of the commonsense world. Peirce only needs to see how useful provisional doubt has been to these thinkers, though he may not agree with the results of their enquiry. Provisional or pretended doubt is useful as providing a direction to enquiry. It helps focus attention on the real objects of enquiry. It refrains the understanding from its tendency to confuse real objects of enquiry with objects given in the natural standpoint. The effectiveness and usefulness of feigned or provisional doubt can hardly be questioned.

Doubt provides a new dimension to enquiry when it becomes procedural. The previous stage was the stage of suspension of judgment. Now it is a real procedure. Descartes indicates different steps that have to be systematically followed.

One has to begin doubting things about which one is least certain, step by step, to those that appear most certain. In other words, things that we less strongly believe have to be doubted first, e.g. first sensory objects, then other people’s bodies and souls, and then ones own body and soul, and lastly mathemati­cal objects to which one more strongly adheres. Methodological doubt does not end only in a negative procedure of t iminating everything that has been believed in so far. A possibls being, “a Deus Deceptor,” is imagined to exist, who is suspected of deceiving us in making us believe things that are not true. This procedure, when followed to its utmost limits, Descartes thinks, will bring us to a point beyond which whatever we notice is indubitable. The cogito is the first such indubitable truth which surpasses all limits of doubt.

Methodological doubt serves the putpose of cleaning all the rubbish in the way of knowledge. Its purpose is to eliminate all thoughts and beliefs that have no rational foundation. It is a mental catharsis. It purges the mind of all past prejudices, Once the mind is purified through this procedure, every new entry would be accepted as truth. There will be no risk of confusing truth with mere beliefs. Methodological doubt ends in absolute indubitability. It is a stepping stone to all positive discoveries. Absolute indubitability is not merely a subjective feeling. It has its foundation in reason itself. It is a stage where reason announces that whatever is apprehended now is true. When doubt ends, the mind perceives “clear” and “distinct” ideas. Such “clear” and “distinct” ideas are much more than mere beliefs. They are truths objective and absolute.

So much for Descartes’ claim. It is interesting that, whereas Descartes sees methodological doubt as an important tool of knowledge, Peirce rejects it as stupid. The question, therefore. how doubt can be used as a method requires some further clarification. The significance of methodological doubt in enquiry can be determined by raising the question : what is the purpose of enquiry ? To Descartes the purpose of enquiry is to arrive at clear and distinct ideas. For Peirce the purpose of enquiry is settlement of opinion. This is the question of the very meaning of knowledge. How is knowledge to be defined ? Peirce would define

knowledge in terms of a set of beliefs established by scientific reason. Descartes defines knowledge in terms of “clear” and “distinct” ideas known by intuitive reason. Descartes aims at indubitability or certitude which is his criterion of truth. Peirce rejects certitude as a criterion of truth because it is subjective. He seeks truth in beliefs that are scientifically establised by com­mon consent of competent persons. To Peirce truth is public, not personal. Beliefs are not true because I consider them to be so. They are true because scientific research has proved them to be so, and because competent authorities agree on them. These beliefs, such as beliefs in the real or external world, are very precious to Peirce. They should not be disturbed without genuine reason. It does not make sense to destroy all beliefs at one stroke without having any genuine doubt about them. This does not serve any purpose. Why should we give up long-established beliefs if they sound perfectly true to us ? One must not be misled here to think that Peirce is defending personal or uncoordinated beliefs—beliefs that have no rational foundation, or beliefs that are not firm. He himself condemns the way of tenacity and the way of authority in establishing beliefs. It is very unsafe to cling to one’s irrational beliefs or beliefs that are propagated by state, church or any other authority. In a way Peirce might appear to appeal to authority when he talks about settlement of opinion amongst competent authorities. But this is a different kind of authority. Authority of the scientist and other compe­tent persons in the relevant field has to be relied upon because what is transmitted by such authorities is a result of genuine scientific research. The scientists are persons who are dedicated to the search of truth and have reached an agreement on the point in question. However, Peirce defends some commonsense beliefs also. Our commonsense belief has to be trusted because what is known by it cannot be genuinely questioned. By merely put­ting into interrogative form does not make a fact a question. One gains nothing by putting aside what has been commonly believed by the scientists or what common sense is disposed to believe.

Enquiry, Peirce believes, is a cooperative venture. It is progressive. Every new thinker or scientist is expected to participate in this joint cause. If there is any disagreement on any point, scientific reason is fully capable of handling it. Scientific reason is something we all commonly share. It is different from an apriori reason. The so-called a priori reason is nothing but an “inclina­tion to believe ‘. Peirce looks at it contemptuously. FIe refuses to admit any such capacity of intuitive reason which in his view is perhaps another name for one’s own fancy. The subjective certitude claimed by such reason is nothing more than one’s “in­clination to believe” which should occupy no place in scientific or philosophic enterprise. As against it scientific reason is objective. Its claims are based on observed facts. Most of these claims can be verified. It is reliable. In the presence of such an objective method there is no need to question beliefs based on it, unless they are really questionable. Peirce considers scientific method as almost foolproof. Besides, it is practical. It economises efforts and helps progressive enquiry. Pretended doubt, to Peirce, is uneconomical and impractical. It is waste of effort and time. It is, therefore, undesirable.

So much for Peirce to whom purpose of enquiry is to establish beliefs. This is in sharp contrast to Descartes to whom philosophical enterprise is aimed at certitude in the form of “clear” and “distinct” ideas. Descartes believes that it is important for all of us to question at least once in life all our beliefs and convictions. Most of these beliefs are prejudices which we inherit from our parents and society. In the presence of these beliefs our vision is likely to be obscured and confused. There is always a possibility of confusing true for false and vice versa. If we are not able to focus our attention on what we intend to understand, we cannot genuinely know a thing. Knowing is knowing “clearly” and “distinctly”. But this is impossible in the presence of con-fused perceptions that have already occupied our mind. We need, therefore, to clear our mind of all past prejudices in order to have clear perceptions. Methodological doubt is, therefore, required to do this cleaning. What follows are clear and distinct ideas.

Peirce strongly protests to this procedure. The whole bunch of old beliefs are rehabilitated after the application of methodological doubt. This sounds ridiculous to Peirce, What is the point in rejecting beliefs first and rehabilitating them later? This is impractical and uneconomical.

The difficulty with Peirce is that he judges the worth of philo­sophical enterprise in terms of its practicality and economicality. He does not recognise that some pursuits are worth doing in them-selves, and philosophical pursuit is one of them. The practical world is well taken care of by science. The yearning of man to know something beyond the scientific world could be justifiable in itself. Once this is admitted the feasibility of methodological doubt becomes apparent. Methodological doubt helps view the fundamental problems of philosophy always in a new light and in a new perspective.

Besides, Peirce’s conception of philosophical progress is also mistaken. He views philosophical achievements in the manner of scientific achievements. Scientific progress consists in coordination and assimilation of old discoveries with now ones. Scientific project is a combined and cooperative effort. Many minds, rather than one mind, are involved in the establishment of scientific hypotheses and scientific theories. Every single bit of scientific information is incorporated somewhere with other information. Every new scientist is expected to take note of available relevant scientific information in his field. No scientist can afford to reject totally the work of his predecessors and take up the matter in question afresh. If this were to happen, scientific progress would be blocked. Now, this is not the nature of philosophical enquiry. Philosophical investigation is essentially individualistic in character. Every philosopher expresses new ways of looking at things. Every new philosophical theory claims to supersede the old ones. Every time problems are seen in new light. New apparatuses are designed to cope with problems, new issues are raised, new meanings are assigned. Philosophical progress has a completely different meaning. It consists in critically examining the old views, and replacing them with new ones whenever they are unsatisfactory. Every philosophical enterprise comes up as a new challenge. It proclaims rejection of old beliefs, old customs and old habits. The philosopher’s mind hates to walk on beaten path. He wants to open new avenues ro knowledge by closing the old ones. Philosophical progress means revolution of thought and knowledge. It constantly requries replacement of stale ideas with fresh ones. If philosophical progress is thus understood, the feasibility of doubt as a method becomes all the more obvious. For methodological doubt, after clearing the ground for new knowledge, provides new direction to enquiry and helps build knowledge on new and stronger foundation.

References

Justins Buchler, Ed., Philosophical Writings of Peirce. Peter Smith.

E.S. Haldane and G.R. Ross, Ed. & Tr., Philosophical Works of Descartes, Cambridge University Press, 1967.