PLOTINUS’ ETHICAL THEORY?

Miss Tahira Braid

A reader, interested in the mystical philosophy of Plotinus, is often nonplussed on discovering that it is devoid of ethics. What may be stated, by way of generalisation, is that his explanation about “Reality” may be  subjected to an ethical interpretation. That is to say, when Plotinus draws a sketch of “Reality,” he posits ethical values to it. For example, the first hypostasis of “Divine Being” is “The One” as well as “The Good”. Yet one wonders where the moral proposition in Plotinus’ advocacy for things of the physical world to strive back to “The Source” lies. And the justification that this is the only one possibility of the soul’s redemption from the cyclic reincarnation does not explain its rational necessity. In this respect hardly any reference is made to the subject of ethics in the Enneads except in the course of discussion “On Beauty”. But even in this section Plotinus refers to virtues as moral actions and as states belonging to the higher (secondary) realm of “Beauty”. But beyond the use of descriptive terms concerning moral actions, Plotinus does not proceed further.

Yet, if one were to closely examine the general framework of his mystical philosophy, one may infer an ethical theory of a different category. This is to be found in his idea of spiritual guidance. In Plotinus’ thought we are confronted with a strange combination of two antagonistic doctrines and which is a synthesis of Stoic and Aristotelian ethics. From the Stoics he borrowed the idea that virtues make oneself like God. From Aristotle he borrowed the idea that virtues make oneself like oneself and not like anybody else. Plotinus thinks that, according to Aristotle, “by Civic virtues, not in the Divine, one be-comes truly oneself ; by doing so one comes closer to the Divine, by exercising higher virtues emanating from the Divine one be-comes Divine.”[1] To this he combines his own idea of “self with-drawing” from the many factors of the physical world.

In this paper, I shall try to indicate that, although in the general sense an ethical theory is lacking, there is an ethical theory of a different type in relation to Plotinus’ view of spiri­tual guidance. I shall also endeavour to prove that it is precisely in the above context that he has overlooked the problem of social morality. And this I shall discuss at length in the following two sections.

Section “A”. In the second tractate of the first Ennead titled “Virtues” Plotinus states his concept of the two kinds of virtues, civic and political, the idea of which he inherited from Aristotelian ethics. By means of these virtues the soul is purified and attains the final stage of enlightenment.

Virtues, he contends, is the good of the soul in the way the good of matter is form or the good of the body is soul. Because all virtues lead to the “Spirit” and the “Spirit” of the “Good” is the “One,” the “One becomes our “First Nature”. In the, Plotinian theme this is the logical pattern. That is to say, every-thing in the physical world emanates from the “Source” and all emanated things must share their nature with the “Source,” i.e. “The One”.

The practice of all virtues would begin with the avoidance of evil. The first Plotinian generalised ethical maxim would be the avoidance of evil, i.e. matter, and striving towards good—form. Therefore, any kind of involvement with matter, which pervades the universe by way of a “Necessary law,”[2] ought to be avoided through the practice of virtues. “Since evil is here, `haunting this world by necessary law,’ and it is the soul’s design to escape from Evil, we must escape hence.”[3] But what is this escape all about ? According to Plotinus, escape from evil lies “in attaining likeness to God”.[4] And this is explained further “as becoming just and holy living by wisdom, the entire nature being grounded in Virtue.”[5]

In the following two sections of the same tractate, Plotinus endeavours to show that, although souls ought to take the World Soul as their moral model, this does not imply that any state of virtue exists as such in Being. Yet he is convinced, “there is no reason why we should not, by virtues peculiar to our state, attain likeness to a model in which virtue has no place.”[6] For any objection to the view that it is impossible for a soul to derive virtue from Being which in turn is above virtue, Plotinus explains by way of analogy : “The material house is not identical with the house conceived in the intellect, and yet stands in its likeness : the material house has distribution and order while the pure idea is not constituted by any such elements ; distribution, order, symmetry are not parts of an idea. . . . So with us ; it is from the Supreme that we derive order and distribution and harmony, which are virtues in this sphere ; the Existences.”[7] So in Being, virtue does not exist. And if it exists, it exists as pure thought. Yet once this pure thought begins to exist in the soul, it takes the form of virtue which in turn may be likened to the pure thought of Being. It must nevertheless be emphasised that Virtue in Being (only in a manner of speaking) is neither identical nor equivalent to the Virtue in the Soul. Virtue in the Soul possesses a trace of perfection which enables a person to lead a better life. On analysing virtue, we come to the conclusion that it is neither wholly matter nor wholly form. But the more it partakes in common with the Divine (Being), the more it shares with formless Divinity. This means the souls that share in Virtue also share more form, and are closer to Divinity. Or, again, the more form the souls take into themselves, the more Divine or Godlike do they become.

Plotinus agrees with Plato that Virtues are a purification of the soul. Purification is described as the unmingling of the soul with body or matter. Paul Henry, in his article “The Place of Plotinus in the History of Thought,” explains Plotinus’ concept of purification in the following manner : “To purify is to remove what has attached itself from the outside to the inmost self.”[8] He continues : “the categorical Imperative of Plotinian mysticism is, `cut away everything’ . . . which includes the sensible and corporeal realities which are exterior and inferior . . . the multiplicity of concepts . . . to the pure unity of the self-withself and self with God.”[9]

Concerning the soul’s purification, the following would be the presentation of the Plotinian argument: Before matter entered into the soul there was “Good”. Therefore, the cleaning of the soul from matter would suffice. But in this case, it is the act of cleaning and not the cleaned thing which is good. It is unthinkable that the “Absolute Good” should have its abode in matter, for matter is evil. Therefore, the resulting “Emergent” in the process of purification is of the nature of good. The soul’s nature, which is good, lies in its devotion to the “Intelligible Realm”. There is no other option for the soul but to withdraw itself from the world-at-large and enter into communion with this “Intelligible Realm”. “The soul’s true good is devotion to the `intellectual Principle,’ its kin ; evil to the soul lies in frequenting strangers. There is no other way for it than to purify itself and so enter into relation with its own, the new phase being by a new orientation.”[10]

Through disengagement with the physical world, and in its state of self-contemplation, the soul finds itself in a state that is above emotions, passions and affections. As it no longer knows suffering it suppresses all forms of feelings without fear, desire or shame. One may infer that, at this stage, the soul begins to exist on a rational plane. And, again, it is at this stage that Plotinus would begin to consider the human individual as a moral being. And in a moral being, whenever desires are there, these desires can no longer be considered as evil or sinful. For instance, when there is a desire for food or drink, it would be for the sake of satisfying the basic needs of the body. In a moral being, no matter what the desire may be, it would not be there for the sake of sensuous pleasure. This is because reason would be in total control of, and in domination over, emotions.

Section “B”. If Plotinus’ views on ethics must be forcefully drawn from what has been stated so far, one may affirm that he places importance over the intention of the act that makes it good or evil. An act is good if it is motivated by reason. An act is evil if it is motivated by emotion. For Plotinus emotions al-ways lead to sensuousness, and sensuousness ought to be avoided, nay, shunned. Reason, on the other hand, by its own necessity, having the nature of good would avoid actions regarded evil.

Once reason begins to dominate emotions, the stage of self-discipline is reached. Through exercise of self-control over passions and affections, the soul will be like God. “In all this, there is only matter of discipline . . . but our concern is not merely to be sinless but to be God.”[11]

Critical Appreciation. In the Plotinian scheme, there is no scope for evil as a hostile potential force as it is understood in the Christian, Jewish or Islamic sense. In the Plotinian theme, evil is the principle of negation. At a moral level (as there can never be absolute evil), human wickedness is never absolute. Any form of outward action is good or bad to the extent that it re­flects the inner state of the soul. And he who becomes a sage is not the one who has primarily mastered an evil force but the one who has become a reasonable being and is in full control of his emotions.

Like Kant, Plotinus pays importance to intention rather than the consequence of an act. An action is good only if it is motivated by reason. But sometimes a good action may be per-formed through a sentiment. And it is only in the aftermath of the experience that such an action is realised to be motivated either by reason or emotion. But Plotinus would perhaps over-rule such a possibility to be the moral good because such an act as initially swayed by a sentiment would be judged as an emotional or a moral act.

(1) Having a complete picture of Plotinus’ scheme of morality what strikes us is that Plotinus completely ignores the problem of social morality. The problem of morality arises only with inter-personal relations. Instead, Plotinus is more interested in the salvation of the individual. In his view of spiritual guidance he draws out a mystical path by means of which “the flight of the alone to the alone” is rendered possible. And as his views favour an individual living in isolation, he is indirectly advocating against social life. Human beings, psychologically speaking, are of such a nature that they shun isolation. Because man is gregarious by nature, he likes to keep to his kind. And he does this by establishing a community life.

But suppose, even for the sake of argument, we were to accept the idea that all men should live alone. There would come a time when the whole race would become extinct. This is be-cause, in the first place, propagation would not be possible. Secondly, the outside forces of the natural world would prove hazardous to human life.

(2) Again, the mystic path or “the flight of the alone to the alone” is without a general or universal appeal to mankind. This is why all forms of mystical doctrines are not publicly accepted. Also the idea of an isolated individual living with the infinite Being is rather unpopular. Having no foreknowledge of God save that He is an “ineffable Being” brings to the human mind a fear of the unknown. This is the reason why monotheistic religions have a greater appeal to people than mysticism. For example, all revealed religions ensure the idea of a social life to man. According to the Christian belief, before Christ dies on the cross, he promises one of the thieves (who dies with him) that soon they shall be together in Paradise. The Qur’an also refers to the concept of Paradise as a place in which man will live in communion with his fellow beings.

(3) Finally, Plotinus’ philosophy suffers, from the unresolved contradiction of determinism and indeterminism. In his theory of emanation, Plotinus shows how things “flow” in and out from one another. The emanation of one level of reality from another is a kind of determinism. Yet he advocates for the souls striving towards good which is not possible without the precondition of a free will. That is to say, without the precondition of free will, any judgment pertaining to morality is not possible. If man does not have freedom to choose between courses of action, it does not make sense to question the rightness or the wrongness of the action. So although Plotinus does talk about man’s struggle to-wards the acquisition of good, he does not explain the possibility of striving with reference to his metaphysics.

In conclusion one may state that an ethical theory as accept-(ed in the general sense does not exist in Plotinus’ philosophy. The main criticism lies in the fact that, although Plotinus uses ethical terms, these terms bear no reference to social morality. Considering the fact that Plotinus does not claim to be a prophet of revealed religions, his use of ethical terms does not carry religious sanction. But whether the use of the words “Good’’ and “Evil” converts Plotinus’ philosophy into an ethical theory is an open question.

Bibliography

1. A.H. Armstrong, Cambridge History of Late Greek and Early Medieval Philosophy, Cambridge, 1967.

2. J.N. Deck, Nature, Contemplation and the One : A Study in the Philosophy of Plotinus, Toronto, 1967.

3. W.R. Inge, The Philosophy of Plotinus, Longmans, 1929, 2 Vols. (3rd edition).

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4. J. Katz, Plotinus’ Search for the Good, New York, 1950.

5. Stephan MacKenna, Tr., Plotinus : The Enneads, London: Faber and Faber Limited (4th edition), 1966.

6. E. O’Brien, The Essential Plotinus, New York, 1964. Complete translation of ten tractates.