PROLOGUE TO THE FORMALIZATION OF SOCIAL THEORY—

ACCORDING TO THE PHILOSOPHY OF SELF

A. H. Kamali

Social knowledge in general is formulation of thought or language in accordance with the rules that spring from the nature of Social Experience. As Social Experience is communication of 'Social Fact' to an experiencing agent, it is bound to have its grounding, for the fulfilment of its own implicit intent, in the universal and necessary conditions inherent in the composition of that fact.

I

`Social Fact' to summarize the conclusions of my last paper[1] is a spatial manifold, whose mode of givenness is posited in the connectives that join together mutually other individuals. This manifold becomes object of experience with a knower, within or without, to intuit it.

There is no doubt that the individuals in the composition of the Social order of reality are charged with consciousness, but the division of the Social Experience into subject and object by that account represents indeed, no ontological variations.

The division of experience into subject and object, when read as meaning ontological changeover involves intrinsic objectivity of the object, corresponding to the intrinsic subjectivity of the subject.

This metaphysical view, leading to intrinsic difference of the subject and object of experience, is at the heart of Absolutism and cannot assimilate facts of Social experience, as the latter essentializes a mode of experience in which an ego is in confrontations with another ego, for the uncontestable refutation of the Absolutistic premise of experience in whom the 'ego-in-opposition-to-not-ego' is posited as the Universal pattern of all experience.

In Social experience and not in social experience alone, but also in the knowledge of other minds the inseparable intrinsicality of subjectivity that belongs to the perceiving ego and the perceived ego is not effected. In becoming object of consciousness, the latter ego does not undergo an ontological transformation of its nature. It remains a subjectivity.

Indeed, Absolutism is a very limited and narrow philosophy that does not go beyond the ordinary physical experience in which a knowing mind is in apprehension of unknowing and inorganic objects. Generalization of this experience into a universal and necessary truth implies that all reality in its ultimate character is of the nature of an intrinsic Subjectivity bearing in its experience an Intrinsic Objectivity (...shorn off subjectivity in its own right.). Consequently, whenever Absolutism tries to describe the experience of other subjects, it has to divest them off their intrinsic subjectivity and thus reduce them to empty presentations like the physical presentations in opposition to the knowing mind. But, every spectator of a living person recognizes the intrinsicality of the Subjectivity, that inseparably belong to him. This very admission is a transcendence beyond the limits of Absolutism, and shakes to foundation its metaphysical categories of subject and object, according to whom to know is the logical property of the subject and to be known is that of the object. A subject when becomes known does not really change its nature, and is not divested off 'knowing.' That he is simply known is a 'position' without ontological significance. This truth is expressible as the ontological independence of the object from the Subject in the 'knowledge-situation' or 'experience'.

It is on the basis of this premis which overcomes the limits of Absolutism or Spiritual Monism that access to the domain of Spiritual Existence is possible. Absolutism narrows down to inert and inorganic nature only, but the idea of ontological independence of the object entails widened scope of experience and points out to the possibility of the knowledge of other minds. A sentient being is not only capable of knowing other entities devoid of sentience, but also other individuals who are sentient in their own right. Consequently, to be known is an epistemical position; and one and the same being may be constituent element of number of experiential systems in which he occupies different positions; in some of them he may be subject and in others, he may be object.

Therefore, to be subject of experience or to be object of experience has no import for the nature of a being qua sentient being. This statement may be called Epistemological Realism in distinction from the Epistemological Idealism of the Absolutists.

Since Society necessarily and universally pre-supposes the plurality of subjective agents in its constitution, the possibility of Social cognition has in its foundations the knowledge of the plurality of subjects and as such it involves in its essence the thesis of Epistemological Realism.

Social Knowledge is rooted in the knowledge of other subjects. Therefore, this notation of plurality of subjects in thought or language is the first necessary and universal rule of Construction at the bas's of social knowledge.

The second philosophical ground of Social Knowledge lies in the rule of Mutual Otherness. It is this rule of construction necessarily and universally involved in the social knowledge that differentiates this kind of knowledge from the knowledge of other person.

With epistemological Idealism, the experience of otherself is reduced to the experience of one self, but a case of reductionism is not impossible on the basis of Epistemological Realism also. This kind of reduction occurs when the social experience is interpreted as manifest of one (single) subjectivity and the categories of personality structure are brought forward to process the experience into thoughtful judgements.

When an experience containing plurality of subjects is ordered according to the rule of subjective existence successively, so that it is posited as a knowledge of one single subject in the earlier posited plurality of subjects, there is no more genuine social construct in language or in thought. Yet, constructs of this type and theories couched in its categories are abundant in social sciences. I have already examined that Social experience cannot be reduced to the experience of 'a subject in the plurality of subjects' and have seized upon the Law of Mutual Otherness as the universal and necessary condition of social factuality. Consequently, Mutual Otherness i s the Second Law of social knowledge; and constitutes necessary and universal rule for the constitution of social construct or thought.

It seems very much pertinent to point out that those who revolt against the tendencies of construing social experience as an experience of subjectivity in their flight from Collectivism take refuge in Individualism.

Individualism recognizes Mutual Otherness as the law of social phenomena, and very cautious individualists like Popper and Hyek adhere to this rule as a methodological principle, hence the distinction between Individualism and Methodological Individualism.[2]

However, since no rule is there which has no ground in the nature of experience; and no experience is valid which is not founded on the nature of 'the experienced', there is no distinction between Individualism and Methodological Individualism. The recognition of the law of Mutual Otherness, in Individualism appears as a sanction to employ the individualistic categories, i.e. those categories which are true of the experience of a Subject. Both Collectivism and Individualism commit the same kind of reduction. The category of the 'Acting Subject' is the Key concept in both types of Reductionism. The categoies of social theory are always borrowed from the nature of personalistic experience.

The constructive rule of Mutual otherness which effectively gives protection against collectivism does not safeguard against the Individualistic reduction with the revival of the same personalistic categories and the stratification of the first rule of the construction of subjective experience extends over to social experience.

The two camps, Collectivism and Individualism fail to project Social experience in thought and language. Consequently, the Law of Mutual Otherness which eliminates the collectivistic reduction must be supplemented by the Rule of Mutual Relatedness as the constructive principle in Social thought.

This rule is grounded in the universal necessity of social Relation as given in the structure of Social Experience.

Social relations in their establishment of connections between the separate egos constitute an order of its own kind. Thus Collectivism and Individualism are not the only alternatives: there is a third alternative also and that is spatiality which truely projects the nature of Social experience. It is constituted in the relationships between individuals and therefore the Rule of Relatedness is the constructive principle of Social Knowledge in whose implementation the distortions of personalistic categories are overcome and transcended.

These three axiomatic rules of social knowledge (1) the rule of plurality of subjects, (2) the rule of mutual otherness, and (3) the rule of social relationship can be combinedly denoted as the Schema of Social Space.

Sufficient reason for this schema as philosophical foundation of Social Knowledge lies in the nature of social experience itself. As this Schema lies in the bases of social experience, it becomes the philosophical foundation of social knowledge. As articulated in accordance with it, the constructs and concepts about society become adequate to experience.

Logical limits of social knowledge lies within the limits of social experience. No social construct refers beyond the experience. Consequently, all social constructs which can be translated in terms of the social experience constitute social knowledge. The success of this translation is guaranteed in the schema of construction which apriorily formulates the construct in accordance with the constitution of social experience.

Consequently, the schema which is apriori to the constructs is a posteriori to the social experience. It is obtained in social experience as such.

The social experience is presentation and qua presentation imposes its own schema on the mind of the observer; and the observer by following it becomes conscious of the social experience.

II

Since there is no object beyond social experience to which the social knowledge refers, the social experience is itself Social object. The idea that social object causes social experience leads to the difficulties not unlike those which beset the dualism of a material substance behind sensations.

There is no distinction between social experience and social object. The social fact when it becomes a constituent of some epistemical situation is social experience.

The social experience is a known aspect of the Social fact. There are two possibilities: either the social fact completely enters or partially enters into an epistemical situation. In the former case social experience is completely identical with social fact. In the latter case a distinction arises between the experience and fact: the experience is only a constituent of the fact, so that not one, but many partial experiences constitute the totality of the social fact. Consequently, the distinction between experience and fact is epistemically valid; but it shall never be taken as the relation between consequence and ground, or that between effect and cause. The distinction is of the nature of part and whole. The social reality is the whole which is made of the component parts. In epistemical domain, this truth can be stated as the whole of experience which is given in the configuration of the partial experiences.

Since the whole of social fact has the constitution of the relational manifold in mutually other individuals, every partial experience has a movement to complete itself in accordance with its schema. Suppose that I intuit A who is in a social space; my experience of A contains an implicit reference to other components of the schema of social space. The partial experience will not become complete unless all the other aspects enter into the experience. Thus, Schematic completion lies in the nature of Social experience.

The unit of social experience, therefore, is a complete social fact. An experience which is a segment of the unit experience must inevitably move to integrate with other segments of the experience in order to fulfil the demands of its completion. It may be stated, therefore, that if a partial experience demands a logical completion in the fulfilment of the schema of sociality, it is a piece of social experience, otherwise it is not.

In conformation to this; if a proposition like "X is there" does demand completion by other propositions so that to convey a social fact, it is not a social proposition, unless combined with those propositions. All of them put together would convey a unit social fact. Consequently the unit of propositional set of social knowledge is to be defined as one which in its totality satisfies the schema of social fact.

III

Sociology i s a systematic study of sociation and that of the dynamic varieties of its forms of actuality. Though with Comte and Spencer it had appeared as synthesis or apex of all sciences, yet these are the works of G. Simmel, F. Tonnies, L. F. Ward and L. W. Small, C. H. Cooley etc. that could acquire the full vision of the Category of Sociation, abstracted and objectified in the successive re-orientation of Sociology towards the goal of a well-ordered science. Highly precious contributions of Max Weber, Durkheim, Von Wiese, W. Thomas, F. Znaniecke, Karl Mannheim etc. have consolidated the Category of Sociation in its own right with developing on its 'grund-begrif a web of conceptual tools that represent the social phenomena in an autonomous frame of reference independent of the constructs that were relevant to other sciences like biology, individual psychology, or say ethics, etc. Now, Sociology moves in a very well delineated context; it has ceased to oscilate between metaphysics and cosmology, or between biology and politics; it operates within the limits set by the category of sociation, and has to advance by feeding only on the immense possibilities latent in its constitution. Consequently, Sociological thought is dependent from its very inception on the structural apprehension of Sociation.

Most of the Sociologists, mentioned above including G. SimmeI, Tonnies, and Mannheim import collectivistic categories in the body of Sociological system; there are others like Melinowski, R.K. Mukerjee, and Freud who conceive sociation as instrumental in origin. Consequently, such and possibly other varieties of models lead us to conceive that the definition of sociology as the science of sociation does not by itself guides us to objective and unanimous knowledge, unless the universal and necessary constitution of sociation is not grasped and internalised as the basic frame of reference of Sociology. The 1st section of this paper, therefore has been conclusively devoted to clarifying the category of sociation. That part of our thesis is metasociology, which investigate into the nature and character of sociation, the category presumed in the science of sociology.

Sociation, it has been shown in the preceding part of this thesis, has a place in the order of reality as an ontological category which when assimilated by thought becomes epistemological.

As 'noesis' is not committed to any structural form, it has the capacity and the dynamism to adopt any form. Its attention to the being of sociation (a content of reality) makes it adopt the composition of the latter; its structural form becomes the structural form of sociation. In its creative moments then, it creates the `ideal' entities which are but the determinations of its self-assumed formal nature. These ideal entities organised into a full fledged system is Sociology. Here I do point out to the constructed nature of sociology.

The concept of sociology as a construction in thought has a far-reaching consequences. The most important one is concerned with repudiation of the copy theory of systematic knowledge. Copy theory implies representation of all unbearable details of events in thought, a heap of unordered knowledge. Systematic knowledge, on the other hand, tries to leave out the details. Its mode of development lies in the apprehension of the germinal category of events, and is commitment to that category. By adopting the form of that category, thinking becomes independent of experience, and works out more determinate forms out of the general form assimilated in its nature. I think, at this moment we can do justice to Kant. Kant is perfectly right in so far as he conceives that thinking applies its own categories to the raw-material of experience, but is mistaken if he conceives the categories of mind as eternal. Hegel, Marx, Weber, Mannheim and Cassirer have opened the way to a more dynamic interpretation that the mental categories are gradual internalization of the objective reality. John Dewey's idea of the flexible human nature throws light on the problem in the same direction. However, the enormous possibility of adopting any form inherent in the nature of consciousness cuts short the whole discussion on the point by directly providing logical foundation of the relevancy and validity of objective thought.

The logical necessity of dynamic assimilation of the forms of external reality is universal basis of all systematic thought which after its being posited in accordance with the form of the attended context of reality becomes free from the particular contents. Hence thought, or systematic knowledge is not a reproduction of the particular events.

Sociological system, consequently, is a web of ideal concepts posited by the thinking mind of the sociologist in accordance with the forms of sociation. Systematic Sociology is a thought system; it's particular details are mental entities and not copies of the particular social events.

IV

This methodological construction of sociology is quite in line with mathematical systems. Sociological thinking follows the pattern of mathematical thinking. Mathematics is governed by a form whose compositional reduction has been attempted by Peano, Frege, Whitehead and Russel, Whyle, Hilbert, Godel and may others. The thinking mind assimilates the form, let us say, the five postulates of Peano, and constructs ideal entities, i.e. the number system. Mathematical procedure is thus strictly constructive as Kant has originally conceived it. Mind, to give another example, gives to itself Reimanian form (Postulates) and constructs a system of non-Euclidean geometry. The same constructionism as method is adopted in Sociological thought. Theoretical sociology is a system of ideal constructs out of the germinal form of sociation. Mathematics is formal discipline; theoretical sociology is also formal discipline and affirms in its architectonic independence from the particular contents of experience. Those who disfavour abstract thinking have pronounced formal sociology as a dead corpse of ideal forms. But this shows their aversion to the formal aspect of a science, and is likely to detract them from accepting the valuability of even Mathematics and formal logic.

Formal sociology may be an end in itself as an expression of the creative genius of mind in the same way as (formal) mathematics. Only a very small fraction of formal sociology may pass into practical uses, as very humble part of mathematics has found application in physical and other types of experience. This meagreness of practical aspect does not deter the growth and expansion of mathematics. So, it should not become an obstacle to the theoretical activity of the limitless rise of sociology. It may not have practical utility as a whole, still as an art activity, as an end in itself, can exist and must exist.

An intricately developed and sufficiently expanded sociological system with all its ramifications may be readily available like the advanced theory of equation in meeting with the newly developing perceptual situations. Theoretical knowledge is- backbone of perception; and theoretic constructs become applied concepts in relation to the context of fact. Non-Euclidean geometries and mathematical theory of probability have been mere theoretic constructs, but with the new advances in celestial mechanics and the development of uncertainly in specification of the movement of an atom along with its location, they have found respective empirical content to become applied systems. Similarly, many of the branches of formal sociology may become part of the applied sociology. The function of applied science is to describe and analyse the actually functioning concrete system.

Description and analysis of the concrete system presupposes on elaborate background of the theoretic system. Actually existing social systems are intricate cobwebs of relations and their composite configurations. Their perceptual grasp or observation demands that the perci pient should be adequately equipped with the theoretic architectonic which defines, discerns, and picks out the relevant object-matter from the mass of events.

The concrete social system, which is recorded by observation, requires analysis. Its complete particular form is broken in components. This act of analysis is not done in Vacuum, it also needs the theoretical system, which contains in its construct the possible ideal types of the concrete system. Analysis is done by isolating parts of the concrete system in accordance with the ideal configuration. The validity of analysis is judged by the synthetic activity in which an ideal blue print (the ideal form) is kept by the scientist, and the parts are fitted into it. If the resultant synthesis in accordance with the blue print completely corresponds to the actual system, then it is verified that the applied ideal type is relevant to the empirically observable social system. In this manner theoretic science guides the applied science. The formal procedure of applied science follows the steps of observation analysis synthesis and verification; and the entire procedure feeds upon the formal knowledge which is developed according to the principle of construction. Applied sociology following its own rules renders the empirical social systems intelligible by providing their analysis in terms of the elementary forms of sociation. These latter forms are the final terminus of analysis within sociology. It is not the task of sociology to go beyond.

V

It has been propounded in the preceding papers that social system is spatial system; and it has also been said that mathematics is the science of space.

A question may naturally arise that if mathematics is the universal science of space, what is the justification for sociology?

Our answer evokes the question why there is Geometry. All geometric constructs are exhaustively translatable in terms of the universal mathematics (i.e. Algebra); but still there is geometry. Its existence is justified on the basis of one fundamental fact that it selectively studies those forms which are immediately there in the visual field. Geometry directly studies that space which obtains in the compresence of the visual sense-data. This space can not be reduced to any other kind of space. Therefore geometry has a justification to exist as a science of a specific kind of space. Undoubtedly, it would continue to be a branch of the most general science of space, that is of Mathematics. Similarly Sociology has a right to exist by the side of Geometry to study space of its own kind — the social space. Studies in Sociology have a singular criterion; they follow the principle of social construction. Its description is of immediate significance and has immediate translation in terms of our direct social experience.

There is one more delicate point as it contains an ontological consideration: the mutual irreducibility of the different types of space points out ontological uniqueness given in their various figures; parallelogram, quadrilateral, polygon etc. are manifolds of triangles. Their description involves the presentation of the triangles of which they are constituted. The triangles, themselves, are made of straight lines. Consequently, straight lines and points are the ontological foundation of the existence of such figures. They cannot be deciphered further; they set the root-ground of the study of a triangle. A straight line is the smallest relation between two points; and is, member of the class of lines. Consequently the category of line is the ultimate foundation of plane Geometry. It is indivisible. Its abstraction and removal would change the geometric experience into something else. This experience not only presupposes the points, but the distinctive givenness of the lines also. Consequently the idea of line (or the immediate experience of line) provides the ontological basis of the geometric configurations. Similarly, the category of sociation paves the ground for the unique order of social formations. It is ontologically irreducible, and presupposes not only the category of Individuals and their mutual otherness but also the unique category of social relatedness which binds the individuals in social systems.

Geometry studies the lines between points and their combinations into various possible configurations. Sociology studies sociation and those combinatory complexities that develop in its different designations. Consequently, Sociation as such is the basic frame of reference in Sociology.

VI

Universal and necessary conditions of societies, i.e.

1.        The axiom of plurality of individuals

2.        The axiom of mutual otherness

3.        The axiom of their mutual connectedness:

as has been told, are the philosophical foundation of all social sciences. These are meta-sociological concepts, component of sociation which are projected in the determination of the entire body of sociology. Beyond them, there is no provision of philosophical generalities, metaphysical references and trans-social speculations within its constructions.

Since, not a few sociologist have violated the limits of the systematic discipline, as the ideal of sociology should be, it is really a part of duty to prove such inadvertant attempts meaningless within the bounds of this discipline. Since sociology is determined by its own apriori foundation, it is never competent to draw philosophic conclusions about society, human destiny arts and religion.

Sociology is a science and not philosophy. Consequently it has to incarnate the arche-form of science. I have tried to propound the schema of science and its differenting essence in the Third part of this work wherein I have placed sociology in the group of natural science. Here I content myself to pointing out roughly that the class-characteristic which differentiates natural science within the general class of all systematic knowledge (Wissenschaften) is the Category of Interaction. Unidirectional causal series yield historical knowledge. But natural science as such is grounded in the form of interaction. Mutual causation is the formulative schema of scientific knowledge.

Pure Mathematics is devoid of this schema. But Physics and Chemistry presuppose it, hence are natural sciences. Sociology, too, in order to become science has to presuppose it. It has to view its object-matter in the category of interaction which bestows on it the logical property of a natural science.[3]

Consequently, besides the schema of sociation which is also relevant to some aspects of philosophy, ontology, and axiology, sociology has its ultimate foundation in the schema of Interaction to become a science. This schema demands that if there are two individuals A and B, they must be determined apriori under the form of interaction. A causes B and B caused A. For sociological purpose, the content of this inter-causality is sociation. Therefore, A socially responds to B, and B socially responds to A. I think, the conjunction 'and' in the description of the scientifically schematized situation must be substituted by the word 'cause.' B socially responds to A, which causes "A to socially responds to B", ad infinitum. The abstract schema relevant for sociology would be: A's social Response in intercausation with B's social Response. A and B both are bracketted out; only interstimulating social acts remain in the field of observation. These acts are the data of sociology which are ordered in the schema, of interaction. In a situation composed of two individuals, the Unit of sociological observation is not the act of one individual; it is really half of the unit-fact, which must be completed by observation of the other half. A's affection to B must complete itself in B's attitude to A, and then alone the unit of observation is composed in the category of interaction.

As, it may appear, now, every unit-fact again develops and completes itself in the development of another unit fact. A's social Act causes B's social Act, which again causes A's social act. This interaction shows a development in time, or in more accurate language it has temporal dimensions. Actually existing social facts are not only spatial events but also temporal. Their concrete perception therefore, demands the full category of space-time. The category of space is an abstraction out of the concrete and similar is the case with the category of time, but space-time is the concrete category of concrete factuality. Actual social systems are developing changing spatialities; their changing nature is represented by their temporality. Consequently, the business of sociology must be defined in relation to the concrete social systems, as prediction of the temporal sequences of the system. The theoretical concepts, developed within the body of sociology, must be such that they should make possible inferences as to the temporal dimension of the system. If such inferences are genuinely drawn from the concepts, it is said that the concepts have scientifically explained the concrete system.

The following attempt will gradually make all these points clarified and finally in the discussion of science, their full expositions will be attempted, according to the Philosophy of serf, we have propounded in the earlier papers.

Notes