Iqbal on Democracy:
Acceptance or Rejection?
Dr. Zeenath Kausar

Ever since the colonization of the Muslim lands and the spread of Western concepts and ideologies in the Muslim world, Muslim thinkers seemed to have preoccupied in exploring and analyzing the alien ideologies from Islamic perspective. Obviously, the purpose behind this has been to provide the correct Islamic stance to the people on several issues related to the Western concepts and ideologies. Some important ideologies that have been assessed and are still under critical assessment by Muslim thinkers include nationalism, democracy and feminism. A survey of the Muslim reflections on these ideologies needs a full-fledge study that is beyond this paper.

Here, in this paper, an attempt is made to make an exploration of the views of the world-known poet-philosopher of Islam, Mohammad Iqbal on democracy. For this a comprehensive study of his writings both in the form of prose and poetry is explored and analyzed. Besides this, some secondary sources are also referred to and utilized. It is contended in the paper, that although Iqbal accepted some of the principles of democracy but he has rejected the secular and material orientation of the philosophy of democracy. It is argued that Iqbal’s acceptance of some principles of democracy and his rejection of some aspects of democracy is based on his broad perception of Islamic fundamentals and concepts. It implies that Iqbal accepted only those principles of democracy which he deems compatible with Islam but at the same time he rejected the secular foundation of the same principles as well as all those principles and core concepts of democracy which he thinks incompatible with Islamic philosophy of life and Islamic polity. It is therefore concluded in the paper that it is as irrational to accept any of the Western concept or ideology without any critical scrutiny as it is illogical to reject any Western concept and ideology only because it is originated in the West. Hence, Iqbal’s stance on democracy seems to be a commendable model for Muslim scholars to decide about the Islamic position on any Western concept and ideology. However, it is also emphasized that it is more essential and urgent for Muslim thinkers to concentrate and promote their own Islamic terms and terminologies and to devote their intellectual potentials on setting proper directions to the destination of Islamic Ummah-revitalization of Islamic civilization. Engagement in the debates on the compatibility and incompatibility of Islam with every concept and ideology which Western modernity and postmodernism are presenting before the world should be only a side business not the main preoccupation of thinkers and leaders of the Muslim Ummah.

It is important to clarify at the very out set that the views of Iqbal on democracy cannot be studied in isolation with his broad perception of Islam, his philosophy of (Khudi) selfhood, his concepts of (mard i mu’min) man of belief or (insān i kāmil) perfect man and his views on ijmā‘ and ijtihād. Hence, Iqbal’s views on democracy shall be studied and assessed in context with the above concepts. The paper comprises three parts. In the first part, Iqbal’s arguments and contentions for the acceptance of democracy shall be presented and analyzed. Whereas, in the second part, Iqbal’s arguments for the rejection of some democratic principles shall be highlighted. This shall be followed by a conclusion.

Iqbal: Acceptance of Some Democratic Principles

Some of the important principles of democracy that are appreciated by Iqbal include ‘freedom’, ‘equality’ and ‘election’. He finds these principles compatible with Islam to a certain extent. For instance, he points out that in Islam, although the interest of an individual is subordinated to the community but the individual is given sufficient liberty which is necessary for the development of his personality. He contends that the Western theory of democracy also protects the interest of the community while providing a conducive environment to individuals for their own development in the same way as Islam does. He writes.

The best form of government for such a community would be democracy, the idea of which is to let man develop all the possibilities of his nature by allowing him as much freedom as possible.[i]

Iqbal illustrates his contention by pointing out that the Caliph of Islam is subject to the same laws like all others in the given state. He is supposed to be elected by the people and should be deposed by the people “if he goes contrary to the law”.[ii] Hence, Iqbal asserts: “Democracy, then, is the most important aspect of Islam, regarded as a political ideal”.[iii] But at the same time, he points out that this ideal of freedom lasted in the Muslim world only for thirty years and later “disappeared with its political expansion”.[iv]

At some other place, Iqbal traced some historical facts to show how the principles of freedom, equality, election and deposition of rulers are operated in early Muslim history. Once some one asked the Prophet Mohammad  whether he would get any position after the Prophet, if he embraced Islam? The Prophet  said that it was not in his disposition to do it. Then, Iqbal pointed out how Abū Bakr was selected as the first Caliph and what he said to the people: “…Obey me as I obey the Lord and his Prophet, where in I disobey, obey me not.”[v] Thus Iqbal highlighted some important historical facts to show that “the idea of universal agreement is, in fact the fundamental principle of Muslim constitutional theory.”[vi] All this shows the “freedom” and equality that embodied in Islam. He also quoted the Prophet  who is reported to have said: “I am a man like you; like you my forgiveness also depends on the mercy of “God”. He also discussed the classical theory of Caliphate, particularly the theory presented by al-Māwardī. Through out this discussion, he emphasized that “if the Caliph does not rule according to the law of Islam, or suffers from physical or mental infirmity, the Caliph is forfeited.”[vii] Further he writes: 

The origin of state then, according to Al- Māwardī, is not force, but free consent of individual who unite to form a brotherhood, based upon legal equality, in order that each member of the brotherhood may work out the potentialities of his individuality under the law of Islam. Government, with him, is an artificial arrangement, and is divine only in the sense that the law of Islam-believed to have been revealed-demands peace and security.[viii] 

Iqbal also discussed how all the officials are appointed or elected in the Caliphate and they are removed by the concerned authorities or people, as explained by al-Māwardī. After having discussed all this, he remarked: “It is clear that the fundamental principle laid down in the Qur’an is the principle of election; the details or rather the translation of this principle into a workable scheme of Government is left to be determined by other considerations.”[ix] Iqbal then pointed out that later the principle of election did not develop on democratic lines for two reasons. Firstly, the idea of election did not suit the Persians and the Mongols. Secondly, the Muslims during this period were preoccupied with political expansion.[x]

From the above views of Iqbal, many scholars including Maẓharuddīn contends that “Iqbal stresses the elective principle as the basis of Islamic democracy. Besides, he believes in the supremacy of the law and the equality of all Muslims.”[xi]

In fact, according to Iqbal, it is Islam which has imported to the people their natural rights, equality, freedom and justice. He writes:

            Liberty took its birth from its gracious message,

            This sweet wine dripped from its grapes!

            It was impatient of invidious distinctions.

            Equality was implicit in its being!

The modern age, kindled a hundred lamps, has opened its eyes in its lap.[xii]

The above words of Iqbal throw abundance of light on the fact that the modern Western discourse on liberty and equality can be traced back to Islam, particularly from the time of the Prophet Mohammed  and the period of Khulafā-i-Rāshidūn. It was during this period that the real meaning of liberty and equality was translated into practice. In other words, this principle of democracy-liberty and equality are not new to Islam at all. In fact, it is Islam which has presented these concepts to the world to liberate man from all sorts of man-centred authoritarianism and dominations. It clearly implies that Islam is totally against hereditary monarchies, dynasties, empires, military dictatorships and self-imposed rule over the people.[xiii] But, after the period of Khulafā-i-Rāshidūn (period of Four Rightly Guided Caliphate), the elective principle of Islamic polity was gradually relegated to background. Therefore, it is generally argued that one of the reasons of the decline of the Islamic Ummah can be traced back to the time of the Muslim history when the concept of Shūra (consultation) is set aside and instead the elements of ‘force’ or ‘heredity’ were practically incorporated in the Muslim political history.[xiv] Hence, it is important to differentiate between the real Islamic political system and the Muslim political practices after the Rightly Guided Caliphate. It seems that there is a need of making the same kind of differentiation between Western theories on liberty and equality and the Western practices, particularly, British and French colonialism. For instance, a study of at least one direct original contributor to the theory of democracy, Jean-Jacques Rousseau, shows that there is a big difference between how Rousseau defined ‘liberty’[xv] and how the British and the French colonized many countries and deprived people all kinds of freedom and liberty. It may be argued that Rousseau advocated direct democracy and presently Western states are following representative democracy and British and the French colonization have nothing to do with democracy. But it is not the question of form, direct or indirect democracy but the latent meaning of civil liberty as defined by Rousseau-obedience to the law prescribed by oneself is liberty. Was the British colonization of Indian subcontinent based on this concept of liberty? Did the British colonize India after taking the ‘general will’ of the Indians? Basically, is colonization based on the concepts of ‘liberty’ and equality? Colonization was justified by the West as ‘White man’s burden’ of civilizing the uncivilized! Does colonizing mean civilizing? If not, then, in no way can colonization be justified. But Iqbal observes the following:

Democracy has been the great mission of England in modern times, and English statesmen have boldly carried this principle to countries which have been, for centuries, growing under the most atrocious forms of despotism….England, in fact, is doing one of our own great duties, which unfavourable circumstances did not permit us to perform.[xvi]

As far as Iqbal appreciates liberty, equality and the elective principle in democracy, it is understandable. But to talk about England as though it took the mission of democracy particularly at a time when it was in full swing of its colonization net-work with its imperialistic designs is questionable. Iqbal who lived during the British colonization of India was quite aware of British imperialism and its double standard policy for ‘liberty’ and ‘equality’ towards itself and its colonized people. If democracy means to give real freedom and liberty to all the people, to let people enjoy all the human rights based on their traditions, to respect all cultures and civilization all over the world and to allow them to rise and flourish, then, it is very hard to say the true fact, that not only Britain, the whole of the West which boasts about democracy, does not follow it sincerely. Whether it is the question of human rights or the issue of exporting democracy, the West has never followed it as a mission for its own sake but only for its own self interest of promoting imperialistic agenda. This attitude of double standard of the West is admitted by the Western scholars themselves.

Huntington observes:[xvii]

            Non-Westerners also do not hesitate to point to the gaps between Western principle and Western action. Hypocrisy, double standards, and “but nots” are the price of universalist pretensions. Democracy is promoted but not if it brings fundamentalists to power…

Unlike what Iqbal had said, England, neither took the mission of democracy during its period of colonization nor it the West as a whole ever took up democratization as a mission for its own sake. Nevertheless, it is no doubt the mission of the Islamic Ummah to liberate people from absolutism and despotism of a single man or a group of people, but this requires the promotion of popular ‘vicegerency’ not popular sovereignty which is the central part of secular democracy.

Iqbal’s views on the growth of the republican spirit, the abolition of Khilafah in Turkey, the importance of ijtihād and ijmā‘ are also very much relevant to comprehend his stance for democracy. According to Iqbal, the abolition of Khilafah in Turkey is based on ijtihād. He contended that the Turks exercised ijtihād to settle the first question of the Khilafah: ‘Should the Caliphate be vested in a single person?’ He pointed out that the ijtihād of the Turks that the Caliphate or Imamate can be vested in a body of persons or an elected Assembly is “perfectly sound”. He asserted: “The republican form of government is not only thoroughly consistent with the spirit of Islam, but has also become a necessity in view of the new forces that are set free in the world of Islam.”[xviii] As for ijmā‘, according to Iqbal, the modern legislative assemblies bear the characteristics of ijmā‘: He writes:[xix]

            “….the transfer of power of ijtihād from individual representatives of schools to a Muslim legislative Assembly, which, in view of the growth of opposing sects, is the only possible form ijmā‘ can take in modern times.

 Iqbal strongly believed in collective ‘ijtihād’. He argued that in the contemporary times, the right of ijtihād should not be concentrated only in the hands of individual scholars and experts of the Qur’an and Sunnah alone. Along with the experts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah, it seemed essential to seek the opinions of experts in physical and social sciences on the given issue as the case may be. Hence according to Iqbal, legislative assemblies constituted by experts of various disciplines including the experts of the Qur’an and the Sunnah and Uṣūl al Fiqh can play an important role in exercising collective ijtihad.[xx]

However, later Iqbal realized some practical problems that might arise in the legislative assemblies where Muslims are in minority like British India. He proposed the formation of an assembly of Ulema who should be independent of the legislature. “The idea” of the assembly, according to Iqbal, “is to protect, expand, and, if necessary, to reinterpret the law of Islam in the light of modern conditions, while keeping close to the spirit embodied in its fundamental principles.”[xxi] For this reason, many scholars including Mūḥammad Khālid Mas‘ūd contend that “the significance of Iqbal’s contribution in this discussion thus lies in his re-construction of ijtihād as a collective effort in the form if ijmā‘, rather than an individual attempt.”[xxii]

Here, Iqbal’s contention that the abolition of Khilafah in Turkey and its replacement with the republican form of government is based on ijtihād, needs critical assessment. There is no doubt that the Khilafah in Turkey remained only in namesake since the whole institution of Khilafah was distorted and degenerated. It can also not be disputed that Islamic political system is based on consent and elective principle. But was it not clear to Iqbal that Mustafa Kamal Ataturk was not interested in restoring Islamic political system, rather he aimed and established a thoroughly secular republic based on the Western model? If Kamal Ataturk had abolished the distorted and torn out Caliphate in 1924 in order to establish the genuine Caliphate based on Shūra with the supremacy of Sharī‘ah, this would have been welcomed by the Muslim world whole heartedly. But, history bears witness to the fact that all the attempts of Ataturk were manoeuvred on Western model of modernization. But, it does not however mean that Iqbal accepted secularism and secular foundation of democracy which shall be soon discussed later in the paper. Perhaps to Iqbal, the abolition of the distorted caliphate and the formation of a republican government is Ijitihād, not of course the formation of Western styled secular republic which is repugnant to Islam.

However, an important point can be raised here as a corollary of this discussion on shūra, ‘ijtihād, and ijma‘ and Iqbal’s assertion on the consultative and elective principles of democracy that they are based on the Qur’anic demand “rule by mutual consultation”, (amruhum Shūra bainahum)[xxiii] Even the Prophet was commanded to take counsel with the companions in all public matters. Here, the question arises as to who should be consulted by whom? It should be remembered that when the Prophet  was asked by the companions about the decision that is mentioned in the Qur’anic verse (3:159) he replied that it means “taking the counsel of those who are known for their good opinions and then following it.”[xxiv] It is also reported by Abū Huraira that  “the Prophet practiced Shūra with his companions more frequently than anyone else he had seen”.[xxv] The same tradition of consultation (Shūra) was followed by all the first four Rightly Guided Caliphs. According to Ibn Taimiyyah (Shūra) consultation is obligatory for Muslim authorities (ulu ’l-amr) where no explicit injunction from the Qur’anic revelation is available.[xxvi]

According to the historical practice, it is important to note that not only the Caliphs ruled with consultation but even they were appointed on the basis of the consultative method. According to the jurists including Ibn Taimiyyah and al-Bāqilānī, the Imam can only be appointed through the choice of the people, (al-ikhtiyār) which implies that “the Imam holds his office because of a contract drawn by the wise (ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd).[xxvii] It is agreed by all the scholars including Fathi Osman who asserted that “after the death of the Prophet (11 A. H. /632 C.E) the first four caliphs held their offices as a result of free election.”[xxviii] This public agreement which offered the caliph his power is known as bai‘ah (from the root bai‘ah, meaning “to sell”). The Qur’anic principle of Shūra (counsel) inspired this unique historical experiment.”[xxix] According to the historical facts, this bai‘ah was given firstly by the pious distinguished and leading persons of the community. This bai‘ah was followed by the bai‘ah of the masses which the caliph obtained in the mosque. According to some historians the bai‘ah given by the distinguished and the leading persons is a “special bai‘ah.” Whereas, these distinguished and leading persons who give their special bai‘ah, are known in the juristic literature as (ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd).[xxx] Later, by the time of the Ummayyad dynasty itself, the term and the procedure of “ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd” survived only in the juristic literature because the elective principle was gradually ignored and eliminated.

As far as the consultation of (ulu ’l-amr) on public matters is concerned, there are different opinions among scholars on this issue. However, as pointed out by Fathi Osman, “most commentators of the Qur’an as well as jurists take the term “ulu ’l-amr” to mean both the rulers and ulema together, while some of them say that it refers only to the ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd. Mohammad Abduh supported the argument that the term ulu’l-amr meant ahl al-ḥall wa al-‘aqd.’[xxxi] According to Fathi Osman, Abduh supported this view-point because he was more inclined to restrict the authority of the rulers by considering the Shūra as the basic authority in the Muslim community and the Islamic state.”[xxxii]

From the above discussion it is quite clear that those who elected the caliphs in the first round were the eminent persons and those who are consulted on public maters are also eminent persons whom include particularly those who are quite knowledgeable, the real Ulema. Obviously, the Ulema are mostly needed for doing ‘ijtihād’ whenever necessary based on the Qur’an, Prophetic traditions and the earlier precedents. Here, two important questions can be raised if the modern form of democratic system is accepted. Firstly, what if the general masses are ignorant and they elect either insincere and less knowledgeable persons in the parliament and legislative assemblies? Secondly, what if those who are elected are not the right kind of persons and they are incapable of doing ‘ijtihād’?

According to Fazlur Raḥmān, such apprehensions and objections were “first advanced by those Turks who sought to defend the imperial power of the Sultan against the protagonists of constitutionalism.”[xxxiii] He pointed out that Namik Kamal from Turkey and Muḥammad al-Ghazālī from Egypt refuted such arguments and asserted that general masses possess sufficient wisdom and practical sense to understand the state matters.[xxxiv] Furthermore, according to Fazlur Raḥmān, ‘amruhum shūra bainahum’ implies that “their common affair is to be decided by their common and mutual consultation and discussion-not by an individual or an elite whom they have neither elected nor sanctioned.”[xxxv]

Yet the problem remains unresolved. For instance, can any law made by the legislators be accepted to the Muslims even if it contradicts the Qur’an and the Sunnah only because it is passed in the elected legislature? As mentioned earlier, for Iqbal the abolition of the distorted caliphate in Turkey and the formation of the republican government is based on “sound ijtihād.” But could Iqbal accept the whole secularization programme of Ataturk and the subsequent secular governments in Turkey, Egypt and in all other Muslim states only because they are elected governments, by any chance? Could Iqbal accept absolute sexual and reproductive rights demanded by the feminists in some contemporary legislative assemblies which are supported by the majority members in some countries only because they are discussed and accepted in the assemblies? All these show that modern election method and deliberations in the parliament though appear to be nearer to Islam but both in their spirit and actual practice, they are far away from the Islamic concepts of ‘Shūra’ ‘ijtihād and ijmā‘ Hence modern election method and parliaments cannot guarantee a good government unless those who rule and those who are ruled mutually aim and work for the common good. In other words, democracy as such cannot be regarded as a good government acceptable to Islam unless those who are in power are God-loving people and they aim at the general good of the people and make the laws based on the spirit of the Qur’an and the Sunnah for all the good of the people.

From the above discussion, it is quite evident that although the elective and consultative principles of democracy are accepted by Iqbal as compatible to Islam, these principles are not totally free from problems and risks in secular democracies.

Iqbal’s Rejection of Secular Foundation of Democracy

Iqbal’s rejection of the secular and material foundation of democracy is rooted in his comprehension of the Islamic concept of Tawḥīd, the unity of Allah and the unity of life. Tawḥīd, for Iqbal, is the unifying force which joins the spiritual and material aspects of life into a single and the united entity of life. Unlike the dualistic concept of life of the West which separates ‘matter’ from spirit’ according to Iqbal, in Islam ‘all this immensity of matter constitutes a scope for the self-realization of spirit’.[xxxvi] For this reason, there is no bifurcation between ‘mosque’ and state and ‘all that is secular is therefore sacred in the roots of its being’.[xxxvii] In fact, for Iqbal, distinction between the Church and the state does not exist in Islam. He writes:

That according to the law of Islam there is no distinction between the Church and the state. The state with us is not a combination of religious and secular authority, but it is a unity in which no such distinction exists. The caliph is not the necessarily the high priest of Islam; he is not the representative of God on earth… In fact, the idea of personal authority is quite contrary to the spirit of Islam.[xxxviii]

This unified approach to life in Islam is antithetical to secularism, nationalism and democracy. Iqbal was quite aware of this fact. He points out the main difference between democracy in Islam and democracy in Europe:

            The Democracy of Europe-fear overshadowed by socialistic agitation and anarchical originated mainly in the economic regeneration of European societies…..The Democracy of Islam did not grow out of the extension of economic opportunity, it is a spiritual principle based on the assumption that every human being is a centre of latent power, the possibilities of which can be developed by cultivating a certain type of character.[xxxix]

Democracy in the West being originated from the economic regeneration of European societies is secular and materialistic by its very nature. It mainly caters to the material life of a society leaving the spiritual aspect altogether. Consequently, democracy in the West tends to move away from moral and ethical values. This secularist and materialistic orientation of Western democracy is totally rejected by Iqbal. This is precisely pointed out by Fazlur Raḥmān: ‘the essence of his (Iqbal’s) criticism is that the Western democratic societies aim only at accomplishing material ends, and that the average Western man is devoid of any vision of a higher moral social order.’[xl]

Fazlur Rahman also points out that according to Iqbal, ‘the error does not lie in the democratic forms and processes but in their lack of ethical and spiritual concerns and their orientations and value system’.[xli] Therefore, for Fazlur Raḥmān, “Iqbal was undoubtedly a democrat”[xlii] since he appreciated democratic forms and processes although he rejected democratic value system. Obviously, Iqbal’s rejection of the democratic value system lies in his strong belief in the unity of life which joins the spiritual and the material aspects of life into one single entity.

Further more, Iqbal’s concept of the sovereignty of Sharī‘ah which demands ultimate loyalty to Allah also contradicts secular democratic principles. Iqbal states: “It (Islam) demands loyalty to God, not to thrones. And since God is the ultimate spiritual basis of all life, loyalty to God virtually amounts to man’s loyalty to his own ideal nature.”[xliii] Besides this, in his Rumūz i Bekhudī, he writes:[xliv]

What is it that infuses one breath in a hundred hearts?

 It is one of the secrets of faith in Tawḥīd!

Faith and Wisdom and Law all spring from it,

It is the source of strength and power and stability!

There is no god but God” is the capital of our life!

Its bond weaves our scattered thoughts together!

Thus, Iqbal looks at Tawḥīd not merely as a verbal faith in the unity of God and unity of life but a spring from which flows ‘wisdom’ and ‘laws’ to reign supreme in society and state. Supremacy of Islamic laws implies supremacy of Allah’s will, the Divine will. In other words, Allah’s will which is expressed in the Qur’anic injunctions and Prophetic traditions on all aspects of the life of man and society at all levels should be prevailed supreme in the state. In short, Allah is the one who possesses sovereignty and people are His vicegerents on the earth. This implication of Tawḥīd goes entirely against the main tenet of democracy, popular sovereignty. In secular democracy, it is the people who possess the right of making the laws, and also executing and adjudicating the laws. In the formulation of laws it is not necessary for the people in legislature to refer to the scriptures, the Qur’an, the Bible or any other religious text. People are sovereign and independent to make their own laws based on man-made ideologies, man-made constitutions or in line with the programmes of the ruling parties. Therefore, there is a possibility in democracy that the ‘laws’ made by the people in the legislature may contradict the ‘will of God’ and even the ‘will’ of some good people in the state. Here, it is important to remember Rousseau, who emphasized that the ‘general will’ of the people should be a ‘good will’. However, there is a great possibility that people who are making laws in a democratic government are not ‘good’ and therefore, the laws that are made by them are not based on ‘good will’. Thus there are two clear risks in a secular democracy. Firstly, that “general will” may contradict the ‘Divine will’ because those who are making the laws may or may not refer to the Divine laws. Secondly, the ‘general will’ may not be the real ‘general will’ as characterized by Rousseau because those who are making the laws may not be necessarily good people. Hence, ‘general will’ in secular democracy need not be’ good will’ rather it can be a ‘bad will’ which is neither based on the good will of the good people nor it is in harmony with the laws of God.

Whereas, for Iqbal Islamic concept of Tawḥīd demands from the ‘man of belief’ (mard-i-mu’min) submission of his will to the will of Allah. Iqbal describes it in these words: [xlv]

He subordinates everything to God:

His seeing and not seeing, his eating and drinking and sleeping!

In all thy action let thy aim be to draw nigh to God,

That His Glory may be made manifest by thee!

Hence, according to K. G. Saiyyidain, the (mard-i-mu’min), ‘man of belief’ of Iqbal is one who “lives his life in the name of the Lord, dedicating all his powers to the working out of His increasing purpose on earth, thus qualifying himself for the position of God’s vicegerent”.[xlvi] Thus, man is a ‘vicegerent of God in Islam not a sovereign, not also a part of popular sovereignty. This implies for Saiyyidain ‘a rejection of all fears except the fear of God, a surrender of our will and purposes to His increasing purpose’ [xlvii]

In other words, in Islam, the true believers even if they are in the legislature and engage in the law-making process, they remain as vicegerents of God Hence they refer to the Divine laws while making the laws so that ‘their will’ should not be contradicting the ‘Divine will’. It signifies that in Islam no believer submits to another believer or a group of believer rather all submit to God alone, while making, executing and adjudicating the laws. This Islamic principle is fundamentally different from secular democracy where people make, execute and adjudicate the laws without necessarily looking into the laws of God, because they consider themselves sovereign. In practical sense, those who are elected by the people for the parliament and assemblies (law-making bodies) become the rulers and the rest have no way than to follow them or   resist them as opposition with varying rates of success. It means that there is a great risk in Western secular democracy of degenerating into despotism, particularly, if those who are in power do not reflect the good will, rather their own ‘selfish will’ based on their own economic and political interest. For this reason, Iqbal once said the following on democracy: [xlviii]

            The Democratic system of the West is the same old instrument

            Whose chords contain no note other than the voice of the Kaiser,

            The Demon of Despotism is dancing in his democratic robes

      Yet you consider it to be the Nilam Pari                                                       of liberty.

Islam does not tolerate any form of despotism. Whether it is despotism of single monarch or despotism of some people in power. Iqbal says: ‘Subservience to others is a proof of the self’s immaturity! Rise superior to such leaning, O bearer of the cross.’ [xlix] At some other place, he writes: ‘Learn the inner meaning of Muhammad’s message, Rid yourself of all deities but God’.[l]

An important characteristic of democracy as pointed out by Iqbal is that “it has a tendency to foster the spirit of legality. This is not in itself bad; but unfortunately it tends to displace the purely moral stand point, and to make the illegal and the wrong identical in meaning.”[li] This tendency of democracy becomes too harmful if the rulers in democracy become despotic and tends to legalize the wrong. This tendency of democracy is totally anti-Rousseaun. It contradicts his concepts of civil liberty, and moral liberty where people willingly obey the laws since they felt that they reflect their own will because these laws are not only made by them but they are made for their own good. Contrary to this in cotemporary times, in many democratic countries, neither people feel that they are following the laws which are made by themselves nor they feel that ‘their will’ is conjoined with the laws.

It is only in Islam that there is a possibility that the laws made by the Majlis-i-Shūra based on the Qur’an and Sunnah are followed by the believers as their own will because they reflect the will of God and the believers know very well that it is God alone who knows perfectly well what is good for people.  Iqbal writes:

A man becomes a Muslim only when the commandments and prohibitions of the Qur’an appear to him as his own desires. He would not then think that his endeavour to imbibe good morals, a taste for worship, aversion for ugly deeds and spiritual evils were a compliance of some strict authoritative orders of an unforgiving master. Instead, the proclivity to doing good and avoiding obnoxious deeds should arise from his own inner depths.[lii]

Thus, according to Iqbal, a true Muslim is one who enjoys a true moral liberty even superior to the moral liberty of Rousseau. In Rousseau, an individual enjoys moral liberty when he realizes that his will is conjoined with the laws of the state which he has made for himself. Whereas, in the case of a true Muslim, he enjoys moral liberty because he realizes that he is following the laws which are based on the spirit of the Islamic texts, the Qur’an and the Sunnah and that his will is conjoined with the will of God. Therefore, when he follows the Divine laws, he does not feel that they are burdensome for him but he willingly follows them as though they are his own desires and will.

The same message is conveyed by Iqbal in the following poetic verses:

Shariat sprouts from the depths of life.

 Darkness gives way before its light

 and turns it into illumination.

If all the world of man were to accept prohibitions enjoined by it as prohibitions for all of them, the social structure built in its light would last forever.[liii]

According to Muhammad Munawwar, the true believer of Iqbal feels that “to behave in the best manner possible is not burdensome direction imposed on him from out side, it rather oozes out of his own spirit.”[liv] In other words, such a spirit of following the Divine laws willingly is hidden within the nature of a true believer. Further, Munawwar explains that for Iqbal, when such conformity between the nature of man and the principles of nature take place, it stands for a proof in respect of the individual concerned that he or she have become a true believer.”[lv]

All these views of Iqbal on Tawḥīd and on the supremacy of Sharī‘ah and on the ‘man of belief’ go entirely against the secular foundation of democracy and its important principle, popular sovereignty.

According to some scholars, Iqbal rejected democracy because he had less confidence on the masses and also because of his high vision of a perfect man (mard-i-kāmil) who resemble the superman of Nietzsche. Following poetic verses of Iqbal are quoted by such scholars to illustrate this point: [lvi]

            Keep away from Democracy: Follow the perfect man,

            For the intellect of two thousand asses cannot bring forth a single man’s thought.

            Democracy is a system where people are counted not weighed.[lvii]

However, a deeper analysis of the above words of Iqbal along with his other socio-political ideas reveals that Iqbal never despises masses and Iqbal’s vision of “Perfect Man” is not the same as the superman of Nietzsche. This can be illustrated through the following words of Iqbal: [lviii]

            Nietzsche, however, abhors this “rule of the herds,” and hopeless of the plebian, he bases all higher culture on the cultivation and growth of an Aristocracy of supermen. But is the Plebian so absolutely hopeless?…Out of the plebian material, Islam has formed men of the noblest type of life and power. Is not, then, the Democracy of early Islam an experimental refutation of the ideas of Nietzsche?

Thus, Iqbal unlike Nietzsche does not abhor common masses. In fact he asserts that the earlier historical Islamic experience refutes the ideas of Nietzsche. Mazharuddin Siddiqui presents following observation on this issue: [lix]

                                                                                                                        Iqbal’s idea of the ‘Great Man’, the Mard-e-Mo’min or Mard-e-Qalandar is not the undemocratic idea of a single superman who sums up all possible greatness in himself and leads the community unopposed, almost in the manner of a dictator. In fact it is quite within the bounds of possibility that the community may be led by a number of supermen working in cooperation with one another and resolving their mutual differences by means of free discussion.

The above observation of Mazharuddin seems to be acceptable. However, it cannot be denied that Iqbal in the above quoted poetic verses has bitterly criticized democracy-comparing masses with asses and pointing out the importance of a Perfect Man. On this point, Mazharuddin contends that ‘Iqbal is not so much opposed to the democratic form of government as to the rule of a few untalented persons. Whenever a democracy comes to be governed by persons of a low calibre, who have neither intellect nor vision, it is likely to bring disaster to the people.”[lx] He also argues that if the leadership of democracy is dynamic and possesses high calibre and broad vision, it can be successful.

Mazharuddin also points out the importance of educating people in democracy. He writes: “Political democracy is a necessary means of educating the people in the exercise of their rights, ….”[lxi] It seems important to remember here that Rousseau has greatly emphasized the importance of providing civil education to the youth. He was deeply influenced by Plato on this issue who proposed state controlled system of education. Both Plato and Rousseau wanted that the state should infuse in the people from the beginning of their childhood the love for the state and loyalty to the state. They should be schooled and disciplined in such a way that they would know what is ‘good’ and what is ‘virtue’ and should be ready to give their abilities and services to the state. According to Rousseau, such an education would help people in the formation and expression of ‘good will’.

A crucial question arises here: In the contemporary times, do we find any democratic form of government, where such an education is provided to both the ruled and the rulers so that the ‘general will’ should be moulded as a ‘good will’? Contrary to it, it is generally observed that although many democratic nation-states strongly follow the state-controlled system of education, but the spirit behind this education is neither Rousseaun nor Platonic. According to a general observation, in most of the modern nation-states, education is not provided to inculcate ‘good will’ in the people, but to rationalize and justify the “bad will” of those who are in power as the “good will”! This may be called as the politicization of knowledge in the modern nation-state system. But this is a fact that in many cases those who are in power are neither philosopher-kings[lxii] who know what is “virtue” and who aim at the establishment and supremacy of “virtue” nor they represent Rousseau’s  “good will” of the good people. In fact, some rulers in contemporary democracies though talk about the ideals of democracy but sincerely follow the advices which Machiavelli[lxiii] offered to the rulers that cheating, killing, deception, fraud, force and any such evil act is justified for the acquisition, retention and expansion of power. Instead of making and promoting “good will”, they preoccupy themselves in gaining the knowledge of “bad” advised by Machiavelli, so as to use this knowledge of ‘bad’ pragmatically according to the necessity.

In such state of affairs, can democracies work for the good and the wider interest of the people, if the rulers in democracies follow Machiavellian doctrine-ends justify the means? Does not it mean that in such conditions, democracy would turn into a government of the bad people, by the bad people for the good and bad people? It implies that there is a great risk of democracy degenerating into what we prefer to call as ‘democracy,’ rule of the demons. As monarchy may degenerate into “tyranny” if a monarch becomes a tyrant, so also democracy may degenerate into “democracy” if the people who are in power turn out to be the demons.

Hence, the most important factor for a good government seems to be the supremacy of good over bad and this is possible if those who are in power are good and aim at the establishment of good. It is the reason that Iqbal remembers Machiavelli as “that Florentine worshipper of Untruth,”[lxiv] who” wrote a new code for the guidance”, for rulers. Iqbal writes about Machiavelli: [lxv]

            His mind fashioned new patterns (of mischief)

            His religion made the state into a deity

            And presented what was evil as good!

            He kissed the feet of this deity

            And tested truth on the criterion of profit!

One of the solutions to the above discussed problem of good “leadership” for a good government lies in good education. Such an education should be provided in the state that can produce good rulers so that they can make good laws representing “good will” not the “bad will”. Obviously, such an education should not be God-secluded, rather God-centred. Nothing much can be expected from state-controlled secular education that is imparted to the young generation in secular democracies. Education which is devoid of God cannot bring forth God-loving and God-fearing leaders who can strive to give God a central place in laws, politics and society. Again, it is the Islamic philosophy of education which can alone perform this task much better than any other secular philosophy of education.

According to Iqbal, education has a higher purpose to “develop the Divine even in a plebeian and thus open up before him an infinite future”.[lxvi] As explained by Saiyyidain, according to Iqbal, education helps man in “discovering God in man, of developing God-like qualities in him and building up a world worthy of his habitation.”[lxvii] Iqbal strongly believed that knowledge “gives man power which should be subordinated to religion. If it is not subordinated to religion, it is a satanic force.”[lxviii] Iqbal further emphasized that ‘if the power of knowledge is inspired by religion, it is the greatest blessing for mankind.’[lxix] It is quite clear that Iqbal’s philosophy of education is diametrically opposite to the educational philosophy that is operated in those secular democracies where knowledge is bifurcated into so called religious knowledge and modern or secular knowledge. Neither God-secluded education nor secularism which are the hallmarks of Western democracies are accepted by Iqbal. According to Iqbal, education should be inspired by religion so that God-centred education can produce God-loving leaders who can make the laws based on the Divine guidance and who can truly represent the “good will” because their will is conjoined with the “Divine will”. Saiyyidain explains this point of Iqbal’s philosophy in concrete words: “….there is room for that communion with the Self and with Nature which prepares one for spiritual communion with the Absolute or with God.”[lxx] Thus, believers whose will is conjoined with the Divine will are most suitable people for leadership unlike those who rebel against God and make themselves sovereign. It is the reason that Iqbal condemns those Western secular democracies where neither people are prepared for their right nor the rulers are prepared to be virtuous and God-conscious. Unprepared people are elected by unprepared people not on the criterion of virtue and God-consciousness but on the number of votes. Esposito could fully comprehend Iqbal’s criticism of democracy at this point. He writes: 

He (Iqbal) believed that the success of a democratic system was contingent upon the preparedness of its members. A democratic system might be than ideal given the constituents of the society. Thus, Iqbal did not accept the absolute democracy of undeveloped individuals. This is at the heart of his criticism of modern Western democracy: “Democracy is a system where people are counted but not weighed.[lxxi]

No doubt, Iqbal aspires for such a society which should be constituted by “more or less unique individuals presided over by the most unique individuals possible.”[lxxii] This most unique individual is none other than a man of belief, mard-e-mu’min whom he sketches in the following words: [lxxiii]

                                                                                                                     The hand of the mu’min is the hand of Allah

                                                                                                                     Dominant, resourceful, creative, efficient!

                                                                                                                     Born of clay, he has the nature of light

                                                                                                                     A creature with the attributes of the Creator!

From the above discussion it is quite evident that most of the concepts and ideas of Iqbal as discussed above strike the very secular origins of democracy and its values.

            Besides all these, Iqbal’s philosophy of “Khudi” ego (selfhood), and his philosophy of Divine vicegerency also go entirely against the temperament and nature of secular democracy. In secular democracy, the relation of man with God is limited and formal. Whereas, a believer in Islam who is conscious of his “Khudi” selfhood, strives to make himself as perfect as possible and as nearer to God as possible to establish the Kingdom of God on the earth. According to Iqbal, man cannot be a complete individual as long as he distances himself from God. He becomes a complete person ‘mard-i-kāmil’ when he comes nearer to God and “he absorbs God into himself.”[lxxiv] Thus ‘the true person not only absorbs the world of matter by mastering it, he absorbs God Himself into his Ego.”[lxxv]

In order to become unique and absorb God, the Ego passes through three stages- “(a) Obedience to the law, (b) self-control, which is the highest form of self-consciousness or Ego-hood (c) Divine vicegerency.”[lxxvi] Divine vicegerency is identified by Iqbal “as the third and the last stage of human development on earth.”[lxxvii] At this stage, man becomes “the vicegerent of God on earth,” “the most complete Ego,” “the goal of humanity,” the acme of life both in mind and body.’[lxxviii] He established the ‘Kingdom of God on earth’[lxxix] which implies the establishment of “democracy of more or less unique individuals, presided over by the most unique individuals possible on this earth.”[lxxx]

In fact this strong man of belief (mard i mu’min) who is conscious of his selfhood according to Saiyyidain, becomes the architect of his destiny and a co-worker with God in His Plan.”[lxxxi] This is expressed by Iqbal in these words: [lxxxii]

            Exalt thy ego so high that God Himself  will consult

            Thee before determining thy destiny.

Thus, having exalted himself, this mard i mu’min sets out for the performance of Divine vicegerency: [lxxxiii]

            “Tis sweet to be God’s vicegerent in the world

            And exercise sway over the elements.

            God’s vicegerent is as the soul of the universe;

            His being is the shadow of the Greatest Name

            He knows the mysteries of part and whole,

            He executes the command of Allah in the world.

Thus, Iqbal’s ‘man-of-belief,’ (mard i mu’min) is one who is conscious of his (Khudi) selfhood. This consciousness enlightened him about his position of a vicegerent of God and enables him to execute the laws of God in the world. This whole philosophy of Iqbal of ‘selfhood’ (khudi) goes against secular democracy which makes people ‘sovereign and independent from God and destroy their self- consciousness and secrets of self (khudi) from them.

Conclusion

History bears witness to the fact that during the period of absolute monarchies in the West, people badly required some ideology to fight against the absolute monarchs. They found in democracy a good weapon for them to fight against absolute monarchs and form their own government based on the consent of the people. They were quite successful in their attempt since absolute monarchies slowly transformed into constitutional monarchies and then into representative democracies. But the story of the Muslim world is totally different. The Muslim world during its earliest phase followed (Shūra) consultational and election method, then gradually transformed into different forms of monarchies, and empires. In all these forms, the concept of Shūra was neglected in varying degrees. Later, during this period of negative political transformations when the Muslim rulers and masses became weaker and colonisable, they were colonized by the Western imperial powers.[lxxxiv] By the time the Muslim lands attained independence from the colonial masters, the Western leaders made sure that they left behind them the ‘Babu class’ as what Arnold Toynbee called those who had no interest what so ever in Islamic mission but they have their own vested interest. Since then, most of the Muslim rulers in most of the Muslim states continue to come from the “Babu class.” Hence, presently the question which is standing before the Muslims is not the installation of democracy for the continuation of the rule of ‘Babu class’ people but the establishment of Divine vicegerency, the rule of the vicegerents of Allah SWT to establish the laws of God, supreme in the world. This needs the establishment of Caliphate or Islamic political order or Islamic state. But this does not however mean that Muslims should resort to force to install Islamic political system. All those Islamic movements and Islamic parties which are striving for the establishment of Islamic state all over the world are quite aware that “there is no compulsion in Islam.”[lxxxv] For this reason they are participating in the elections so that they come to power on the consent of the people not on the basis of “force.” However, the whole problem of the Islamists coming to power is not so simplistic. The Islamists have to fight against three anti-Islamist forces: two internal within the Muslim states and the other external. Under external comes the Western powers that are anti-Islam and are ever ready to help the dominant internal class, the ‘Babu class’ against Islamists for their own ‘vested interest’ – political hegemony. They may be referred to as ‘Hegemu class.’[lxxxvi] There is one more internal force, which comprises of those pseudo-intellectuals who are always opportunists and are ready to serve the secular political leadership in return of some positions and privileges. They may be referred to as ‘Oppu class.’[lxxxvii] They run big “think tanks” under the patronage of secular political leaderships and help the secular cause and deceive general masses. Thus there is a well-planned and well-knitted collaboration among anti-Islamist forces from local to international level and from both the sides, intellectual and political. The anti-Islamist collaborators become as undemocratic as possible in the name of democracy to block all the roads of Islamists to power with the argument that the Islamists would not form a democratic government. Is this collaboration democratic? If not, then is it not more urgent and imperative for Islamists who aim to establish peace and justice on the earth and who may be classified as ‘Justu class’[lxxxviii] to concentrate seriously on how to combat against the undemocratic strategies of the so-called democrats instead of engaging in the debates on the compatibility or incompatibility of democracy with Islam?

This short study on Iqbal’s views on democracy has clearly revealed that Iqbal’s acceptance of some democratic principles that are compatible with Islam does not mean that Iqbal has totally accepted democracy. The secular philosophy of those democratic principles are far away from Islamic concepts of Shūra and ijmā‘ and is incompatible with Islam and is therefore rejected by Iqbal. It is also pointed out in the paper briefly that democratization in the real sense of promoting “liberty” and “equality” to the people has never been the mission of the West, rather it has its own vested interest behind it. In such state of affairs, it seems pertinent for Islamists to reflect and formulate some suitable strategies to face the undemocratic strategies of anti-Islamist collaborators and set proper direction to attain their goal-revitalization of Islamic civilization. Revitalization of Islamic civilization entails the establishment of all socio-political and economic institutions based on the Divine Laws, which reflect the Divine will. When the Divine laws prevail supreme in the Islamic civilization, people would enjoy real liberty and freedom because they would follow the Divine laws willingly. This further shows that people can enjoy real liberty only through Divine vicegerency not through popular sovereignty.

Notes and References